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Non-interactive key establishment in mobile ad hoc networks

Non-interactive key establishment in mobile ad hoc networks. Li, Zhenjiang; Garcia-Luna- Aceves , J.J. Ad Hoc Networks Volume: 5, Issue: 7, September, 2007, pp. 1194-1203. 97/10/27 H.-H. Ou. Introduction. NIKAP (non-interactive key agreement and progression protocol)

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Non-interactive key establishment in mobile ad hoc networks

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  1. Non-interactive key establishment in mobile ad hoc networks Li, Zhenjiang; Garcia-Luna-Aceves, J.J. Ad Hoc Networks Volume: 5, Issue: 7, September, 2007, pp. 1194-1203 97/10/27 H.-H. Ou

  2. Introduction • NIKAP (non-interactive key agreement and progression protocol) • SCK (Self-certified key) cryptosystem • H. Petersen, P. Horster, Self-certified keys – concepts and applications, in: Third Conference of Communications and Multimedia Security, Athens, September 1997. • centralized authority (CA) only at the initiation intervention. • Proposed • S-NIKAP • A-NIKAP • AOSR (Ad hoc on-demand secure routing protocol) H.-H. Ou

  3. SCK • Initialization • A centralized authority (CA), Z • P, q are large primes with q|(p-1) (i.e., q is a prime factor of p-1) • KAєZq*is a random where Zq*is a multiplicative subgroup with order q and generator σ. • (xZ,yZ) is the Z’s (private, public) key pair generates by itself. • Z computes the IDA’s signature parameter • guarantee rA= σKA (mod p) • private key xA =SA= xZ·h(IDA, rA) + kA (mod q) • Node A publishes rA and IDA • A’s public can be computed by any node • yA=yZh(IDA, rA) ·rA(mod p) • (xA, yA) can denote as the initial key pair (xA0, yA0) H.-H. Ou

  4. SCK • User-controlled key pair progression • Node A can update its (private, public) key pair as (xAt, yAt) in time inteval (t· △T, (t+1)· △T) • Node A can choose n random KAtєZq* where 1 ≦t ≦n • compute guarantees rAt= σKAt (mod p) then publishes • Private key can progresses as • xAt = xA0·h(IDA, rAt) + kAt (mod q) • The corresponding public keys can be computed according to • yAt=yA0 h(IDA, rAt) ·rAt(mod p) H.-H. Ou

  5. SCK • Non-interactive pairwise key agreement and progression • Node A • xAt = xA0·h(IDA, rAt) + kAt (mod q) • yBt=yB0 h(IDB, rBt) ·rBt(mod p) • kAt = yBtxAt (mode p) • Kt = h(kAt) • Node B • xBt = xB0·h(IDB, rBt) + kBt (mod q) • yAt=yA0 h(IDA, rAt) ·rAt(mod p) • kBt = yAtxBt (mode p) • Kt = h(kBt) H.-H. Ou

  6. S-NIKAP & A-NIKAP H.-H. Ou

  7. AOSR (Ad hoc on-demand secure routing protocol) • Route request initialization • RREQ ={RREQ, S, D, QNum, HC, {NodeList}, QMACS,D} • HC =0, {NodeList}=Null • QMACS,D = Hash(CORE, HC, {NodeList}, KS,D) • CORE = Hash(RREQ, S, D; QNum, KS,D) • Route request forwarding (Node Ni) • Checking Qnum and {NodeList} • HC=HC+1, {NodeList}= {NodeList}+Ni-1 • Update QMACS,D as QMACi,D = Hash(QMACi-1,D, HC, {NodeList}, Ki,D) H.-H. Ou

  8. AOSR (Ad hoc on-demand secure routing protocol) • Check RREQ at destination D •  • Route maintenance • CORE = Hash(RERR, Ni, S, D; RNum, Ki,s) H.-H. Ou

  9. Conclusions • Non-interactive key establishment and the succeeding key progression (rekeying process). • S-NIKAP & A –NIKAP • SCK • Application • AOSR H.-H. Ou

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