Origins of the Cold War: Division of Germany and Korea

1. Origins of the Cold War: Division of Germany and Korea

2. Potsdam conference, 1945 the Cecilienhof Palace

3. Potsdam conference, 1945: to divide Germany, and to divide the Far East • Stalin and Truman crossed Berlin by car. Truman assessed Stalin as following: “I can cooperate with him” However, cooperation is failed due to: • New position of Truman and Byrnes to Germany for • Idea of British Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Eden to create the “Western European block” (later, Atlantic partnership and later, NATO) in order to stop communists and draw lines of influence in Europe, 1945 >> Germany must be reconstructed and included (it was an idea), but • Germany was said to be a better partner than Russians

4. Potsdam conference, 1945: to divide Germany, and Japan War 3) Byrnes cut Stalin’s proposals for German reparations 4) Truman’s story of the atom bomb: US tested it and tried to shock Stalin 5) The only shared problem: The war against Japan became a question, but Stalin was involved to return Kuril islands lost in 1905

5. Kuril Islands • Stalin went to Far East to take over Kuril islands for possible future threat from Japan

6. A Division of a Far East, summer 1945 • Byrnes came to Moscow to ask Stalin to continue a war with Japan: • He acted like Roosevelt: to find a compromise with Molotov • Both divided Korea for North K. and South K. • He changed the American influence in Japan for the Russian one in Romania and Bulgaria (U. S. would recognize them, Soviet Russian – a regime of MacArthur in Japan) • USA and USSR against Japan: Soviet moved to Manchuria, U. S. dropped bombs on two Japanese towns and in August Japan was surrendered.

7. Far East: Japan, Kurils, Korea, China • Japan was occupied by U.S. in August 1945 • Stalin got 4 Kuril islands from Japan • Korea was divided into two zones until free elections (Kim Il Sung -Ким Ир Сен and Syngman Rhee-Ли Сын Ман) • China continues the Civil War between Mao Tse-tung and Chiang Kai-shek • Conclusion: the discourse of division is confirmed and Nobody took into consideration an local opinion

8. Korean War, 1950-1953: the course of events • 1947-Truman proposed to Stalin: “Let’s arrange the elections” (There were more population in the south); and Stalin – let’s withdraw the troops (there were more arms in the North) • Since 1949 the clashes between zones were started, and it was clear that the zones would seek the unification on their terms.

9. Documents evidence about Stalin’s position as to the unification of Korea • The meeting with Kim in Moscow, March 1949: Kim was asking for military aid, but Stalin avoided the answer. • February 1950 – Stalin met Mao Zedung in Moscow and they established the alliance; however, Stalin did not trust Mao. • and in 1950 Stalin wrote to the Soviet ambassador: “...I understand the dissatisfaction of...Kim..., but he must understand that such a large matter in regard to South Korea....must be organized so that there would not be too great risk.... Literature: Did Russia participated? until 1990s – yes, today – no, but Stalin’ encouragement was a contribution to this war + equipment

10. The significance of the Korean War • What was happened in June 1950 was the first hot war of the Cold War; • It was signalized that the East-West tension is deep and permanent; • It has demonstrated to the Soviet Union that the USA was ready to fight against the Soviet expansion in all, even insignificant (strategically) parts of the world; • The both sides were ready to be involved in a war against each other;

12. What is “German question” in the reality of 1950s • During the 2 WW and during the initial cold war context: • How to divide and create new a weak, agrarian, demilitarized Germany>> The Big Three – created the discourse about 1) “Zones”, 2) reparations 3) democratization of “Zones” + 4) high authority and free hands of zonal military administration.

13. What is “German question”? 2. In historiography: It is process of finding the answers on the following questions: • Why the allies could not unify Germany or why they did not want to do it? • Who was responsible for the long division of nation? >>

14. German question: the turning points, 1943-61 I) 1943-45: • The idea to divide and to weaken (Tehran conference) was suitable for both Soviets ad Americans: • Stalin – to prevent a new aggression • Roosevelt – to give Germans a lesson • Dissent voices: • Moscow: European Advising Commission, London: a Soviet draft of unification after short period of democratization by the Allied Control Council, 1944 • Washington: Department of States: to integrate Germany in West world • Potsdam conference, August 1945: • Soviet demands for huge reparations will be later against Marshal plan; • Too much authority was attributed to the Zonal military administrations; • Indefinite words about future unification.

15. German question: the turning points, 1943-61 II) 1945-1946: the chances for unification have been lost: • Zones with independent administrations, where own, uncoordinated reforms were imposed • Development and reinforcing the political parties >> communists\social-democrats • Absent of a native German government like it was in Japan; • Soviet high demands reparations from American Zone; • James Burns’ speech about development of the democracy in One Zone. • Now in literature: Stalin was ready to change the implantation of the Western style of the democracy in East Part for getting huge reparations from the West Zones + • Stalin was against to build a socialism in the Zone until 1952

16. German question: the turning points, 1943-61 III) 1947-1949: • Marshal Plan and European economic integration became against Soviet reparations received from the West Zone >> to keep own Zones • Bizone- unification of British and American zones and independent currency reform, 1947-1948 and Trizone >> West German federal state • European military alliance with the U.S. became against demilitarizating and weakening Germany >> to keep own Zone • As s result, the currency reform in Western parts of Germany, + and Berlin blockade, 1948-1949 >> • The edge of American-Soviet war in Germany. • “A disintegrated atom created a divided Germany” • Formal establishment of FRG and GDR, 1949

17. German question: the turning points, 1943-61 IV) 1950-52 • Domestic affairs in two parts: positive economic development against economical crisis; Strong democratic parties against unpopular communist parties >> • Stalin’ diplomatic note, March 12, 1952 : • This is letter + a draft of German Peace Treaty; • Neutrality and unification with withdrawal of all military forces.>> • Answer of the West: April 2, 1952 • Referendum for neutrality and unification • Independent elections • USA were not ready to unify Germany, because W. Germany had became a part of north-Atlantic defense system;

18. Two citations from documents • Note as a Soviet draft for German Peace Treaty: “….Germany is re-established as a unified state, all armed forces must be withdrawn…” • Department of States memorandum about potential German Unification: “the U. S. is likely to unify Germany as a part of European Defense Community, and we should avoid the talks with the Soviet Union…”

19. German question: the turning points, 1943-61 IV) 1950-52 • A meeting with the German communists, April 1952 • Stalin pushed them to build a socialist state Problem in historiography: generous step or propaganda? • No answer. • Two opinions: • Stalin was afraid of West Germany as a member of a new West military alliance >> any Germany, but neutral Germany was suitable for him • A pure bluff

20. 1946 – the year of “Cold War in writing” – the establishment of Cold War discourse • The Joint Chiefs of Staff (US) predicted the tension between members of the Grand Alliance, January 1946 in order to get funds from US Congress. • Kennan telegram, February 1946: aggressive Soviet policy • Speech of W. Churchill in Fulton ( atWestminster College), March 1946: Iron Curtain exists • Clark Clifford report, Sep, 1946: deterrence of Russians • Novikov’ Telegram, Sep, 1946: deterrence of Americans

21. Kennan Telegram • The USSR perceives itself at perpetual war with capitalism; • The USSR views systems of socialism and social democracy as incompatible; • The USSR would use controllable Marxists in the capitalist world as allies; • Soviet aggression was fundamentally not aligned with the views of the Russian people or with economic reality, but in historic Russian xenophobia and paranoia;

22. Nikolai Novikov, Soviet Ambassador to the UN and US • American monopolistic capital is characterized a striving for world supremacy • USSR's international position is currently stronger than it was in the prewar period • The "hard-line" policy with regard to the USSR announced by Byrnes • the prospect of war against the Soviet Union

23. 1950: containment policy (final step) • January 1950 – Truman asked to revise the military budget and reexamine the national strategy of the US • Nitze and Acheson drafted several ideas how to find convincing foundations for increasing the budget as the NSC policy papers >> • NSC 68/3 – there is a threat from USSR >> we need a high military budget for containment of the USSR

24. Final assessment of the Cold War Origins • 3 major interpretations regarding the origins of the Cold War: 1) the orthodox interpretation - a responsibility for the breakdown of the wartime Grand Alliance to the Soviet Union: • Stalin expanded communism in Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East, and • The U.S. had no choice but to check Soviet expansionism. • So, ideological clash Soviet historians - the United States exaggerated any threat the Soviet Union may have posed to the United States at the end of World War

25. 1 famous alternative view in orthodox: Hans Morgenthau and Arthur Schlesinger Jr. • traditional goals of Russian expansionism, rather than communist ideology, was premises for the Cold War; • Americans failed to appreciate the nature of Stalin's ambitions, • and the Soviets could not understand the cause of American sensitivity. >> • the Cold Wary was the product of mutual misunderstanding. • Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., and Hans J. Morgenthau, The Origins of the Cold War (1970)

26. Final assessment of the Cold War Origins 2) Revisionist (Gabriel Kolko): • Economic factor - the Truman administration supported for a interventionist strategy designed to make the world safe for American capitalism: • global open door policy of equal trade, • investment opportunity, • private enterprise, • multilateral cooperation in foreign commerce • freedom of the seas

27. Final assessment of the Cold War Origins: revisionists • The Soviet Union: did not want to subordinate its economic system • Losing control in countries with strong communist parties resulted in American support of conservative establishments. Gabriel Kolko and Joyce Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954 (1972)

28. Final assessment of the Cold War Origins • 3) post-revisionism (John Gaddis): • both internal and external influences important in explaining the breakdown of the Grand Alliance: • domestic politics, • bureaucracy, • personality, • specific perceptions of Soviet intentions

29. Final conclusion of N. Tsvetkova • ideological differences are insufficient to explain the Cold War after World War II • Soviet and American interests now collided as both nations attempted to fill the power vacuum created by the collapse of Germany and Japan: Europe, Asia • Misunderstanding: Russian political expansionism cannot understand American global economic policy

30. Homework Analysis of documents: reading and questions File “ Documents_2”