The Space Shuttle Case Stephenrver@alsconsultants.co.uk

1. The Space Shuttle Case Stephen.carver@alsconsultants.co.uk

2. January 28th 1986

3. Space Shuttle Challenger

4. The Challenger Crew Mike Smith Dick Scobee Ron McNair Ellison Onizuka Christa McAuliffe Greg Jarvis Judith Resnik

5. Who was the Father of the U.S. Space Programme ???

6. “Perception is nearer the truth than reality.” John F Kennedy

7. NASA’s Budget (in $ Billions) Real 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 * Adjusted for inflation using the 1967 Consumer Price Index

8. NASA’s Employment 400000 350000 NASA 300000 Contractor 250000 200000 150000 100000 50000 0 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965

9. “When you look at employment numbers and key votes, the space program has an importance out of all proportion to its budget.” John Ehrlichman Chief Advisor to Nixon

10. Marshall Cape Houston Washington

11. “For the first time ever it became apparent that cost would need the same considerations as the usual design parameters of weight and performance.” Sam Beddingford NASA Development Engineer

13. “There is no question that the Media was somewhat awed by the many successes of NASA”. “The press somehow came to believe that NASA was infallible and took the shuttle program too much for granted. John Noble Wilford, Pulitzer Prize winner Science writer of the New York Times

15. The definition of Criticality 1R is:- “Loss of mission, vehicle and crew due to metal erosion, burn through, and probable case burst resulting in fire and deflagration.”

16. Safing Payload Operations Maintenance and Checking Landing Pre-launch Vehicle Assembly Payloads installed on pad External Tank delivery SRB cycle Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) Retrieval SRB refurbishment

17. “I think we tried to push the shuttle into the operational phase so fast that quality control suffered. People were working 12 hour days, seven days a week, weeks or even months at a stretch - that has an effect – that’s when quality suffers.” Bob Huddleston NASA Quality Specialist

18. “ If the Challenger disaster had not halted flights we would have been brought to our knees anyway by the spring of ‘86.” Horace LambethNASA Director of Engineering

19. “The Flight Readiness Review process developed by Lucas was simply not doing the job. It established a political situation within NASA in which no centre could come to a review and say that it was ‘not ready’……...

20. “Puff of black smoke” As predicted. the primary O ring fails on ignition.

21. 23 Feb 1986 NASA - Managing Risk orTaking Risks?The Sunday Times NASA has released a report estimating the risk of the shuttle’s booster rocket failing at One in 60,000. But a study sponsored by the US Airforce and made available to NASA in December 1983, gave risk estimates of one in ……..?

22. “Disasters happen when decisions are made by people who cannot remember what the consequences were last time”

23. February 1st 2003

24. NASA admit that despite knowing about Colombia tile damage they didn’t bother to inspect for damage.. • “We didn’t believe that pictures would be useful to us…. there was zero that we could have done anyway so, we decided not even to take them” Ron Dittemore Colombia Programme Manager 1st Feb 2003

25. New York Times 3rd Feb 2003 It has been revealed that NASA fired 5 out of 9 members of their Shuttle Safety Panel last March after they had criticised standards. The Panel had warned that safety work “had deteriorated” and that “short term planning had delayed planned improvements”.

26. 2 Final Questions: Who decides? Would you??