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Firewalls

Firewalls. First notions. Types of outsider attacks. Intrusions Data compromise confidentiality, integrity Web defacement availability, reputation Zombie recruitment DOS, liability risk Denial of Service Attacks Sniffing/Information theft. Why firewalls?. Against firewalls:

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Firewalls

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  1. Firewalls First notions

  2. Types of outsider attacks • Intrusions • Data compromise • confidentiality, integrity • Web defacement • availability, reputation • Zombie recruitment • DOS, liability risk • Denial of Service Attacks • Sniffing/Information theft Florida State University Fall 2005

  3. Why firewalls? • Against firewalls: • Host security measures are effective • Firewalls increase Internet latency, and impose arbitrary limitations on legitimate Internet usage • Against host-based security only: • administratively hard to enforce consistency • firewalls may actually increase internal available bandwidth by blocking bad traffic • Scalability: network vs. host security model Florida State University Fall 2005

  4. Internet Firewalls Picture from textbook: Building firewalls, by Zwicki et al. Florida State University Fall 2005

  5. Firewalls can • Enforce security policies to decide which traffic to allow and to not allow through the fire-walled channel • Log security-related information • Reduce the visibility of the network Florida State University Fall 2005

  6. Firewalls cannot • Prevent against previously unknown attack types • Protect against insiders/ connections that do not go through it. • Provide full protection against viruses. Florida State University Fall 2005

  7. Services typically protected • HTTP/HTTPS • FTP • SSH • SMTP • DNS Florida State University Fall 2005

  8. Firewall Configurations

  9. Single-Box Architectures • Simple to manage, available from vendors • Single point-of-failure, no defense-in-depth • Types: • Screening Router • Dual-homed host Florida State University Fall 2005

  10. Screening Router Picture from textbook: Building firewalls, by Zwicki et al. Florida State University Fall 2005

  11. Dual-Homed Host Picture from textbook: Building firewalls, by Zwicki et al. Florida State University Fall 2005

  12. Screened Host Architecture Picture from textbook: Building firewalls, by Zwicki et al. Florida State University Fall 2005

  13. Screened Subnet Architectures • Adds an extra layer of security to screened host • Perimeter network isolates internal network from Internet • Components: • Perimeter network • bastion host • internal router • external router Florida State University Fall 2005

  14. Screened network Picture from textbook: Building firewalls, by Zwicki et al. Florida State University Fall 2005

  15. Services on the Bastion Host • Incoming connections from the Internet: • DNS queries • FTP download queries • Incoming mail (SMTP) sessions • Outgoing connections protected either by: • Packet filtering (direct access to the Internet via screening routers) • Proxy services on bastion host(s) Florida State University Fall 2005

  16. Split-screened subnet Picture from textbook: Building firewalls, by Zwicki et al. Florida State University Fall 2005

  17. Multiple Internet Connections Picture from textbook: Building firewalls, by Zwicki et al. Florida State University Fall 2005

  18. Variations • For high performance, use multiple bastion hosts • Ok to merge a bastion host with an external router • Not Ok to merge a bastion host with an internal router • Bad to have multiple interior routers on the same perimeter network Florida State University Fall 2005

  19. Internal Firewalls Picture from textbook: Building firewalls, by Zwicki et al. Florida State University Fall 2005

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