1 / 31

Threat Independent Protection System

Threat Independent Protection System. An active countermeasure system for helicopter applications. Christer Zätterqvist October 18 2010 M-00015364 issue A. The objective. Complete the mission objectives Achieve the same amount of landings as take-offs… Survivability

soo
Download Presentation

Threat Independent Protection System

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. Threat Independent Protection System An active countermeasure system for helicopter applications Christer Zätterqvist October 18 2010 M-00015364 issue A

  2. The objective • Complete the mission objectives • Achieve the same amount of landings as take-offs… • Survivability • Increased Aircraft Combat Survivability (PS) • Susceptibility to threats (PH) • Maximizing PS = 1 - PHPK|H (1- Susceptibility * Vulnerability) • Increased likelihood for mission success

  3. The problem • A plethora of threats • Small arms • IR • IR imaging • RF • Laser • Multi-mode • CLOS • LLTV • Wire • Radio • Unguided • AIED • …

  4. Known threats • MANPADS (SA-7, SA-14, SA-16, SA-18, Stinger, Mistral, HN-5, FN-6) • IR AAM (AIM-9, AIM-132, IRIS-T, AA-8, AA-11) • IR SAM (SA-9, SA-13) • RF AAM (AIM-7, AIM-120, AA-9, AA-12) • RF SAM (Command typ, SA-2, SA-3, SA-4, SA-5, SA-6, SA-8, SA-10, SA-15) • IR/RF AAM (also IR/SARH Semi Active Radar Homing, AA-2, AA-6, AA-7, AA-10 • CLOS (LLTV, Wire (RBS56, Bill), Radar (RBS23, Bamse), Radio • Beam riders (RBS70/90, Starstreak) • AT/RPG (AT4, Carl Gustav, RPG-7)

  5. Known threats Decoys possible Non-decoy technology required BR IR AAM gen. 4 Current capability RF SAM MANPADS gen. 4 CLOS IR AAM gen. 3 Threat technology MANPADS gen. 3 IR SAM IR AAM gen. 2 RF AAM IR AAM gen. 1 MANPADS gen. 2 IR/SARH AAM MANPADS gen. 1 AT/RPG Difficulty to decoy

  6. MANPADS

  7. Less known or emerging threats • AIED • Known attacks using AIED • Envisioned to become more and more used as consumer electronics becomes more and more capable, sample components;

  8. AIED Threat technology AIED Difficulty to decoy

  9. AIED, a design example Verbal description

  10. The problem in a nutshell • A plethora of existing and emerging threats • Limited knowledge of installed seeker/guidance technology • Unguided threats do not respond to decoys • Proliferation of developed weapons • Development trend of consumer electronics

  11. Downed helicopters in Iraq 1 • 68 helicopters lost to insurgent fire, resulting in 201 fatalities [1] Source; The Brookings Institution, Iraq Index October 1, 2007

  12. Actions • Preventive / Tactical • Arms control • Port and border security • Tactics • Flying tactics and operating procedures • Speed / altitude • Situational awareness • ConOps • Technical • Hardening of structure • Ruggedized airframe • Blast protection • Signature reduction • System redundancy • Countermeasures Layers of protection • Survivability = 1- (Susceptibility * Vulnerability)

  13. Analysis, threat matrix • Analysis of common threat characteristics • Highly transportable • Designed to fly… • On-board propellant • Similar physical attributes • Similar kinetic energy

  14. Analysis, proliferated threats

  15. Result of analysis • A CMDS is needed to address the plethora of current, emerging and future threats • Use knowledge of common threat characteristics No such system exists today for flying platforms

  16. TIPS, the idea • To physically counter incoming threats regardless of guidance technology, if at all present....

  17. Threat characteristics • Counter threats with the following characteristics • Portable by a single person • Speed: 84 – 600 m/s • Mass: 1,9 – 10,8 kg • Body/warhead diameter: 4 – 10,5 cm • Altitude: 0 – 3500 m • Range to shooter: xx – 5000 m

  18. Threat characteristics • Threats smaller than 4 cm = HFI • Angle/sector indication • Range indication

  19. TIPS, one system – all threats • System functions • Detect • Launch • Intercept • Defeat

  20. TIPS, one system – all threats • System functions • Detect • Radar • Short range • High resolution • 360° coverage • Installed on the platform • Launch • Intercept • Defeat

  21. TIPS, one system – all threats • System functions • Detect • Launch • A directional launcher • Azimuth and elevation • Directed towards the incoming threat • Launch of counter-projectile • Sector inhibit function • Intercept • Defeat

  22. TIPS, one system – all threats • System functions • Detect • Launch • Intercept • Counter Projectile • Short range • Guided towards the incoming threat using own platform guidance data • Defeat

  23. TIPS, one system – all threats • System functions • Detect • Launch • Intercept • Defeat • Defeat mechanism • The threat defeat mechanism is activated at a suitable distance from the incoming threat • Remote or proximity activated • Preferably non-explosive

  24. Datalink Discrete signal Wireless datalink TIPS system building blocks TDCU Tactical Display & Control Unit ADC Active Defense Controller SPU Safety Pin Unit Display Radar sensor Radar sensor ADC SPU Sensor Controller Wireless Transceiver Launcher Radar sensor Radar sensor Counter Projectile(s)

  25. TIPS system building blocks

  26. TIPS connected to existing CMDS

  27. Simulation

  28. Sample installation, Super Puma

  29. Conclusion • Investigation shows it is possible to develop a system capable of defeating targeted threats • Will affect platform ConOps • Development cost is significant

  30. Questions?

More Related