Political Culture and Democratization

1. Political Culture and Democratization Preliminary thoughts for chapter 8 of Approaching Democracy: Research Methods in Comparative Politics Michael Coppedge

2. Relevant individual Attitudes: Diffuse vs. specific support, Confidence in institutions and Leaders, interpersonal trust, Tolerance, moderation

3. Determinants of attitudes: Age, education, income, ethnicity, religion, party, inequality, etc. Relevant individual attitudes

4. Determinants of attitudes Relevant individual attitudes Individual participation: Voting, contacting, donating Petitioning, demonstrating, Striking, violence

5. Collective identities: Nationality, ethnicity Religion, tribe, class, Party… Determinants of attitudes Relevant individual attitudes Individual participation

6. Elite orientations: Ideology, programs, Moderation, ambitions Polarization Collective identities Determinants of attitudes Relevant individual attitudes Individual participation

7. Collective identities Elite orientations Determinants of attitudes Policies Relevant individual attitudes Individual participation

8. Collective identities Elite orientations The regime: Level, change, longevity Determinants of attitudes Policies Relevant individual attitudes Individual participation

9. Collective identities Elite orientations Institutions And Processes Regime Determinants of attitudes Policies Relevant individual attitudes Individual participation

10. Forms of direct action by row actor to replace column actor

13. Complete independence Mass support for… policies leaders executive congress institutions Government performance The actual regime courts Democracy In principle military

14. Complete independence: no change

15. Connected mass attitudes

16. Mass attitudes converge

17. Connected elite positions

18. Elite orientations converge

19. Bottom-up influence

20. Elite orientations converge to mass average

21. Top-down influence

22. Mass converges to elite average

23. …or to the most influential elite actor

24. More bottom-up than top-down

25. Elites converge to mass position faster than mass converges toward elite position

26. More top-down than bottom-up

27. Mass converges to elite average faster than elites converge toward mass average

28. Government performance affects mass support

29. Mass support trends in direction of exogenous performance

30. Government performance affects elite orientations

31. Elite orientations trend in direction of exogenous performance

32. Positive performance exogenous, all else endogenous

33. Eventually, all actors trend in the direction of steady positive performance because it’s exogenous

34. Negative performance exogenous, all else endogenous

35. Eventually, all actors trend in the direction of steady negative performance because it’s exogenous

36. Variable performance exogenous, all else endogenous

37. Without a steady trend, actors that are only indirectly influenced by performance may never converge with the others

38. Recap • We should expect no strong relationship between mass attitudes toward democracy and regimes because • Other kinds of attitudes may matter more • Attitudes don’t matter unless they are translated into action, even if indirectly • Their impact on regimes is necessarily mediated • Snapshots and cross-sections can’t capture the dynamic, endogenous relationships

39. Implications for research • Test for associations between attitudes and more proximate outcomes on the pathways to regime change • Election of semiloyal leaders • Mass support for violent, direct action • Elite beliefs about mass reactions to moves that create, preserve, or undermine democracy. How constrained do they feel? • Measure mass & elite attitudes frequently • Test for convergences, controlling for exogenous factors