Scholtz on hierarchies and networks

1. Scholtz on hierarchies and networks • Institutions like the military, police and national security are hierarchic for the purpose of achieving collective effort. • Institutional hierarchies inevitably develop pathologies. • Intelligence doctrine (particularly the ‘cycle’) reinforces the pyramidal and centrist tendency. • Modern information technology facilitates networks and multiple participation • Hierarchic schemes serve the command; networks serve a web of users.

4. Hierarchies and networks (2) • Historically intelligence was an asset exclusively available to generals to aid strategy. • Today its scope and reach exceed anything imaginable in former times • Intelligence creation relies upon wide organizational participation. • Intelligence can serve strategy, operations and tactics. • Secure networks with controlled access can ‘socialize’ & distribute usage.

5. Decision making • Intent within a context. • A balance of evidence, predisposition and intuition. • Limited by capability, capacity and the unknown. • The calculation of risk (probability). • Obduracy and the pursuit of folly.

6. Intelligence and decision making • Strategists, operational commanders and tacticians can and usually do rely on the existing agenda. • Moving beyond the status quo usually involves obtaining the initiative - a shift from reaction to interdiction. • Preconception and intuition uncertain guides to action; evidence usually incomplete; alternative is intelligent analysis. • Initiative (and therefore intelligence) is needed at each level – strategic, operational and tactical.

7. Intelligence as a nervous system • Reactive systems for (policy or policing) imply an acceptable balance, they do not engage change or require intelligence. • When the level of ‘conflict’ is unacceptable and the problem is beset with unknowns, change and intelligence are essential and essentially linked. • Intelligence is a synthetic process distilling knowledge of the problem (target) and operational learning (tactics). • If it is designed as a nervous system it can serve the brain (strategy) and the fingertips (tactics).

8. Richard Betts’ critique (1) Conceptual approaches to intelligence failure: . Invisible success and disproportionate significance of failure (scapegoats). . Communications failures. . Paradox of repair – new pathologies. . The abilities of those above. . Institutional motive.

9. Richard Betts’ critique (2) Inherent barriers to analytical accuracy: . Business hierarchy limits optimal use. . In crisis, data and policy outstrip analysis. . Ambiguity of evidence. . Loss of influence when ambivalent. . Atrophy of reform.

10. Richard Betts’ critique (3) Elusiveness of solutions: . Tribunals and reviews initiate expensive and counter-productive fail safe regimes . Measure and counter measure – transience of methodologies. . Consolidation as an answer to ‘silos’ generates bureaucracy. . Devils advocate becomes ‘Cassandra’. . Impracticality of ‘upgrading’ users.

11. James Sheptycki’s critique • Digital divide – legacy systems. • Linkage blindness – inf. Boundaries. • Noise – non-consonant data. • Overload – under capacity. • Non reporting and inaccurate recording. • Intelligence gaps – hoarding and silos. • Institutional friction inter and intra agency. • Defensive data concentration. • Resistance of occupational subcultures.

12. Intelligence and strategy – thesis. The strategic commander and policy maker, in time of conflict and confrontation, are beset by the practical requirements of decision making within finite time frames. The ‘intelligence community’ should operate as a corporate brain for the commander, providing an objective rationale for action in the immediate and longer term. The alternative is almost always the march of folly.

13. Intelligence and strategy – engagement level. • Assessment of capability, capacity and intent (friend and foe). • Situational awareness and operational assessment. • Criticality – what losses would catastrophic? • Appraisal of tactical effectiveness and the technical utility of means.

14. Intelligence and strategy – contextual level. • Comprehending mindsets (making the implicit explicit) – cultural expectations and motivations. • Interpreting the social nature of contending communications and command systems. • Interpreting social and economic consequence. • Unmasking enemies in false colours. • Assessing conflict in the context of market, strategic or ideological confrontation.

15. Intelligence and strategy – evolutionary level. • Strategic and tactical comparison – the search of asymmetric advantage. • Obtaining information dominance – in acquisition and distribution. • Promoting a learning culture. • Engineering the ‘Clausewitzian trilogy’–consonance of political will, popular support and operational means.

16. As a methodology. • Target centric – constantly rebuilding the target model and countermeasures. • Network centric – extending reach, utility, spontaneity and opportunity. • Pan centric – comprehensive assessment at apex level. • Establishing a learning culture. • Visible leadership – coordinating, establishing intent and interventionist (incorporating staff principles).

17. General Sir Rupert Smith ‘Utility of Force’. • Paradigm shift from armies with comparable resources doing battle on a battlefield – to strategic confrontation between a range of combatants, not all of which are armies, using different weapons, often improvised. • Politicians fail to distinguish between the deployment and the employment of force. • Lack of clarity and coherence in aim (political); deployment to achieve aim (strategy); battle plan (operations) and movement and fire (tactics).

18. General Bailey’s critique • History of incorrigible reluctance to make accurate assessments of likely length, meaning and outcome of military deployments. • Folly of the contention that deployments can be short, cheap and decisive. • If the new ‘imperialism’ is missions based on ‘human rights violations’ and ‘international law’– requirement is for the long haul (‘nation building’, counter insurgency, holding the ring until the context changes).

19. Scholtz on hierarchies and networks • Institutions like the military, police and national security are hierarchic for the purpose of achieving collective effort. • Institutional hierarchies inevitably develop pathologies. • Intelligence doctrine (particularly the ‘cycle’) reinforces the pyramidal and centrist tendency. • Modern information technology facilitates networks and multiple participation • Hierarchic schemes serve the command; networks serve a web of users.

20. CYCLES OF IMPLEMENTATION Invention Equipment Technical Change Tactics Innovation Procedures Operational Change Operations Adaptation Context Technological Change Strategy

21. The Intelligence Cycle

22. Operational Staff (targets of opportunity in normal business) Target Teams (target ops / plans) TARGET MODELS RECOGNITION S YNTHES I S C O R E E N T I T I E S Other Intel Sources TCG NETWORK CHARTS CRITICAL BUSINESS LINKS CRIMINAL METHODOLOGIES LINKS TO EVENTS OTHER Specialist Collectors (humint, sigint, imint) Trusted 3rd Parties ALERTS Analysis & Researchers Plan Owner

23. Target Centric Model Plans Oversight Collection • Information • Target Modeling • Analysis Research Investigation Execution