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Japan`s Direction: Pacifism & Legitimate Use of Force Daiwa Foundation, London, 13 November 2013

Japan`s Direction: Pacifism & Legitimate Use of Force Daiwa Foundation, London, 13 November 2013. Reinhard Drifte R. デリフテ 杜浩 Emeritus Professor, Newcastle U. Royal United Services Institute, London HP: www.rfwdrifte.ukgo.com/. The risks of territorial + maritime border conflicts.

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Japan`s Direction: Pacifism & Legitimate Use of Force Daiwa Foundation, London, 13 November 2013

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  1. Japan`s Direction: Pacifism & Legitimate Use of ForceDaiwa Foundation, London, 13 November 2013 Reinhard Drifte R.デリフテ杜浩 Emeritus Professor, Newcastle U. Royal United Services Institute, London HP: www.rfwdrifte.ukgo.com/

  2. The risks of territorial + maritime border conflicts • permanent thorn in bilateral/trilateral relationships; • Damage to economic benefit from resources for either side • Domestic manipulation to gain leverage; • Time factor: solution becomes ever more difficult; • China: Risk of demonstrations against Japan turning against the government • China: spoiling China`s reputation as a `good neighbour` • Negative impact on SCS disputes; • Undermining international law and the principle of peaceful resolution of such conflicts • sporadic incidents which can result in armed confrontation; • naval arms race;

  3. PRC escalatory measures since 11 September 2012: Coast Guard [CMS] • (Background: Rhetoric warfare; economic & political retribution) • Regularizing Chinese coast guard patrols in EEZ/CZ/Territorial Waters (Alternation between piano & forte: frequency; number of vessels; length of time in TW →) as of Nov 2013: 69 times TW • - 2010 FLEC into CZ, August 2011 into TW • - CMS into TW 16.3.2012 (J`s island naming), July 2012 (Kokuyuka announcement); 19 Sept 2012 6 vessels: start of regular patrols) • - Dec 2012/Feb 2013: Haijian 50 opening hangar doors as if launching helicopter… • Outcome: Japan`s + China`s coast guard vessels facing each other constantly in the waters around the Senkaku Islands but only formalized verbal confrontation (“get out!”; “Our territory!”) (contrast with exchange of water cannon salvos 25.9.2012 + 24 January 2013 with Taiwan!) • Operational constraints (incentive for escalation to military level?): lack of CG vessels; China reconditioning naval vessels – Japan abandoned the idea; reduction of leave time; closer cooperation between PRC coast guard & military; 22 July 2013 merger of China`s 4 “dragons” under SOA (“Kwantung Army”? Or “Rottweiler”?)

  4. Source: Asahi 29.9.2010http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201009280282.html

  5. CMS aircraft deployment leading to ASDF involvement • 2012 January: announcement of deployment of CMS aircraft “by 2012” • 2012 December 13: CMS turbocraft (Y12) flying over Uotsurijima • - Only possible Japanese operational reaction is deployment of ASDF: 8 ASDF aircraft scrambled (too late) • - Problem: closest radar position is 200 km from Senkaku on Miyakojima • Since then regular CMS aircraft patrols (normally at a distance of 120 km) • Global Times: “Japan aggressive”; “PRC may respond with air force” • Asahi Shimbun: “a highly provocative act that could lead to an armed conflict” • 2013 January: Japanese media report consideration of using tracer bullets (warning shots); denied by gov`t

  6. PRC escalatory measures since 11 September 2012: PLAA involvement • 2013 January: PLAA sends 2 fighter jets against 2 ASDF F-15 interceptors which were following a PLAA Y8 transport aircraft patrolling the PRC oil platforms • Japan: 2013 July-September scramble: out of 193 times, 80 times vs PLAA (+11 over April-June 2013); April-December 2012 160 times vs PLAA (always more vs Russia!) • 2013 Oct 27-29 daily flights through Miyako strait of H-6 bom. +Y-8 surveillance aircraft • Japan: Since 13 Dec 2012 incident: round the clock radar surveillance aircraft (4 AWACS from Hamamatsu; 13 E2C from Misawa) for Senkaku island area • Japan: ASDF deploys F-15 from Naha (Okinawa), 400 km from S. (=20 min flight time); Japan not (yet?) using warning shots as done against Soviet Union; considering to deploy F-15 from ShimojishimaAirport at 200 km from S.

  7. PRC escalatory measures since 11 September 2012: PLAN involvement • 2012 October 16: PLAN vessels in CZ between Yonaguni and Iriomoto for 1st time (typhoon?) • 2012 December: 4 PLAN vessels passing from Pacific through waters between Yonaguni and Iriomoto (normally Okinawa-Miyakojima) • 2013 19 January: PLAN vessel`s firing radar lock-on on MSDF helicopter (involvement of US AWACS!) • 2013 30 January: PLAN vessel`s firing radar lock-on on MSDF destroyer • (PM Noda: greater distance than 3 km; PM Abe: reversal)

  8. PRC escalatory measures since 11 September 2012: Deployment of Drones • 2012 State Ocean Administration announcing deployment of drones “by 2012” • 2012 Dec 15 + 2013 June: drone “apparently came near Senkaku” • 2013 September 3: SOA announced plans to set up 11 bases in coastal areas to operate drone flights in the Pacific • 2013 September 9: Chinese drone outside Japanese air space (ADIZ) 200 km NE of Senkaku (PRC confirmed “aircraft”); ASDF scrambled • 2013 Oct 20: PM Abe approves draft to shoot down foreign drones that intrude into Japan’s airspace if warnings to leave are ignored • 2013 Oct 26: PRC Defense Ministry Spokesman: shooting down “act of war”, would prompt retaliation • 2013 Oct 28: Japan's Chief Cabinet Secretary: Japan will respond lawfully should a Chinese drone violate Japan's airspace

  9. Further Japanese countermeasures • 2013 Jan 13: GSDF elite forces (1st Airborne Brigade) staging public display of retaking island in Chiba Pref. (Narashino) • 2013 Jan: Coast Guard decided to create 600 –member unit exclusively for front-line missions; more 10,000 t class vessels • 2013 Sept 9: Plans for Iwojima-based radar • 2013 Oct: MSDF considering deployment of unmanned helicopters • 2013 Nov: Ground-Ship missiles from north J deployed at Miyakojima drill

  10. What are the Chinese intentions? • Demonstrate that Japan is no longer exerting exclusive control over the islands (contested sovereignty) • Force Japan to admit that there is “territorial dispute” by making this obvious to Japan and the rest of the world • Force Japan to admit that there was a tacit agreement to shelve the dispute (to go back to it?)

  11. The US role: creator, beneficiary, promoter & victim • US: Japan-US Security Treaty Art. 5 applies to Senkaku because “under Japanese administration”, but no automatic US military involvement • US: no position on “sovereignty” (despite “residual sovereignty” in 1951!) • Would Japan risk US security guarantee if it makes a compromise on its administrative rights? • Japanese efforts to get more explicit US support ; “test case of the alliance”? • US dilemma : getting more Japanese burden sharing (for US “rebalancing”); pressure on Japan to finalize Okinawa relocation; “collective defence”, etc • But: develop politically positive & economically lucrative US-PRC relations

  12. US: delicate balancing • US: insisting on diplomatic solution, no use of force (ECS/SCS), opposes "any unilateral actions that would seek to undermine Japanese administration”… (warning against kokuyuka before Sept 2012)… • … while enhancing US force deployment in Japan, joint exercises, etc • - (announcement of F-35 deployment in Iwakuni for 2017; Osprey deployment in Okinawa good for Senkaku defence; June 2013 exercise in Calif. “retaking island”) • - 2013 Jan 10: U.S. introduced AWACS aircraft to East China Sea airspace • - 2013 Oct 2: 2+2 meeting confirms US security guarantee + will rotate long-distance surveillance drones to Japan and deploy its new P-8 maritime patrol aircraft • - 2012 Nov 10: agreement to begin strategic talks for a review of guidelines for bilateral defence cooperation • China urging US to “maintain neutrality”

  13. Improving political climate: A mature understanding of Confidence Building Measures (CBM) • Goal: to avoid military clashes, arms races, and decrease distrust about intentions of the other side • Means: military-to-military dialogues; “Hot Line” of communication for emergencies; joint training for natural catastrophes; fleet visits, etc • Problem: PRC misunderstanding of CBM; better: Distrust-reducing measures; not a means to extract prior concessions! • Result: no military-to-military dialogues; no military hot line; no military aircraft for earthquake relief (Sichuan; Tohoku); fleet visits only since 2007 • Much better between PRC-ROK; PRC-US, etc • Structural problems: PRC secrecy; under-developed military diplomacy (CCP role); different levels of military modernization

  14. Literature • Reinhard Drifte, The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Territorial Dispute between Japan and China. Between the Materialization of the `China Threat` and `Reversing the Outcome of World War II`?, UNISCI Discussion Papers (Complutense University of Madrid), no. 32 May 2013, pp. 9-62, http://tinyurl.com/ka27pvy • Reinhard Drifte, From `Sea of Confrontation` to `Sea of Peace, Cooperation and Friendship`? - Japan facing China in the East China Sea, Japan Aktuell 3, 2008, pp. 27-51.http://www.giga-hamburg.de/dl/download.php?d=/content/publikationen/archiv/ja_aktuell/jaa_0803_fokus_drifte.pdf

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