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Windows Server 2008 Roles & Features. Presented By: Imad Awwad Systems Engineer. Outline. Identify the key new AD DS features in WS08 Explain the value of deploying these features Demonstrate these features in real life scenarios Understand when and how to deploy the key new AD DS features.
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Windows Server 2008Roles & Features Presented By: Imad Awwad Systems Engineer
Outline • Identify the key new AD DS features in WS08 • Explain the value of deploying these features • Demonstrate these features in real life scenarios • Understand when and how to deploy the key new AD DS features
Key Investments areas Branch Office Manageability Security
Key Investments areas Branch Office Manageability Security
Windows 2008 Branch Office Benefits • Security • Bit Locker • Server Core • Read-Only Domain Controller • Admin Role Separation • Optimization • Sysvol Replication • DFS Replication • Protocol • Administration • Print Management Console • PowerShell, WinRS, WinRM • Virtualization • Restartable Active Directory Hub Site Branch Office
Branch Office Dilemma HQ Data Center Hub Network Branch Office • Small Number of Employees • WAN: Congested, Unreliable • Security: Not Sure • Admin Proficiency: Generalist
Branch Office Dilemma HQ Data Center Hub Network Option 2: Put full DC in branch Either give branch admin privilege or manage remotely Branch DC being compromised jeopardizes security of corporate AD!!! Branch Office Option 1: Consolidate and remove DCs from branch Branch authentication & authorization fails when WAN goes down
So how can we deploy a Domain Controller in this environment?!
Read-Only Domain Controller 1-Way Replication Admin Role Separation No replication from RODC to Full-DC RODC Server Admin does NOT need to be a Domain Admin Prevents Branch Admin from accidentally causing harm to the AD Delegated promotion • Attack on RODC does not propagate to the AD RODC Passwords not cached by-default Policy to configure caching branch specific passwords (secrets) on RODC Policy to filter schema attributes from replicating to RODC
RODC – Attacker “experience” Damn! I have a Read-Only database. Also, no other DC in the enterprise replicates data from me. Let’s steal this RODC By default I do not have any secrets cached. I do not hold any custom app specific attributes either. Let’s tamper data on this RODC and use its identity Let’s intercept Domain Admin credentials sent to this RODC With Admin role separation, the Domain Admin doesn’t need to log-in to me. RODC Attacker RODC
RODC Mitigates “Stolen DC” Hub Admin Perspective
RODC Password Replication • Real Life Senario
Read-Only Domain ControllerHow it works? Branch HUB Logon request sent to RODC RODC • RODC: Looks in DB "I don't have the users secrets" Full DC Forwards Request to Full DC Full DC authenticates user Returns authentication response and TGT back to the RODC RODC gives TGT to User and Queues a replication request for the secrets Hub DC checks Password Replication Policy to see if Password can be replicated
Read-Only Domain ControllerRecommended Deployment Models • No accounts cached (default) • Pro: Most secure, still provides fast authentication and policy processing • Con: No offline access for anyone • Most accounts cached • Pro: Ease of password management. Manageability improvements of RODC and not security. • Con: More passwords potentially exposed to RODC • Few accounts (branch-specific accounts) cached • Pro: Enables offline access for those that need it, and maximizes security for other • Con: Fine grained administration is new task
Read-Only Domain ControllerUpgrade path from Windows 2003 Domain • Deployment steps: • ADPREP /ForestPrep • ADPREP /DomainPrep • Promote a Windows Server 2008 DC • Verify Forest Functional Mode is Windows 2003 • ADPREP /RodcPrep • Promote RODC • Test RODCs for application compatibility in your environment Not RODC specific RODC Specific task
Key Investments areas Branch Office Manageability Security
Directory Service AuditingNew Directory Service Changes Events • Event logs tell you exactly: • Who made a change • When the change was made • What object/attribute was changed • The beginning & endvalues • Auditing controlled by • Global audit policy • SACL • Schema
Fine-Grained Password PoliciesExample Resultant PSO = PSO1 Precedence = 10 Password Settings Object PSO 1 Applies To Resultant PSO = PSO1 Applies To Precedence = 20 Password Settings Object PSO 2 Applies To
Key Investments areas Branch Office Manageability Security
Restartable AD DS • Without a reboot you can now perform offline defragmentation • DS stopped similar to member server: • NTDS.dit is offline • Can log on locally with DSRM password Server Core Fewer reboots for servicing Restartable AD DS
ADUC: Prevent Object Deletion Existing Object/OU New Organizational Unit