Ukrainian Crises and Russia’s Domestic Agenda Vladimir Gel’man

1. Ukrainian Crises and Russia’s Domestic Agenda Vladimir Gel’man (European University at St.Petersburg / University of Helsinki) Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 11 September 2014

2. Ukrainian crises (Russian annexation of Crimea, military clash in Donbass, and ongoing major confrontation with the West) - a “trigger event” for changing domestic political and economic landscape in Russia; rise of regime’s public support; “tightening the screws” in terms of civil and political rights and liberties; “statist turn” in economic policy and decline of quality of governance; further regime’s personalization and securitization

3. Ukrainian Crises and Russia's Domestic Agenda • Russia before 2014: • “political hangover” syndrome after 2011-2012 protests – regime’s counter-offense towards the opposition, gradual “tightening of the screws”; • numerous instances of undermining status-quo from within - gradual decline of public support; regime’s troubles in mayoral elections (Moscow, Yekaterinburg, Novosibirsk); • gradual slowdown of economic growth, no way to repeat the miracle of 1999-2008 (but strong expectations and Kremlin’s populist promises)

4. Ukrainian Crises and Russia's Domestic Agenda “Ukrainian scenario” – the major sources of fears in the Kremlin: Orange revolution of 2004 (a rebellion against fraudulent elections) – a trigger event for elimination of electoral competition in Russia and attacks towards media, NGOs, etc. (some trends were observed much earlier); Overthrow of Yanukovich in 2014 (a rebellion against ‘crooks and thieves’) was perceived in the Kremlin as a result of Western conspiracy and as a testing ground for Russia;

5. Ukrainian Crises and Russia's Domestic Agenda • Kremlin’s reaction on Ukrainian regime change should be analyzed not only as a matter of foreign affairs but also as a top item in domestic agenda; • Political survival of authoritarian regimes and their leaders – the priority No.1 in various settings; • Reformatting of ‘winning coalitions’ (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2011) as the major tool of domestic politics; • Heterogeneity of the ‘winning coalition’ in Russia before Ukrainian crises; • ‘Resigned acceptance’ of the status quo by mass public – a source of potential risks

6. Ukrainian Crises and Russia's Domestic Agenda • Short-term effects of annexation of Crimea: • The rise of regime’s public support (up to 80+%, according to mass surveys); • Campaigns against ‘national-traitors’ as arguments for more anti-democratic laws and practices of their implementing (‘foreign agents’, laws on elections and parties, censorship in the Internet, etc.); • Further decline of influence of ‘economic liberals’ in the government, of businessmen beyond the ‘inner circle’ of cronies, etc. • Reliance upon military/security apparatus as the major information source (Gaaze, 2014); • Personalist instead of collegial decision-making

7. Ukrainian Crises and Russia's Domestic Agenda • Side effects of continuity of Ukrainian crises after annexation of Crimea on Russia’s domestic agenda: • Involvement of the Russian military (no way to avoid causalities); • Self-imposed counter-sanctions (major ban on food import from EU/US/Japan, Norway, de-facto foreign travel ban for military and law enforcement officers, etc.); • Economic uncertainty (major capital flight, 0% growth at best for 2014); • Increasing risks of inadequate decisions in many policy areas

8. Ukrainian Crises and Russia's Domestic Agenda • Whether or not the aggravation of numerous regime’s problems against the background of major conflict with the West will lead to its collapse? • Not necessarily, at least, in the short-term perspective; • “Bad policy is almost always good politics” (Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, 2011); • Limited capabilities of organized dissent within the country – both at the level of elites and masses; • A relatively large margin of strength for the economy

9. Ukrainian Crises and Russia's Domestic Agenda • International sanctions might serve as an efficient tool of containment on international arena, but their domestic effects are limited and far from being immediate (Marinov, 2012); • Direct military collision is extremely unpopular on domestic arena but the Kremlin not employed this tool on a fully-fledged manner as of yet; • Purges towards elites, reshufflings of government, etc. are possible as an instrument of ‘switching the blame’; • Regime could survive if exogenous shocks will be not strong enough

10. Ukrainian Crises and Russia's Domestic Agenda • Comments are welcome (gelman@eu.spb.ru) • Thanks for your attention!