“Majoritarian” and “Consensus” Parliamentary Democracies: A Convergence Towards “Cooperative Majoritarianism”?

1. “Majoritarian” and “Consensus” Parliamentary Democracies: A Convergence Towards “Cooperative Majoritarianism”? By Jean Blondel and Francesco Battegazzorre Christina Kennally December 2, 2010 Comparative Politics

2. First: Consociationalism Majoritarianism Second: Adversarial Majoritarianism Cooperative Majoritariansim From the 1990s to Present: A New Set of Changes

3. Consociationalism => Majoritarianism • Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Italy • Power-sharing is decreasing • Development of government and opposition

4. Parliamentary Systems Evolution - Problems • Criticisms of Lijphart’s framework: • No mechanism to register dynamics • Distinction between opposition of “majority” and “consensus” • Only contrasts, no dimensions • No clear definitions

5. Authors’ Solutions • Need a clear definition • Need two clearly-defined dimensions, not contrasts • Need to update the categorization of criteria (those that account for the placement of parliamentary governments)

6. General Trend • Established parliamentary systems become less extreme: Cooperative Majority • Electors have a choice (unlike Consensus) • Civilized Debate (unlike Majority)

7. Lijphart’s “Definition” of Majorityand Consensus • Majority • “government by the majority of people” • Majority in Parliament, not majority of people • “blocs” that oppose each other • Political formula to efficiently decide conflicts • Consensus • No clear definition: • Preferred to consociationalism • Shorter and easier to pronounce • Majoritarian model is point of departure • New variables

8. What does consensus mean? Simple definition: governments that have a larger base than the majority Lijphart’s definition: • a different conception of democracy • “consensus challenges the idea that majorities should govern and minorities should oppose” • Include rather than exclude (although no set parameters for this)

9. Authors’ definition of Consensus • Consensus: agreements made between all forces in society (a necessary condition) • True Consensus: if all participate in decision- making

10. Majoritarian Model • Seems easy because conditions are minimal • Depends on how Majoritarianism is imposed: • Brutally, with limited discussion (imposition) • Less brutal, cooperation with opposition

11. Consensus Model • 2 ideal types of collaboration • Broad-based collaboration at government level • Collaboration at the societal level • Drawbacks • “grand governmental coalitions” not so grand • Exception: wartime • Not all interest groups are considered

12. Two-Dimensional Approach • Two models are two ideal types, we need multiple dimensions to track change (vs. one dimension) • Not a single continuum because of two different types • Not just size of coalition but also how they deal with the socio-political elite when making decisions • Dimension 1: government composition • Dimension 2: societal • Simple: Bare majority to large majority • Complex: majority of large blocs oppose each other, consociational if large coalition with many party representatives exists • Minority government: near majority or true minority government (closer to consensus) and must consider societal dimension

13. Dimension One • Government Composition • Simple: Bare majority to large majority • Complex: majority of large blocs oppose each other, consociational if large coalition with many party representatives exists • Minority government: • near majority • true minority government (closer to consensus) and must consider societal dimension

14. Dimension Two • Societal • Concerned with: • Behavior between government and others • Imposed decisions: Adversarial • Agreement: Cooperation • Difficult to assess cooperation, but more committees outside government higher cooperation • Behavior with government and those not in government

15. Adversarial Cooperative Consociative Consensus Near/Bare Majority Dimension 1: CompositionofGovernment LargeMajority Imposition Cooperation Dimension 2: Government’s Mode of Behaviour

16. Lijphart’s idea: • Features: account for the position of parliamentary government in two-dimensional space • Two dimensions (given to focus on features): • “executive-parties” plane • “federal-unitary” plane

19. Criticisms of Features • No explanation of why features were chosen • All features presented in a dichotomous manner • “executive-parties” plane: • intercorrelation of variables • “federal-unitary” plane: • Introduce veto points instead of a real consensus; checks and balances (stalemate)

20. European Parliamentary Breakdown • 15 Parliamentary Governments • 11 Traditionally Majoritarian • Scandinavian: Cooperative • Britain, France, Ireland: Adversarial • 4 Consociative or consensual • Netherlands: broadly cooperative • Italy, Austria, Belgium: Consociative

21. First: Consociationalism Majoritarianism Second: Adversarial Majoritarianism Cooperative Majoritariansim From the 1990s to Present: A New Set of Changes

22. The Netherlands • Christian Party, pivotal position since 1970s • Liberal Party and Labour Party alternatively partners in coalition governments ’successive’ than ‘simultaneous’ consociationalism • 1990s, Christian Parties decline, Liberal and Labour did not benefit of this sufficiently to become pivotal (one of the two) • 1994 Election: Liberals, Labour and D66 (small centre-left party) formed a coalition government Christian Party in opposition for the first time since 1945, no longer pivotal position

23. Belgian • 19th century  Conservative vs Liberals; then Christians vs Liberals  majoritarian • Emergence of the Socialists  three pillars  still majoritarian up to 1960s (Christians alone; Socialists+Liberals) • New linguistic cleavage  need for institutional reform  large majority required for approval (consociative) 1993 Reform  1998 end of the consociational period (Christians relegated to opposition again in 1998)

24. Conclusions:Consociative to Majoritarian • If we consider Lijphart’s features, there would be no shift toward majoritarianism in the case of Netherlands and Belgium • Cannot attribute changes to Lijphart’s system of variables • Two key features: • Nature of cleavage and ideological panorama prevailing at a particular time • Effect of European Union on the structure of national politics in member-states

25. Additional Conclusions:Majoritarian Adversarial to Majoritarian Cooperative • Scandanivia and Germany are still majoritarian cooperative • Lijphart’s system consider’s only Germany to be majoritarian cooperative • France, Ireland, and even England have become more similar to majoritarian cooperative • England: Labour party reinforced many of Thatcher’s policies • Began as an imposition and then became accepted by those who originally opposed

26. Final Conclusion • Cooperative Majoritarianism seems to be the answer: • Avoid political mistakes of the past • “Europeanization” of politics • To be taken seriously in the European Union, member-states must maintain a level of cohesion within their own country • French case: Cohabitation formula