Can Social Science Tell Us Whether A Society Is Meritocratic? A Weberian Critique

1. Martyn Hammersley The Open University UK University of Ghent, October 2013 Can Social Science Tell Us Whether A Society Is Meritocratic? A Weberian Critique

2. Focus of the paper A great deal of research on social mobility, and on educational and social inequalities more generally, has claimed to document respects in which particular societies are not meritocratic. I want to raise some questions about whether sociology, or social science more generally, can answer the question of whether or not a society is meritocratic or is inequitable. I also want to highlight some important limits on the knowledge that sociology can produce about inequalities.

3. Why Max Weber? • I believe that his methodological position is largely correct. • Much work on social mobility has drawn on his substantive work, but it has not taken proper account of his methodological views. • Indeed, despite his status as a founding figure, much the same is true of the rest of sociology. • So, my general argument here applies to many other sociological fields, not just the study of social mobility or of educational and social inequalities.

4. Weber’s position Value neutrality. Social science can only validate factual claims, not value conclusions. It must therefore be carried out in a way that is, as far as possible, neutral towards practical (i.e. non-epistemic) values: those concerned with what is good or bad, how society ought to be, etc. Value relevance. Unlike natural science, social research focuses upon individual phenomena, rather than aiming at universal laws, and these phenomena must be selected for investigation on the basis of practical values, and studied within a particular value-relevance framework.

5. Epistemic and non-epistemic values Social scientists are, by the very nature of their task, committed to epistemic values: to the goal of producing knowledge, and therefore to the value of truth. However, the practical, that is non-epistemic, values to which they are committed should not constitute their operational goal, nor must these values distort pursuit of that goal. The only legitimate role they can play is in furnishing a value-relevance framework (and in operating as ethical constraints on how the research is carried out).

6. An outline of my argument • If we adopt this Weberian position, it is not possible for sociology to answer the question of whether or not a society is meritocratic, or to identify inequities, since this relies upon practical value judgments. • What it can do is to study society within a particular, and explicit, set of assumptions about what would be meritocratic or equitable, one that is inevitably open to challenge. • This places important limitations on the nature of the conclusions that can be presented on the basis of the research.

7. The meritocratic model Most research on this topic adopts a particular meritocratic model, with the following features: It is generally concerned with whether the chances of attaining high-level occupational positions are affected by social class origin or the income level of parents. It documents deviation from this ideal, and explains this in terms of discrimination (within the education system, in occupational recruitment, etc) and/or depression of the aspirations of working class people caused by material or cultural factors.

8. Limits operating within this model • What is treated as in need of explanation is discrimination and low aspirations, as defined by the meritocratic model. Absence of discrimination and high aspirations are treated as normal and not in need of explanation. • These types of deviation from the meritocratic model are explained as the product either of vested interests (in the case of discrimination, usually) or factors acting behind the backs of actors (in the case of depressed aspirations).

9. Oversimplification? • Why should everyone aspire to be an investment banker, top civil servant, government minister, etc? Is the reason why people do not have these aspirations because they have been caused not to (Murphy 1981)? • What exactly counts as discrimination? How to decide what is relevant or should be rewarded? The peculiar case of educational discrimination: the award of privileges on the basis of ‘an individual’s intellectual achievements, formal credentials, […] or native academic ability’ (Tannock 2008).

10. The meritocratic model as ideal type • What we have here is a model that is an ideal type in Weber’s terms, one that not only simplifies reality but also views it from the point of view of a particular value-relevance framework. • In this respect it has the same character as that much-maligned species homo economicus. • But the response to the limitations of such models should not be to demand a model that captures the full complexity of social life, but rather to recognise their limitations, as well as what they enable us to understand.

11. My argument in summary • It is not that this body of research is defective in its substantial findings; though there are of course many questions that can be asked about the validity of particular findings. • My points are more limited, but also more fundamental, ones – that this research: • typically exceeds what is legitimate by drawing evaluative and prescriptive conclusions; and • fails to be explicit about the assumptions on which it relies, about the limits these impose, and about the fact that different assumptions would often produce quite different findings.

12. Conclusion • Research on meritocracy, and on social class differentials in social mobility and educational achievement more generally, tells us a good deal less than is usually claimed or assumed. • It cannot tell us whether there are inequities, except relative to a particular value-relevance framework. • And it cannot provide explanations that are independent of all value-relevance frameworks. • If we claim otherwise we turn sociology into ideology.

13. Bibliography Allen, A. (2011) ‘Michael Young’s The Rise of the Meritocracy: a philosophical critique’, available at: http://www.shef.ac.uk/polopoly_fs/1.155163!/file/philosophicalcritique.pdf Bruun, H. H. (2007), Science, Values and Politics in Max Weber’s Methodology (Second edition), Aldershot, Ashgate. Bruun, H. and Whimster, S. (eds) (2012) Max Weber: Collected methodological writings, London, Routledge. Hammersley, M. (1995) The Politics of Social Research, London, Sage. Hammersley, M. (2000) Taking Sides in Research, London, Routledge. Hammersley, M. (forthcoming 2014) The Limits of Social Science, London, Sage Murphy, J. (1981) 'Class inequality in education: two justifications, one evaluation but no hard evidence', British Journal of Sociology, 32, 2, pp182-201 Swift, A. (2004) ‘Would perfect mobility be perfect?’, European Sociological Review, 20, 1, pp1-11. Tannock, S. (2008) ‘The problem of education‐ based discrimination’, British Journal of Sociology of Education, 29, 5, pp439-449 Themelis, S. (2008) ‘Meritocracy through education and social mobility in post‐ war Britain: a critical examination’, British Journal of Sociology of Education, 29, 5, pp427-438.