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Airborne Spacing and Safety Alberto Pasquini - Deep Blue (ENAV) alberto@dblue.it. Scope. Introduce and discuss some preliminary reflections about potential safety problems of Spacing applications
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Airborne Spacing and Safety Alberto Pasquini - Deep Blue (ENAV) alberto@dblue.it
Scope • Introduce and discuss some preliminary reflections about potential safety problems of Spacing applications • Reflections based on the experience as Safety Manager of the Mediterranean Free Flight (MFF) project and on a set of dedicated Real Time Simulation (RTS) exercises • Not the official position of MFF and based on preliminary results and observations
Context: the MFF project • Mediterranean Free Flight pre-operational project on Free Routing, ASAS Spacing, ASAS Separation, Free Flight in Mediterranean area • Focus on procedures and validation, based on existing, proven technologies • 5-year programme that started in June 2000 • 9 partners (major Mediterranean air traffic service providers, Eurocontrol, Industries)
Context: Safety Analysis in MFF • Safety Policy and Plan designed to satisfy the ESARR4 requirements and under evaluation by Safety Regulation Commission • Methodology based on the application of the EUROCAE ED78A guidelines and on the Safety Assessment Methodology proposed by Eurocontrol • Safety Assessment in three steps (3 Safety Cases) because of the evolutionary characteristics of MFF
Steps of the Safety Analysis • Identification of the Operational Scenarios for the application of the MFF procedures (OSED) • Identification of potential hazards and of the severity of their consequences (OHA) • Evaluation of acceptability (with reference to frequency), and safety requirements for limitation of non acceptable hazards or mitigation of their consequences (ASOR) • Assessment of the achievement of the Safety Requirements (SSA)
Hazards identification & RTS role • Potential hazards identified on the basis of past project, meetings with operational experts, and “expert opinions” • For each potential hazards need to understand: detectability, mitigation ability, consequences, credibility, related hazards • Use of the RTS to study some potential hazards • Creation of the hazardous conditions through specific “traffic sample” and cooperation of pseudopilots
8 Nm An example - 1 Wrong target in ASAS Spacing Target 2 Delegated 2 Delegated 1 Target 1 8 Nm 8 Nm
An example - 2 Aspects to be investigated for the hazard Wrong target in ASAS Spacing • Does the controller “feel” responsible for the separation even if the action of maintaining the distance has been delegated ? • Does he assign the correct priority to the related actions ? • Are the related tools offering adequate support for the related activities ? • Is the ASAS interfering with the possible emergency manoeuvre ?
Collection of data • Information from: • Meetings between safety observers and human factor experts • Analyses of safety reports and questionnaires by controllers • Brainstorming sessions between controllers and safety observers • Debriefing with controllers involved in the exercises
Characteristics of the simulation • 7 weeks of simulation (1 week for training, 4 weeks dedicated to ground side, 2 weeks dedicated to airborne side), 18 + 4 controllers full time • Free Routing, ASAS Spacing and Crossing concepts en Route and approach to Terminal Area • Improved MTCD (partially), Trajectory Editor, ASAS Spacing/Crossing Graphical Tool, ADS-B and CPDLC (50% equipped) • 30 safety oriented scenario executed (about 50% successful)
Results (Spacing) - 1 • Controllers fix the objective of Spacing manoeuvres leaving some degree of flexibility for the fine actions needed to achieve this objective (they still keep the responsibility) • This degree of flexibility is different for different manoeuvres (spacing, heading and merge, crossing) • Indications about the progress towards the desired objective are less evident to controllers (and this evidence decreases with the degree of flexibility)
Results (Spacing) - 2 • In particular, controllers have less direct indications about possible errors or malfunctions (e.g. errors resulting from miss communication, ac system failures or pilot errors) • More effective monitoring tools would be needed to ensure that controllers have indications about the progress towards the intended manoeuvre objective
Limitations • Results based on expert opinions, meetings with controllers, and real time simulations • Real time simulation concerning an on-going pre-operational project (some problems with platform, procedures under validation, etc.) • Multi national controller team with different background and safety attitude