Findings and Recommendations Global 2001 NCW Innovation Cell

1. Findings and Recommendations Global 2001NCW Innovation Cell CAPT Don Inbody Director, Joint C4ISR Decision Support Center UNCLASSIFIED

2. Approach • Scientific Method • Control, Experiment • Test hypotheses • Analytic Rigor • Measures of Force Effectiveness • Measures of Effectiveness • Measures of Performance UNCLASSIFIED

3. Re-establish status quo in JOA Casualties Time to Achieve Policy Objectives Risk (inside/outside AOR) Gain assured access to JOA Achieve high OPTEMPO e.g. Ship-Days in Gulf or Force Able to Mass Effects e.g. Rate of Effective Ops vs. Centers of Gravity Maneuver forces to gain dominant advantage Precisely engage adversary systems Sustain forces in JOA Protect forces and non-combatants Command/Direct Forces & Support e.g. Centers of Gravity held at risk e.g. Kills Per Sortie - Losses - Damage e.g. Sortie Rate e.g. Avoidable Losses e.g. % Acts Consistent w/Commanders Intent Awareness of terrain and battlespace % HVTs ID’d (& Held at Risk) ISR/Info Search Rates (anti-access systems, COGs) TPFD Closure Capacity Area Defended (air threats, irregular threats) Mobility of forces and support Target(s)-Weapon(s) Pairing Effectiveness “Footprint” in JOA Data-to-Knowledge Processing Capacity Timeliness of Indications & Warning Movement/reaction delay Target track accuracy and holding time Info Availability (Exchange/Collaboration) Flexibility/Adaptability of Forces & Suppliers Susceptibility / Vulnerability of HVTs Max weapon or effect range Launch platform surviviability Timeliness (speed, timing) of Decision-making Visibility of Supply & Demand “Counter-fire” effectiveness Force efficiency Weapon (Effect) Performance (Range, Accuracy, PK) Assessment Accuracy Measures Of Performance Disrupted By Obstacles To NCW (Programs of Record) Awareness of terrain and battlespace % HVTs ID’d (& Held at Risk) TPFD Closure Capacity TPFD Closure Capacity ISR/Info Search Rates (anti-access systems, COGs) TPFD Closure Capacity Area Defended (air threats, irregular threats) Mobility of forces and support Mobility of forces and support Mobility of forces and support Target(s)-Weapon(s) Pairing Effectiveness “Footprint” in JOA Data-to-Knowledge Processing Capacity Timeliness of Indications & Warning Movement/reaction delay Movement/reaction delay Movement/reaction delay Target track accuracy and holding time Target track accuracy and holding time Target track accuracy and holding time Flexibility/Adaptability of Forces & Suppliers Flexibility/Adaptability of Forces & Suppliers Susceptibility / Vulnerability of HVTs Susceptibility / Vulnerability of HVTs Info Availability (Exchange/Collaboration) Flexibility/Adaptability of Forces & Suppliers Susceptibility / Vulnerability of HVTs Max weapon or effect range Max weapon or effect range Max weapon or effect range Launch platform surviviability Launch platform surviviability Launch platform surviviability Visibility of Supply & Demand Visibility of Supply & Demand “Counter-fire” effectiveness “Counter-fire” effectiveness Timeliness (speed, timing) of Decision-making Visibility of Supply & Demand “Counter-fire” effectiveness Force efficiency Weapon (Effect) Performance (Range, Accuracy, PK) Assessment Accuracy

4. Re-establish status quo in JOA Casualties Time to Achieve Policy Objectives Risk (inside/outside AOR) Gain assured access to JOA Achieve high OPTEMPO e.g. Ship-Days in Gulf or Force Able to Mass Effects e.g. Rate of Effective Ops vs. Centers of Gravity Maneuver forces to gain dominant advantage Precisely engage adversary systems Sustain forces in JOA Protect forces and non-combatants Command/Direct Forces & Support e.g. Centers of Gravity held at risk e.g. Kills Per Sortie - Losses - Damage e.g. Sortie Rate e.g. Avoidable Losses e.g. % Acts Consistent w/Commanders Intent TPFD Closure Capacity Susceptibility / Vulnerability of HVTs Movement/reaction delay Target track accuracy and holding time Info Availability (Exchange/Collaboration) Flexibility/Adaptability of Forces & Suppliers “Counter-fire” effectiveness Max weapon or effect range Launch platform surviviability Timeliness (speed, timing) of Decision-making Assessment Accuracy Measures Of Performance Disrupted By Obstacles To NCW (Future Programs) Awareness of terrain and battlespace % HVTs ID’d (& Held at Risk) TPFD Closure Capacity ISR/Info Search Rates (anti-access systems, COGs) Area Defended (air threats, irregular threats) Mobility of forces and support Mobility of forces and support Target(s)-Weapon(s) Pairing Effectiveness “Footprint” in JOA Data-to-Knowledge Processing Capacity Timeliness of Indications & Warning Movement/reaction delay Target track accuracy and holding time Flexibility/Adaptability of Forces & Suppliers Susceptibility / Vulnerability of HVTs Max weapon or effect range Launch platform surviviability Visibility of Supply & Demand “Counter-fire” effectiveness Visibility of Supply & Demand Force efficiency Weapon (Effect) Performance (Range, Accuracy, PK)

5. Findings • The Joint force will fail to achieve its full potential effectiveness without implementation of Network Centric Warfare principles • Current programs of record are insufficient to implement NCW principles • Future planned programs provide only incremental improvement • Further innovation is necessary to implement NCW • Full integration across program and system lines • Doctrine • Organization • Training UNCLASSIFIED

6. Principal Issue • “Impedance mismatches” in information transfer usually fall along systems, program, mission, and service lines. • ergo: • any organization or program that appears to fall along service lines is suspect • acquisition programs not under a system of systems integration umbrella is suspect UNCLASSIFIED

7. Recommendations • Doctrine and Training • New/modified TTP/CONOPS/Doctrine to fully achieve the capabilities offered by the new technologies • Create a T&E force (JFCOM?) using CONUS-based forces to organize a JTF that will train jointly developing and using NC principles UNCLASSIFIED

8. Recommendations • Systems Integration (Acquisition) • Integrate acquisition programs under NCW focused mission capability area umbrellas with mechanism to balance funding and ensure technical compliance/interoperability (e.g.) • SIAP SE • Link-16/JDN/WIN-T/JTRS/JTI • GCCS • DCGS • Invest in distributed, modeling & simulation environments (such as JDEP, Dnet, and ACETEF) to enable concurrent doctrine and systems development to link warfighter with acquisition communities and rapidly field NCW focused capabilities • Doctrine/tactics development • System development and test • Provide consistent methods to measure and compare system performance UNCLASSIFIED

9. Recommendations • Organization • Create standing JTF Headquarters (at JFCOM?) to train to Joint standards of organization able to respond to world-wide crises, tasks. • Organize (at JTF level) by warfare function (Fires, Maneuver, Resources) vice service (ARFOR, LCC, NAVFOR, JFMCC, JFACC) UNCLASSIFIED

10. Global 2001 Innovation Game Network Centric Warfare Cell UNCLASSIFIED

11. Developing a Joint Task Force Headquarters A Path Ahead 15 September 2014 UNCLASSIFIED

12. Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters • Necessary Functions: • Communicate (Up/Down, Sideways including Coalition and NGO) • General Situational Awareness (Red & Blue) • Logistics (Situational Awareness & Management) • Dynamic Retasking of Intel • Direct Fire • Direct Maneuver • Net Assessment (Effects-based Operations) • Information Operations • Rapid Execution • Current Situation: • Existing capabilities are available now • Joint Mobile Ashore Support Terminals • AN/MSQ-126: Integrated Mobile MARFORPAC Command Post • Multiple ACTDs add additional capability • Programs Examined by DSC: • 48 Advanced Concept Tech Demos • 5 DARPA Programs • 7 Joint Test & Evaluation Projects • 26 Concepts • Known Shortfalls: • Standard Operating Procedures • Trained Staff • System Flexibility • Knowledge Management / Information Superiority • Interoperability • Information Operations / IA / OPSEC UNCLASSIFIED

13. Most Attractive Candidate Systems / Concepts Communications • Airborne C4ISR Node • Extending the Littoral Battlespace • Joint Interface Control Officer Support System Command and Control • Joint Continuous Strike Environment • Automated Deep Operations Coordination System • Federated Assessment Target Enhancement • Adaptive Courses of Action / CINC 21 Logistics • Joint Logistics/Joint Theater Logistics/Coalition Theater Logistics Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance • Integrated Collection Management Information Operations • Information Operations Planning Tool UNCLASSIFIED

14. The JTF HQ Shortfalls Organization No permanent staff Not fully using reachback capabilities Need to integrate JTF HQ Identify and train staff early Collocation of DCGS with JTF Doctrine No clear command relationships Current SOPs and TTPs are not integrated Separate planning and execution processes Sensor control (physical) Dynamic collection management Data dissemination Info Assurance / OPSEC Training Establish a school house Joint operational training is secondary to tactical training Time Critical Targeting cycle Leadership Chain of command and command relationships must be specified Decentralized operations require understanding of commander’s intent Materiel Communications capabilities Common Operating Picture Joint logistics planning Dynamic sensor retasking Low Density / High Demand ISR Platforms Space Based Infrared Joint Fires Interoperability Info Ops/ Assurance/ OPSEC Personnel No assigned personnel Additional Intelligence data to analyze Facilities No dedicated facilities No common facilities ISR Tasking, Processing, Exploitation, Dissemination UNCLASSIFIED

15. Materiel Fixes Solutions Organization No permanent staff Not fully using reachback capabilities Need to integrate JTF HQ Identify and train staff early Collocation of DCGS with JTF Doctrine No clear command relationships Current SOPs and TTPs are not integrated Separate planning and execution processes Sensor control (physical) Dynamic collection management Data dissemination Info Assurance / OPSEC Training Establish a school house Joint operational training is secondary to tactical training Time Critical Targeting cycle Leadership Chain of command and command relationships must be specified Decentralized operations require understanding of commander’s intent Materiel ACN (DARPA) ELB ACTD JICO Support System ACOA ACTD JL/JTL/CTL ACTD ICM ACTD JCSE ACTD ADOCS ACTD FATE System IOPT ACTD Personnel No assigned personnel Additional Intelligence data to analyze Facilities No dedicated facilities No common facilities ISR Tasking, Processing, Exploitation, Dissemination UNCLASSIFIED

16. Approach to Field Standing JTF Headquarters (SJTF HQ) • CINC Ownership • Synergy of Full-Time Staff • Improved Capabilities • Available for Current Operations • Firm Doctrine and Training Foundation Field Capabilities (Initial FY03/04) (Update as Required) Spiral Development Continues CJCS Proposed SJTF HQ Model (11/03) Add Other Attractive Initiatives (9/02 - ?) Review & Modify as Necessary (9-12/02) Test in Millennium Challenge 02 with CINC support (7-8/02) Add Most Attractive Initiatives (9/01-4/02) CJCS Plan for SJTF (3/02) Build on Existing Capability (JMAST) (9/01) JFCOM Experimental SJTF HQ Standup (2/02) UNCLASSIFIED

17. Back Up Slides UNCLASSIFIED

18. Proposed Budget • Includes: • 5 Upgraded Joint Mobile Ashore Support Terminals or similar • Top 10 Recommended Programs $ in Million NOTE: Issue paper being developed for FY02-07 budget through Council of Colonels with COL Krieger UNCLASSIFIED

19. 100 Top 10 80 60 Utility (% of Best) 40 20 0 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Rank (% of Best) Methodology • Examined: • 48 Advanced Concept Tech Demos • 5 DARPA Programs • 7 Joint Test & Eval Projects • 26 Concepts • Sources of requirements/shortfalls: • JTF C2 Study (Joint Staff/DSC) • Other DSC studies • Joint Mission Force • JFCOM Joint Experiments • Global Info Grid/Joint Operational Architecture • Measures: • Ability to satisfy shortfalls • Schedule • Include all C4ISR functional areas UNCLASSIFIED

20. Program Ranking: Top 10 Quality Score: 9 - Adds New Capability 3 - Improves/Integrates Existing Capabilities 1 - Automates Manual Process Maturity Factor: 1 - FY02 .8 - FY03 .7 - Started - IOC Unknown .6 - FY04+ UNCLASSIFIED

21. Program Ranking: The Rest UNCLASSIFIED

22. JTF Concepts/Programs Reviewed • USJFCOM - Millenium Challenge 02 (MC 02) JTF-HQ Forward • USCENTCOM - Joint Deployable C2 Center ACTD • USPACOM - Joint Mission Force (JMF) Systems & Applications • USCINCPAC - Mobile C4 Command Post to Support Contingency JTF Operations • USN Joint Mobile Ashore Support Terminal (JMAST) • USN - Joint Command & Control Capability JCC(X) • USAF - Air Operations Center (AOC) Weapon System • Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE) UNCLASSIFIED

23. Baseline JTF C2 Systems & Applications UNCLASSIFIED

24. UNCLASSIFIED

25. Deployable JTF HQ Options 11th Signal Brigade/EAC 11th Signal Bde Similar Communications Capabilities to JCSE The 11th Signal Brigade is a totally mobile unit headquartered at Fort Huachuca, Ariz. It is the primary provider of rapid-deployment tactical communications anywhere in the world. Using switch, satellite, microwave, cable and tropospheric scatter, the brigade is capable of providing service to units no matter where they are in the world. It provides both long distance and local service. * Normally used to backfill JCSE UNCLASSIFIED

26. Responsibilities • OSD • C3I • Advocacy and oversight of entire program • AT&L • Acquisition oversight • Joint Staff • Advocacy and JROC oversight • CINCs • CINCEUR, CINCCENT, CINCPAC, and CINCSOUTH - Integration, execution, coordination, and local operational control • JFCOM - operational execution, interoperability • Defense Agencies - support • DISA • NSA • Services • Army and Air Force - coordination and support • Navy - planning, programming, budgeting, acquisition management, and program execution UNCLASSIFIED

27. Joint Mobile Ashore Support Terminal (JMAST) CINCPACFLT Programmed Upgrades JTF Enhancement Package Current Capabilities / Hardware • GCCS-M • OTCIXS/TADIXS • Message Handling (DMS0 • Environmental Data/Weather • Tactical Decision Aids • Imagery • Resource Mgt. (MS Office) • Projectors/Briefing Equipment • Phone Switch • Integrated Services Digital Network • HF/VHF/UHF LOS • UHF SATCOM • X-band SHF SATCOM • INMARSAT • SINCGARS • Link-11 • SIPRNET LAN, Terminals • NIPRNET LAN, Terminals • Battle Force email • VTC • Secure Telephone • Fax/Secure Fax • GPS • Generators • Power Distribution • Fuel Storage • UPS • HVAC • DRASH Shelters • Tactical Telephone Switch • Coalition Data Network • GCCS (COP, JOPES) • TBMCS • JDIICS-D • Additional Secure Phones • Additional DSRN • Additional SIPRNET • Additional NIPRNET • Additional Coalition Data Terminals • Unprogrammed Upgrades • JWICS (TRE/TRAP) • Link-16/22 • HaveQuick • Network Encryption System • Upgraded Phone Switch • Prime Movers UNCLASSIFIED