National Training Course on Radiation Detection Techniques For front line officers

1. National Training Course onRadiation Detection TechniquesFor front line officers Legal Frameworkfor Nuclear Security

2. Definition of Nuclear Security The prevention and detection of, and response to, theft, sabotage, unauthorized access, illegal transfer or other malicious acts involving nuclear material, other radioactive substances or their associated facilities. Prevention Response Detection

3. Legal Framework for Nuclear Security • Responsibility for nuclear security rests entirely with each State • No single international instrument addresses nuclear security in a comprehensive manner

4. Legal Framework for Nuclear Security • Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the 2005 Amendment thereto • Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident • Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency • Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Model Additional Protocol • International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism • Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) • Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) • Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and the Supplementary Guidance on Import and Export

5. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material • In force since 8 February 1987 • 139 Parties (as of February 2009) • The CPPNM is one of the thirteen international counter-terrorism instruments and is the only internationally legally binding undertaking in the area of physical protection of nuclear material. • The CPPNM has a threefold scope of application: • Physical protection of nuclear material during international transport; • Criminalisation of offences; and • International cooperation and information exchange.

6. Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (cont’d) • Under the provisions that apply only to nuclear material used for peaceful purposes while in international nuclear transport, States Parties are required: • to ensure that, during international transport, nuclear material is protected • not to export or import, or authorize the export or import of, nuclear material unless assurances have been received (Article 4) • The remaining provisions of the CPPNM, which also apply to domestic use, storage and transport (Article 2.2), relate to: • Cooperation and assistance • Criminalization • Prosecution or extradition

7. 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM • The Amendment to the CPPNM was adopted in July 2005. • It will enter into force once it has been adhered to by two-thirds of the States Parties to the CPPNM; thus far only 23 States parties have done so. • The Amendment extends the scope of the CPPNM to nuclear facilities and material in peaceful domestic use, storage and transport. • It also provides for expanded cooperation between and among States regarding measures: • to locate and recover stolen or smuggled nuclear material; • to mitigate any radiological consequences of sabotage; and • to prevent and combat related offences • The Amendment is based in large part on INFCIRC/225/Rev.4; one salient difference being that the latter also applies to military facilities and material.

8. Early Notification and Assistance Conventions • The Notification Convention (Oct.1986) applies in the event of any accident involving specified facilities or activities of a State Party from which a release of radioactive material occurs or is likely to occur and which has resulted or may result in an international transboundary release that could be of radiological safety significance to another State. • Pursuant to the Assistance Convention (Feb.1987), States Parties are to cooperate between themselves and with the IAEA to facilitate prompt assistance in the event of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency to minimize its consequences and to protect life, property and the environment from the effects of radioactive releases. • Both contribute to the enhancement of the response to an act of “terrorism”by providing a mechanism for rapid information exchange to minimize transboundary radiological consequences.

9. Safeguards Agreements and Model Additional Protocol • Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSA) are concluded between the Agency and NNWS Parties to the NPT as required by Article III.1 of the NPT. • A number of enhancements to the CSA were established in the Model Additional Protocol (AP), approved by the IAEA Board in 1997. • The conclusion of an AP, in combination with a CSA, represents an important improvement in safeguards that can contribute significantly to nuclear security.

10. International Convention for the Suppressionof Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (2005) • Details offences relating to unlawful and intentional possession and use of radioactive material (which includes nuclear material) or a nuclear explosive device or radioactive material dispersal or radiation-emitting device, and use or damage of nuclear facilities • States Parties are required to adopt measures as necessary to criminalize these offences • States Parties are “to make every effort to adopt appropriate measures to ensure the protection of radioactive material, taking into account relevant recommendations and functions of the International Atomic Energy Agency” (Article 8)

11. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) • Adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and is, as such, legally binding. • Enhances international cooperation for the prevention and suppression of terrorist financing as well as prevention and criminalization of terrorist acts. • Obliges all States to criminalize assistance for terrorist activities, deny financial support and safe haven to terrorists and exchange information for the prevention and prosecution of criminal acts. • The Security Council “notes with concern the close connection between international terrorism … and illegal movement of nuclear… and other potentially deadly materials, and in this regard emphasizes the need to enhance coordination of efforts on national, sub-regional, regional and international levels in order to strengthen a global response to this serious challenge and threat to international security”.

12. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) • Also adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and as such legally binding • Refers specifically to the CPPNM and to the IAEA Code of Conduct • Sets out State obligations with respect to WMD and non-State actors • Measures mirror the structure and activities of the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Plan of Activities including necessary legal and regulatory infrastructure (OP2 and OP7), physical protections measures (OP3), illicit trafficking (OP10), non-proliferation (OP8), accounting and control systems (OP3) and export and import controls (OP3). • Establishes the 1540 Committee and State reporting obligations • Explicitly states, inter alia, that none of its obligations shall be interpreted so as to conflict with or alter the rights and obligations of States Parties to the NPT or alter the responsibilities of the Agency

13. Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and Supplementary Guidance • Nearly 100 States have made a political commitment with regard to the Code • “Orphan sources” can pose significant dangers to human health and safety. In the wrong hands they can also pose major security risks, enabling terrorist or criminal elements to develop radiation dispersal devices or “dirty bombs” • Through the development, harmonization and implementation of national policies, laws and regulations and through fostering international cooperation, the Code seeks to: • achieve a high level of safety and security; • prevent unauthorized access or damage to, and loss, theft or unauthorized transfer of, radioactive sources, so as to reduce the likelihood of, inter alia, the malicious use of such sources to cause harm to individuals, society or the environment; and • mitigate/minimize the radiological consequences of an accident or malicious act involving such a source. • In March 2005, supplementary guidance on implementing the import/export control provisions of the Code was issued.

14. IAEA Legal and Legislative Support Objectives • Raise awareness of the binding and non-binding instruments • Assist States to comply with their international obligations • Enable States to establish national legislative frameworks The “3S” Concept: Safety, Security and Safeguards Multi-means approach including • International and regional workshops • Training and fellowships • Assistance in reviewing and drafting legislation • Development of reference material

15. IAEA Legal and Legislative Support The 7 fundamental elements of implementing legislation at the national level are: • Regulatory Authority • Licensing • Inspection • Enforcement • Criminalization • International Cooperation • Import/Export Controls

16. IAEA Technical Support for Nuclear Security Advisory Missions Relevant to Nuclear Security Under the Nuclear Security Plan for 2006-2009: • ITE: International Teams of Experts • INSServ: International Nuclear Security Advisory Service • IPPAS: International Physical Protection Advisory Service Other missions: • IRRS: Integrated Regulatory Review Service • ISSAS: IAEA State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material Advisory Service

17. Conclusion • The legal framework for nuclear security is a broad, comprehensive and coherent body of law with concrete rights and obligations. • Responsibility for nuclear security rests entirely with each State. • States are encouraged to enhance their status vis-à-vis the international legal framework for nuclear security and to implement their international obligations at the national level. • The Agency provides advice and assistance upon request.