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UN Intelligence Possibilities and limitations

UN Intelligence Possibilities and limitations. Presentation to Folke Bernadotte Thursday, 2 April 2009 Claire Bamber, Peacekeeping Situation Centre, DPKO. Bond in a blue beret?. Not exactly…. Total deployment in September 2008: 111,600 88,754 uniformed personnel and 20,690 civilians

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UN Intelligence Possibilities and limitations

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  1. UN Intelligence Possibilities and limitations Presentation to Folke Bernadotte Thursday, 2 April 2009 Claire Bamber, Peacekeeping Situation Centre, DPKO

  2. Bond in a blue beret? Not exactly…

  3. Total deployment in September 2008: 111,600 88,754 uniformed personnel and 20,690 civilians From 119 countries DPKO HQ support Budget for 01 July 2008 – 30 June 2009: Near $USD 7.1 billion 1,000+ HQ staff supporting 100,000+ in the field

  4. New Directive • DPKO Directive on JOC and JMAC was approved by USG DPKO on 1 July 2006 upon the advice of the DPKO Senior Management Team. • Issued to all DPKO-led missions on 12 July 2006.

  5. The JMAC Approach Objectives of the JMAC approach are three-fold: • Support integrated mission management. • Support mission security. • Support informed decision-making across all components. • Not a decision-making body and does not replace existing management or command structures at any level. • It supports decision-making, operations management and mission security.

  6. CASE STUDY: MINUSTAH The Capstone Doctrine: “A PKO must continuously analyse its operating environment to detect and forestall any wavering of consent… and must have the political and analytical skills… to manage situations where there is an absence or breakdown of local consent.”

  7. HUMAN INTELLIGENCE: Information provided by locals helped the UN in making arrests.

  8. Working with the HNP An opportunity and a challenge…

  9. Imagery intelligence Aerial imagery allowed MINUSTAH to produce useful maps, identify weapons storage sites, hiding places for victims of kidnapping, the rebel leaders’ bases and to map out dozens of potential sniper positions.

  10. Success… despite the lack of signals intelligence “MINUSTAH’s JMAC established the gold standard for intelligence support for planning and execution of operations mounted to defend and enforce the mandate.” United Institute of Peace Report 2008

  11. CASE STUDY: MONUC MONUC’s JMAC: about military operations… and much more.

  12. Stabilisation Plan for Eastern DRC – a JMAC plan

  13. Transformed access to and by the local population.

  14. UNOPS: building roads a kilometre at a time.

  15. UN agencies and others benefitted from the more secure environment.

  16. No SIGINT but…

  17. Local staff have access to humint that international staff might otherwise lack.

  18. JMAC: The Challenges • Lack of clarity of concept • Lack of buy-in by Mission leadership • Competition and duplication with mission political affairs, civil affairs, military operations and intelligence and security • Poor staff choices • Inadequate mission direction

  19. Questions & Comments?

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