400 likes | 532 Views
Kinship Systems & Demographic Outcomes: perspectives from Asia . Monica Das Gupta University of Maryland. Presented at the MOSIAC conference, Budapest, September 4-5, 2012. Outline of talk. Different types of kinship system Focus on pre-modern patrilineal kinship systems
E N D
Kinship Systems & Demographic Outcomes: perspectives from Asia Monica Das Gupta University of Maryland Presented at the MOSIAC conference, Budapest, September 4-5, 2012
Outline of talk • Different types of kinship system • Focus on pre-modern patrilineal kinship systems illustrate how variations shape demographic outcomes: • Partiblevsimpartible inheritance • Women’s position in natal home • Family systems show persistence … but are not immutable • Conclusions
Three broad types of kinship system (rules of inheritance and residence) • Matrilineal system: inherit from mother’s side, couples live with mother’s side Not many societies with this system today • Bilateral system: inherit from either side, couples live with either side or on own • Found in many pre-modern societies, including much of SE Asia Increasingly common in today’s urbanizing world, shift from patrilineal/ matrilineal systems • Patrilineal system: inherit from father’s side, couples live with father’s side • Common in pre-modern Eurasia and elsewhere • Much variation in rules
…different kinship systems can result in very different living arrangement for the elderly in neighboring islands % aged 60+ Married living with married children Son Daughter Philippines 1984(bi-lateral) Male 29 24 Female 28 34 Taiwan 1989(patrilineal) Male 55 5 Female 63 7 Source: Casterline et al. 1993 … this is just one illustration of how kinship systems shape people’s lives
Differences between patrilineal systems shape demographic outcomes • Partible or impartible inheritance?(“stem”/“joint” family) • Access to household resources: • Some “stem” systems exclude non-inheritors after property transferred • “Joint” systems allow all (sons) access to household resources • In both systems, some siblings may marry later or never, less likely to reproduce • Age at which hand over property – affects power of the aged • Can adult women maintain ties to natal household? • Acceptable to remain in natal home? • How complete a break with natal home when marry? Lot of variation on the ground in the operation of these systems
… ramifications of differences (contd) Norms of inheritance and residence shape: • Rights (and relative value) of different categories of family members • Norms of cooperation between family members (siblings, generations, spouses) • Management of household resources & labor Demographic implications: • Marriage, childbearing, population regulation • Health outcomes • Differentials between siblings • Intergenerational support • Women’s and children’s health
Age at which hand over property affects power of youth vs aged
Hajnal and others were only partly right • Joint family systems do make it possible to marry without financial independence • But joint family systems also controlled sons’ marriage to limit division of property • Evident from data from NW India, China ….while allowing unmarried sons to live and work in the household
Restricting son’s marriage to avert land division Genealogy of a Jatsublineage, Ludhiana district, Punjab India 250 80 80 80 40 40 moved to Patna 80 80 8 8 8 8 8 20 40 26 26 20 40 26 1 each 10 12 each 20 20 20 10 20 20 4 4 40 40 ? unmarried son age 40+ married son unmarried son age 35-39 adopted son-in-law Numbers indicate landholding units. 5 units = 1 acre Source: Das Gupta (1995a), based on archival records and field interviews
Restricting sons’ marriage to reduce land subdivision% of men aged 40+ never-married, Punjab India, 1911-1984 Punjab State Khanna villages (Caste) 1911 1921 1969 1984 Jat (landowners) 12.05 13.10 22.77 17.61 Chamar (landless labourers) 4.41 4.88 5.43 4.08 Source: Das Gupta 1995a Sources: For Punjab, Census of India 1911, 1921 (caste not available in recent censuses) For the Khanna study villages, Wyon and Gordon (1971) for the 1969 data, and my re-study for the 1984 data. All data only for Sikhs, as the population of the Khanna Study villages is predominantly Sikh.
In North China, Lee and Campbell (1997) find regulation of marriage & childbearing • Relationship to head of household affects chances of marrying young or ever-marrying: • Head’s brothers may marry later or never • Head’s son’s chances higher than brother’s son or cousin’s son • Greater restriction on marital fertility of less privileged members • Household heads and their sons had higher marital fertility AND higher proportion of sons/daughters (line of succession)
3. rigid patriliny marginalizes women: Demographic consequences
Several factors at work • Less strenuous efforts made to seek health care for females than for males • Young mothers doubly disempowered by being female and being young – poorer maternal & child health • Constraints on meeting own nutritional needs while pregnant / lactating • Constraints on accessing health care since low autonomy, sometimes also mobility restrictions
Gender differences in probability of consulting a doctor if ill, rural Pakistan 2001 Probability of consulting doctor if ill (percent) 20 Male 15 10 Female 5 0 10 12 14 16 0 2 4 6 8 Age (years) Source:World Bank 2005, from Pakistan Rural Household Survey 2001. The probability of consulting a doctor is predicted from a regression of probability of being ill on child and household characteristics.
Less spent on health care for femalesHousehold annual medical expenditure by age & sex, rural Pakistan 2001 Rupees 10000 Males Females 8000 6000 4000 2000 0 Age: 0-6 Age: 7-13 Age: 14-17 Age: 25-49 Source:World Bank 2005. Cross-tabulations based on Pakistan Rural Household Survey 2001 data. The figures refer to medical expenditures reported for each household member who had been ill during the year and for whom any medical practitioner was consulted. Note: The gender differences in expenditures are statistically significant.
Women’s caloric needs not met during pregnancy and lactation Khanna villages Punjab India, 1984, women aged 16-44 (% of caloric requirements met) Source: Das Gupta 1995b
… while men’s caloric intakes rise with needKhanna Study villages, Punjab India, 1984 Source: Das Gupta 1995b
Mother’s position affects child’s healthInfant mortality rates by place of delivery Khanna Study villages, Punjab India, 1984-88 Mortality rates by age (per 1000 livebirths) Source: Das Gupta 1995b
Mobility constraints to women accessing health services: Doorstep delivery of RCH services helpsImpact of presence of “Lady Health Worker”, rural Pakistan 2001 Percent 50 No LHW in community LHW in community 40 30 20 10 0 Using contraceptives Tetanus toxoid injections Source: World Bank 2005 Notes: PIHS 2001-02 data for rural married women aged 15-49 who had given birth in the thee years before the survey. The figures refer to statistically significant predicted probabilities from Tables A4.3-A4.5.
Reducing fertility helps improve women’s health:Women’s Mortality fell faster than Men’s, India, 1970-1990 Source:Das Gupta et al 2011, derived from Government of India, Sample Registration Bulletin 16(1), June 1982, and SRS Based Abridged Life Tables 1988-92, New Delhi: Registrar-General of India.
3b Rigid patriliny encourages sex-selection
Patrilineal family systems differ in exclusion of adult daughters from helping parents • Most offer some scope for helping parents: • Can inherit land and stay home (esp. if no brothers), or remain single with old parents • Can maintain contact after marriage • Generates milder son preference • A few rigidly exclude scope for helping parents: (the traditional system in Han China, S Korea, NW India) • Organized into clans and lineages • Woman’s productivity belongs to husband’s lineage • Little scope for adult daughter to help parents • Generates strong son preference (Low/no son preference in matrilineal or bilateral systems)
Potential for adult daughters to help parents in pre-modern patrilineal societies as evidenced by ethnographic studies Low High China (Han) NW India South Korea Europe Japan West India North India South India Many Islamic societies Son preference varies correspondingly as evidenced by child sex ratios in demographic data High Low • Striking correspondence between kinship systems and “missing girls” • Reflected in ethnic variation within countries Source: Das Gupta (2010)
East and South Asia:areas with more rigid patrilineal systems have more masculine child sex ratios Source: Das Gupta (2010)
Before sex-selection technology: Later-born girls’ higher mortality Khanna villages Punjab India 1965-84 CMR (0-4 yr.) 140 120 100 80 Boy 1 Boy 1 Boy 2+ Boy 2+ Girl 1 Girl 1 Girl 2+ Girl 2+ Source: Das Gupta 1987
Shift to sex-selection technology from 1980s: Sex ratio at birth rises sharply after one girl born Sex ratio at birth by family composition, China 1990 160 150 140 130 120 Sex ratio at birth 110 100 90 80 0 boys 1+ boys 0 girls 1+ girls Composition of family at time of birth Source: Computed from Zeng et al. 1992
Sex-selection technology made it easier for parents Sex ratios at birth by birth order, S.Korea1982 & 1989 220 S.Korea1989 200 180 160 Sex ratio at birth 140 120 S.Korea 1982 100 1 2 3 4 Birth order Source: Park and Cho 1994
But rigid patrilineal systems offer social protection Mari Bhat and Rajan (1992) find in India’s 1981 Census: • The excess mortality of children without a father is: • 4% in Punjab, which has rigid patriliny • 22% average for India (heterogeneous in kinship systems) • Households look after their own: • upside of rigid rules of household membership
Rigid patriliny induced from above in S Korea, much of China • State controlled people through lineage organization • Lineages responsible for members’ actions, threat of collective punishment • State incentivized people to form patrilineages, drop bilateral & matrilineal systems • Path for ethnic minorities to enter the mainstream Han fold, and access its benefits • Supernatural beliefs used to reinforce loyalty: • Ancestors’ wrath if don’t follow rituals, have sons to ensure continuing care of ancestors • Process of social engineering from c. 15th century (Ming, Choson dynasties) • China ethnographies show (ongoing) spread of Han culture to the peripheries of the empire • State-induced change from bilateral system in S Korea, consciously following Chinese neo-Confucian model (archival research by Deuchler 1992) Source: Das Gupta (2010)
Pre-modern systems change as shift to urban industrial life Industrialization, Education: • Provide access to livelihood independent of the lineage • Exposure to new ideas Urbanization: • People live and work in impersonal settings (apartments, offices) not surrounded by lineage kin’s pressures • Rules of residence relax: daughters OR sons may live near parents alters relative value of girls and boys to parents Process of changing norms can be accelerated by media efforts Source: Chung and Das Gupta 2007
Sex-selection falling in many settings in East & South Asia Trends in child sex ratios (0-4 years) China, S Korea, India, NW India Source: Das Gupta, Chung and Li (2009), updated with 2010-2011 censuses
Sex ratio at birth normalized in S.Korea • Ethnographies show women maintain ties with parents • Perhaps rigid patriliny relegated to past, with transformation from peasant to urban society
Conclusions • Differences between kinship systems have many ramifications • Some illustrated here with empirical data from Asia • Partible and impartible inheritance systems differ sharply • but marriage regulation in both • Rigid patriliny marginalizes women: • affects women’s and children’s health • encourages sex-selection • ..but some social protection for all household members • Kinship systems show persistence … but are far from immutable