Executive Institutions

1. Executive Institutions Choices and consequences

2. Structure • Recap last class: • Electoral systems: key points and clarifying mixed systems • Debate about the choice of types of executives • Are presidential executives inherently less stable? • Juan Linz, Arend Lijphart v. Shugart and Carey, Cheibub • Classifying types of executives • Presidential, semi-presidential, and parliamentary executives (Lijphart, Duverger, Siaroff, Norris) • Evidence about the consequences • For democratization and stability • ‘Big men’ executives in Sub-Saharan Africa • Conclusions • What types of executive would you recommend for post-conflict peace–settlements in Iraq and Afghanistan?

3. Resources • Siaroff, Alan. 2003. ‘Comparative presidencies: The inadequacy of the presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary distinction .’ European Journal of Political Research 42: 287. • Van Cranenburgh, Oda. 2008. ‘'Big Men' Rule: Presidential Power, Regime Type and Democracy in 30 African Countries.’ Democratization15(5): 952-973. • Pippa Norris. 2008. Driving Democracy: Do Power-Sharing Institutions Work? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ch 6.

4. Plan Assignment #1 - 18th Oct • Paper. 20%. Institutional Choices. Due 10am Monday 18th October. 1,500 word essay. Pick one of the following topics. • Compare any two countries emerging from conflict and outline the primary advantages and disadvantages of the choice of alternative electoral systems for each state. • Does decentralization strengthen or weaken good governance? • Do participatory processes encourage more sustainable and democratic constitutional choices? Discuss by comparing and contrasting any two contemporary cases of constitution writing. • “Presidential executives generate inherently more unstable regimes.” Evaluate and discuss.

5. I. Recap Types of electoral systems

6. Recap: Types of electoral systems

7. Recap: Mixed systems • ‘Combined’, ‘dual’, ‘hybrid’ systems • Combined dependent • eg Germany, NZ • Distribution of seats depend upon the 2nd party list PR vote • ‘Top up’ for smaller parties • Combined independent • eg Ukraine, Taiwan • Two electoral formulae used independently in the same election to the same body

8. E.g. 2009 German Bundestag election results

9. II. Debates Consequences of types of executives for political stability, governance, and democratization

10. Juan Linz’s critique: Presidential executives are inherently less stable • Elections are a zero-sum game: one winner raises stakes • Weaker partisan links with legislature, fewer coalition incentives, less cooperation, more potential gridlock • Exacerbated in fragmented party systems with PR elections for the legislature • Rival sources of legitimacy: legislature and executive • Difficulties of removing unpopular, incapacitated, or corrupt leaders and lack of smooth executive succession • Depends upon the qualities of an individual leader – a risky course • More breakdown of democratic states in presidential regimes (especially in Latin America) • Ref: Juan Linz 1990. “The perils of presidentialism.’ Jnl of Democracy 1/1: 51-69.

11. Juan Linz • “While parliamentarism imparts flexibility to the political process, presidentialism makes it rather rigid.” • Tensions between desire for strong leader and need for constraints • “Presidentialism is ineluctably problematic because it operates according to the rule of ‘winner-take-all’..a zero sum game, with all the potential for conflict such games portend.” • Agree or disagree? • Ref: Juan Linz 1990. “The perils of presidentialism.’ Jnl of Democracy 1/1: 51-69.

12. Challenges to Linz’s claims • Matthew Shugartand John Carey. 1992. Presidents and Assemblies CUP. • Problem is not presidential executives per se but strong presidential powers • Compares breakdown of democratic regimes in developing societies in 20th C and finds that more parliamentary regimes have broken down (59%) rather than presidential regimes (52%) • “We find no justification for the claim of Linz and others that presidentialism is inherently prone to breakdown.” p42. • Presidential systems also allow direct accountability to electorate

13. Challenges to Linz’s claims • Jose Cheibub 2007. ‘Presidentialism, Parliamentarism and Democracy.’ CUP. • Presidential executives more likely to arise in states with history of military coups and in larger countries • Instability and democratic breakdown is due to these historical developments and authoritarian legacy, not type of executives per se • Once the authoritarian legacy is held constant, presidential and parliamentary democracies have relatively equal chances of surviving (p.22)

14. Political importance of issue • Afghanistan: strong presidential system • Direct 2nd ballot elections, Head of Gov and head of state, two term limit, appoints Cabinet) • Yet weak legislature, weak parties, few effective checks and balances, no obvious successor • Yet Iraq, parliamentary executive, • Presidency council: President, two vice presidents, and a prime minister • President elected by 2/3rd House of Representatives • PM from largest party • Elections in 2010 yet stalemate in forming new government

15. E.g. Iraq election results 7 March 2010

16. III. Types of Executives Classifying and defining types

17. Defining heads of government (Lijphart 1999 Patterns of Democracy) • Presidential • Elected for a fixed term of office • Popular (direct) election • Non-collegial one-person executive with subordinate cabinet • Parliamentary • Prime Minister is subject to a vote of no confidence and thus accountable to parliament • PM leads largest party • Cabinet executive with collective responsibility Problems with this classification?

18. Semi-presidential category Maurice Duverger – 5th French Republic President elected by popular vote Head of state shares executive power with PM President is independent of parliament PM and cabinet are dependent on parliament Mutual autonomy, cohabitation E.g. Finland, Austria, Ireland, Portugal

19. Siaroff’s classification

20. Norris

21. Classification of executives

22. Type of executives by region Table 6.3: Classification of type of executives by region, 2003 Note: The number of states falling into each category in 2003. Source: Coded from Arthur S. Banks Cross-national Time-series Data Archive.

23. Trends in types of executive Mixed Presidential Note: Coded from Arthur S. Banks Cross-national Time-series Data Archive.

24. Parliamentary powers by type of executive

25. Types and parliamentary powers Parliamentary Powers Index: (PPI) The aggregate strength of the national legislature (0-1 scale) (Fish-Kroenig 2009). Classification of executive types (Norris Driving Democracy) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Mean N Std. Deviation PPI ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 Parliamentary Monarchy .65 18 .11996 2Mixed executive .50 81 .21022 3 Presidential republic .47 39 .11054 4 Monarchy .23 9 .08337 5 Military state .19 3 .22605 Total .49 152 .19684

26. IV. Evidence for consequences

27. Table 6.4: Types of executive and democracy, all societies worldwide

28. Political crisis by types of executives Note: The political crisis scale is constructed from events recorded in the Banks dataset including the number of coups d’etat, major constitutional changes, political assassinations, general strikes, cases of guerrilla warfare, government crisis, purges of opposition, riots, revolutions, and anti-government demonstrations. The measure is constructed for every regime-year as a simple additive scale without any weighting. Source: Coded from Arthur S. Banks Cross-national Time-series Data Archive 1972-2003.

29. Executives and political stability

30. Executives and crisis

31. Van Craneburgh: African states Type 1: Countries with a single head of state and government selected by popular election, but accountable to the legislature Type 2: (Presidential republics) Countries with a single popularly elected head of state and government, not accountable to the legislature. E.g. Ghana Type 3: Countries with a single head of state and government not selected by popular election, but accountable to the legislature. E.g. South Africa Type 4: Countries with a single head of state and government selected in some capacity by the legislature, but thereafter not accountable to it. Type 5: (Mixed republics) Countries with a popularly elected head of state and a separate head of government (prime minister (PM)), with the latter accountable to the legislature eg Namibia Type 6: Countries with a popularly elected head of state and a separate head of government not accountable to the legislature. Type 7: (Mixed republic) Countries with a head of state selected in some capacity by the legislature and a separate head of government (PM), with the latter accountable to the legislature. Eg Mauritius Type 8: Countries with a head of state not popularly elected and a separate head of government not accountable to the legislature

33. Van Craneburgh’s conclusions Presidential powers vary considerably among African states Varied performance of ‘presidential’ and ‘semi-presidential’ systems

34. V. Conclusions

35. Conclusions • Classification of executive types far from straightforward • Institutional choices matter • Parliamentarismis associated with consolidation of democracy • Robust effect for different countries and time periods • Robust effect for different measures of democracy • Cases illustrate historical processes underlying relationship • Yet among younger democracies, parliamentary regimes are far less common than mixed executives • Policy implications for constitutional choices..Sudan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan and Iraq…

36. Next class: Federalism and Decentralization