The Changing Climate of High Seas Fisheries Governance

1. The Changing Climate of High Seas Fisheries Governance Alison Rieser University of Hawai’i at Manoa The Challenge of Change: Managing for Sustainability of Top Oceanic Predators Workshop April 12, 2007

2. 1992 • Failure of Coastal State EEZ management came to light with the collapse of the No. cod stock and Canada’s & NAFO moratoria • Coincided with the assertion of larger community interests in global commons and proliferation of hard & soft int’l law • Framework Convention on Climate Change • Convention on Biological Diversity • Rio Declaration, Agenda 21

3. UN Fish Stocks Agreement –restoring the role of RFMOs • Strengthening the RFMOs is key • Fishing States have a duty to join or create an RFMO if none exists • States with a real interest have a right to membership • Non-member States must adopt measures consistent with those of the RFMO • Compatibility with coastal State management of straddling & migratory stocks

4. Questions about the reliance upon RFMOs in the new law of the sea • Would high seas fishing states cooperate more than they did prior to the advent of EEZs? • Have conditions changed sufficiently to motivate them to cooperate, to make them more likely to observe the new obligations reflected in the UN Fish Stocks Agreement?

5. Changes in climate:greater attention to fisheries from new quarters • Scientists from a wider array of disciplines are now looking at a broad range of issues connected with fisheries, including meta- and retrospective analyses • NGOs have moved beyond whaling to all marine fisheries, especially high seas

6. Changes in climate:scientific consensus on the need for an ecosystem approach • Attention to foodweb dynamics, habitat • agree on ways to operationalize it, e.g.: • FAO Technical Guidelines on EAF • Pikitch et al. 2004. “Ecosystem-Based Fishery Management” Science, 305:346-347.

7. Changes in climate: strategies to apply external pressure on RFMOs through other multilateral agreements • Conservation NGOs bringing attention to fisheries impacts at meetings of Parties to: • CITES (int’l trade in endangered species) • Convention on Migratory Species • Convention on Biological Diversity • World Summit on Sustainable Devt

8. CITES • Proposals to list by-catch species as threatened by international trade • Effort to list Atl bluefin tuna on App. I • proposals for Southern bluefin • Appendix II listing of great white shark, basking shark, whale shark • Proposals at June ’07 meeting to list porbeagle and spiny dogfish on App. II

9. Convention on Migratory Species of Animals (Bonn) • commitments among states to protect habitat and prevent activities that threaten listed species • Species-specific Memoranda of Understanding • e.g., Agreement on Conservation of Albatrosses and Petrels (ACAP) • ACAP representatives attend mtgs of all RFMOs that overlap albatross range as intergovt’l organizations

10. Results of this attention? • WCPFC in 2006 is the first RFMO to adopt measure requiring at least 2 methods to mitigate seabird bycatch • CMS Parties prepare for meeting on options for cooperation on migratory sharks (toward possible agreement) • Australia mentions CMS activities as “good motivation” for WCPFC to adopt shark measures; Commission adopts fin-to-body weight ratio/full utilization/IPOA

11. Changes in climate: International Scrutiny of RFMOs • Consensus that RFMO performance has been poor • Overfishing of target fish stocks, delays in adopting rebuilding plans • Few measures to mitigate adverse effects of fishing on non-target species and habitat • No effective scheme of allocation • Slow to deal with illegal, unreported, unregulated fishing • International attention is now on the reasons for poor performance • Review Conference for the UN Fish Stocks Agreement • FAO Committee on Fisheries March 2007 • Independent bodies, e.g., High Level Ministerial Task Force/Chatham House

12. Different strategies for providing international oversight • Publicizing failures (shame-on-you strategy) • RFMO = “Regularly Failing to Manage Our Oceans” • Identifying “best practices” among RFMOs (good-on-you strategy) • Defining a “model” RFMO (inspiration strategy) • Making specific proposals for items on RFMO agenda (here’s-how-you-do-it strategy) • e.g., Greenpeace detailed proposal to WCPFC for bigeye TACs and allocations by gear type, marine reserves in ‘donut holes’ between FFA States’ EEZs • TRAFFIC’s analysis of conservation impacts of allocation for WCPFC; trade measures

13. Impact of outside scrutiny: identifies costs of the unresolved allocation issue • pressure to set TACs high enough to maintain fishing levels by historical fishing nations undermining scientific advice • new members insist on shares of TAC or TAE • reluctance to approve the admission of new members • non-compliance with quotas

14. Contributions of outside scrutiny – how to make progress on allocations • RFMOs should view this as priority issue • specify criteria • for allocating TAC/TAE; linking it to compliance • for new members in terms of rebuilding target stocks • for distributing any decreases across parties • penalties for exceeding quotas & other CMMs • Monitor the impact of allocation on the distribution of fishing effort to unallocated species, areas where bycatch of juveniles or protected species is likely or where localized depletion • Get outside help early in the process: provide an arbitrated negotiation process & advisory panel of external experts Source: Willock and Lack, 2006. Conservation implications of allocation under the WCPFC.

15. Internal reforms by RFMOs • Cooperate and coordinate among RFMOs (circle the wagons strategy?) • FAO COFI review of RFMOs Mar 2007 • Jan 2007 Kobe, Japan meeting of all tuna RFMOs

16. Joint Tuna RFMOs Course of ActionKobe, Japan Jan. 26, 2007

17. Kobe: RFMO Performance Review • Goal - to improve effectiveness and efficiency in fulfilling mandates • Using a common methodology and criteria • review framework: • common elements of the RFMOs’ charters • best practices • applicable int’l instruments • Teams selected to ensure objectivity and credibility; publicize on RFMO’s website • First review asap; then every 3-5 years

18. What role for inter-RFMO cooperation? • If RFMOs meet, will there be ‘policy transfer’? • e.g., if new RFMOs (SEAFO & WCPFC) deal with allocation, will older RFMOs follow suit (NAFO, CCSBT) • Does united action on IUU fishing translate into internal reforms? (overcapacity, overfishing) • Does coordination increase accountability?

19. Research question: role of institutional innovations in RFMOs • Structured and binding decisionmaking • Voting on matters of substance instead of consensus, with no opt-out allowance • Independent experts panels; arbitrated negotiation of allocation criteria • New science arrangements (e.g., hybrid model in WCPFC and CCSBT independent science advisory panel)

20. Conflicts or synergies among policy instruments? • How might allocation of participatory rights affect the adoption of EBM tools? • Depends on the nature of the right; transferability; spatial dimension • Should place-based management measures be adopted first to avoid creating resistance by quota-owners who claim spatial rights? • Are there incentive-based tools for ecosystem protection?

21. New RFMOs: preemptive actions by quota owning companies • How does the ownership of fishing rights change the behavior of industry? • e.g., Deepwater Stakeholder Ltd (NZ trawler companies) proposed Benthic Protection Areas for NZ’s EEZ & the new So Indian Ocean RFMO

22. SIO Closures are those proposed by Southern Indian Ocean Deepwater Fishers’ Assoc. (NZ quota-owning companies) proposed “Benthic Protection Areas” for adoption by the new SIO RFMO