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SIGYN II 2009-2012. Partners and sub projects Partners: Volvo Cars Alkit communication SP EIS by Semcon Chalmers Viktoriainstitutet Sub projects: Academy & Administration Security cOncept and IT Architecture (SOTA)
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SIGYN II 2009-2012 • Partners and sub projects • Partners: • Volvo Cars • Alkit communication • SP • EIS by Semcon • Chalmers • Viktoriainstitutet • Sub projects: • Academy & Administration • Security cOncept and IT Architecture (SOTA) • Safety Analysis and concept for Diagnostics and software Download (SADD) • TrAfic Control and Test car mAnagement (TACTA) • Connected car Impact on Repair shops and After sales (CIRA)
SIGYN II Studies concepts for remote diagnostics and SWDL with focus on Safety & Security Remote asynchronous Diagnostics & SWDL Synchronous remote session Vehicle state of health Remote SWDL task & result Wireless Diagnostics & SWDL Remote online Diagnostics Remote Diagnostic task & result Remote data measurement task & result Safety and Security concept cover all parts.
SIGYN II Safety Analysis • Vehicle diagnostics and software download has been performed during decades in workshops with no or little concern of System Safety, so why start considering System Safety in this project? • Because of the addition of the term ”Remote” • Previously the diagnostic client was always physically attached to the vehicle via the OBD-connector (and became de-attached before the vehicle left the workshop) • Soon the diagnostic client will be built into the vehicle (thus never de-attached) • In addition, there will be occasions when the workshop mechanic have no visual overview of the vehicle when performing remote diagnostics 3 Issuer: [Name] [CDS ID], [Organisation], [Name of Doc], Security Class: Proprietary Issuer: [Name] [CDS ID], [Organisation], [Name of Doc], Security Class: Proprietary Date created: [YYYY-MM-DD]
Scope of analysis 1) Remote Diagnostics & SWDL 2) Local 3) Asynchronous 3) Synchronous 4) Vehicle user and the diagnostic operator are part of the system under consideration. 2) Remote Issuer: [Name] [CDS ID], [Organisation], [Name of Doc], Security Class: Proprietary • Issuescovered by the Safetyanalysis • What can be done with remote diagnostics? • Diagnostic ReadoutServices • Are only able to readout information (signals, DTCs etc.) from the vehicle • Does not affect ECUs operation • Diagnostic Control Services • May write data affecting ANY vehicle function, overruling the vehicle user intention • Has the ability to set the vehicle in programming mode (SWDL) • I.e. unexpected diagnostic control could in worst case manipulate brakes, turn-off headlights etc. while the vehicle moves! Functional safety has to be considered!
Conducting risk analysis Client move seats when children is inside vehicle, no failure etc. Freeway Snow Client sets vehicle it prog, no failure Speed > 90 km/h Client activates EPB, caused by failure etc. Client activates seat heat, caused by failure Night Vehicle parked etc. Indicator manipulation, no failure etc. Vehicle moves Client switch off all lamps, caused by failure Slope Trafic jam The conclusions are that there are risks both caused by potential system malfunction and in normal operation, but the analysis becomes too extensive. A systematic approach was applied where the analysis was subdivided into: 1. Safety Analysis in normal operation, SIGYN II analysis method developed 2. Hazard and risk Assessment ISO 26262 5 Issuer: [Name] [CDS ID], [Organisation], [Name of Doc], Security Class: Proprietary In SIGYN II different conventional methods, such as FMECA/HAZOP/FTA, have been applied… Date created: [YYYY-MM-DD]
Analysis Result: Functional Safety Concept (FSC) a) An initiation sequence is performed which secures that a vehicle user: • Is present at the car (by action) • Is informed about the effects of the script/services • Confirms consent and controls when diagnostics start • b) Defined vehicle conditions are fulfilled: • ‘Vehicle not moving’ is always a mandatory condition • SWDL requires additional conditions than other diagnostics The above applies only for vehicles that are notlocated in a designated area (e.g. workshop or factory) The vehicle user shall always be able to abort any ongoing remote diagnostics Issuer: [Name] [CDS ID], [Organisation], [Name of Doc], Security Class: Proprietary • Remote diagnostic services shall be classified as either safe or risk related • NO restrictions applies for safe diagnostic services (readout or control) • Risk related services can only be executed after the following conditions are fulfilled:
TechnicalSafetyConcept (TSC) 7 Issuer: [Name] [CDS ID], [Organisation], [Name of Doc], Security Class: Proprietary There are several different ways for implementing the FSC into a real vehicle. The decision of which implementation to use must be based on deep knowledge of the in-vehicle electric architecture and a cost/benefit estimation which has not been within the scope of SIGYN II. Different proposals of technical safety concepts regarding a general requirement allocation were made, which all had more or less pros and cons. The overall result of the safety analysis is a concept containing both methodologies and proposals. . Date created: [YYYY-MM-DD]
Road map Remote diagnostics & SWDL • SIGYN II Research 2009-2012 • AE Remote diagnostics Coming FFI application Remote vehicle data collection and visalization. • AE projects for base technologies 2009-2011: • WLAN (b/g/n) inc. Ethernet • SWDL Next generation • AE projects for base technologies 2011-2013: • Make concepts remote (AE 2011-2013) • Vehicle information security (AE 2011-2013) TKO AR 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 • SIGYN functions: • Vehicle data collection • Synchronous workshop diagnostics • Vehicle data measurement & callibration • Remote SWDL • Remote online diagnostic read out • Vehicle state of Health • Remote SWDL • Remote parameter settings and data measurement • Remote online diagnostic control • Remote SWDL & parameter setting campaign Security concept Safety concept Remote Services