Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics , V.7

1. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, V.7 Lectio, Divisio, Commentaria

2. Lectio Of political justice part is natural, part legal, natural, that which everywhere has the same force and does not exist by people's thinking this or that; legal, that which is originally indifferent, but when it has been laid down is not indifferent, e.g. that a prisoner's ransom shall be a mina, or that a goat and not two sheep shall be sacrificed, and again all the laws that are passed for particular cases, e.g. that sacrifice shall be made in honour of Brasidas, and the provisions of decrees. Now some think that all justice is of this sort, because that which is by nature is unchangeable and has everywhere the same force (as fire burns both here and in Persia), while they see change in the things recognized as just. This, however, is not true in this unqualified way, but is true in a sense; or rather, with the gods it is perhaps not true at all, while with us there is something that is just even by nature, yet all of it is changeable; but still some is by nature, some not by nature. It is evident which sort of thing, among things capable of being otherwise, is by nature, and which is not but is legal and conventional, assuming that both are equally changeable. And in all other things the same distinction will apply; by nature the right hand is stronger, yet it is possible that all men should come to be ambidextrous. The things which are just by virtue of convention and expediency are like measures; for wine and corn measures are not everywhere equal, but larger in wholesale and smaller in retail markets. Similarly, the things which are just not by nature but by human enactment are not everywhere the same, since constitutions also are not the same, though there is but one which is everywhere by nature the best. Of things just and lawful each is related as the universal to its particulars; for the things that are done are many, but of them each is one, since it is universal.

3. Divisio: Observe the main divisions Of political justice part is natural, part legal, natural, that which everywhere has the same force and does not exist by people's thinking this or that; legal, that which is originally indifferent, but when it has been laid down is not indifferent, e.g. that a prisoner's ransom shall be a mina, or that a goat and not two sheep shall be sacrificed, and again all the laws that are passed for particular cases, e.g. that sacrifice shall be made in honour of Brasidas, and the provisions of decrees. // Now some think that all justice is of this sort, because that which is by nature is unchangeable and has everywhere the same force (as fire burns both here and in Persia), while they see change in the things recognized as just. This, however, is not true in this unqualified way, but is true in a sense; or rather, with the gods it is perhaps not true at all, while with us there is something that is just even by nature, yet all of it is changeable; but still some is by nature, some not by nature. // It is evident which sort of thing, among things capable of being otherwise, is by nature, and which is not but is legal and conventional, assuming that both are equally changeable. And in all other things the same distinction will apply; by nature the right hand is stronger, yet it is possible that all men should come to be ambidextrous. The things which are just by virtue of convention and expediency are like measures; for wine and corn measures are not everywhere equal, but larger in wholesale and smaller in retail markets. Similarly, the things which are just not by nature but by human enactment are not everywhere the same, since constitutions also are not the same, though there is but one which is everywhere by nature the best. Of things just and lawful each is related as the universal to its particulars; for the things that are done are many, but of them each is one, since it is universal.

4. Divisio: Name the main divisions I. He draws a distinction Of political justice part is natural, part legal, natural, that which everywhere has the same force and does not exist by people's thinking this or that; legal, that which is originally indifferent, but when it has been laid down is not indifferent, e.g. that a prisoner's ransom shall be a mina, or that a goat and not two sheep shall be sacrificed, and again all the laws that are passed for particular cases, e.g. that sacrifice shall be made in honour of Brasidas, and the provisions of decrees. II. He refutes an objection Now some think that all justice is of this sort, because that which is by nature is unchangeable and has everywhere the same force (as fire burns both here and in Persia), while they see change in the things recognized as just. This, however, is not true in this unqualified way, but is true in a sense; or rather, with the gods it is perhaps not true at all, while with us there is something that is just even by nature, yet all of it is changeable; but still some is by nature, some not by nature. III. He explains variations in natural justice It is evident which sort of thing, among things capable of being otherwise, is by nature, and which is not but is legal and conventional, assuming that both are equally changeable. And in all other things the same distinction will apply; by nature the right hand is stronger, yet it is possible that all men should come to be ambidextrous. The things which are just by virtue of convention and expediency are like measures; for wine and corn measures are not everywhere equal, but larger in wholesale and smaller in retail markets. Similarly, the things which are just not by nature but by human enactment are not everywhere the same, since constitutions also are not the same, though there is but one which is everywhere by nature the best. Of things just and lawful each is related as the universal to its particulars; for the things that are done are many, but of them each is one, since it is universal.

5. Divisio: Work on the main divisions one-by-one I. He draws a distinction Of political justice part is natural, part legal, natural, that which everywhere has the same force and does not exist by people's thinking this or that; legal, that which is originally indifferent, but when it has been laid down is not indifferent, e.g. that a prisoner's ransom shall be a mina, or that a goat and not two sheep shall be sacrificed, and again all the laws that are passed for particular cases, e.g. that sacrifice shall be made in honour of Brasidas, and the provisions of decrees.

6. Divisio: Divide the first division I. He draws a distinction Of political justice part is natural, part legal//natural, that which everywhere has the same force and does not exist by people's thinking this or that; // legal, that which is originally indifferent, but when it has been laid down is not indifferent, // e.g. that a prisoner's ransom shall be a mina, or that a goat and not two sheep shall be sacrificed, // and again all the laws that are passed for particular cases, // e.g. that sacrifice shall be made in honour of Brasidas, and the provisions of decrees.

7. Divisio: Present the first division in outline form • He draws a distinction Of political justice part is natural, part legal: • natural, that which everywhere has the same force and does not exist by people's thinking this or that; • legal, • that which is originally indifferent, but when it has been laid down is not indifferent, e.g. • that a prisoner's ransom shall be a mina, or • that a goat and not two sheep shall be sacrificed, • and again all the laws that are passed for particular cases, e.g. • that sacrifice shall be made in honour of Brasidas, and • the provisions of decrees.

8. Commentary on the first part“Of political justice part is natural, part legal” • “Justice” is to dikaion, viz. a just state of affairs, not the virtue of justice (dikaiosunê). • This is a distinction drawn for political justice only, because convention plays no role in familiar (paternal) justice, which was just discussed. • “Natural” renders phusikon. From Aristotle’s usage later it is clear that for him “natural justice” means the same as “just by nature” (phusei). • Of these two views, “All justice is conventional”, vs. “All justice is natural”, Aristotle is close to affirming the latter, but he does so because he defines the former narrowly (basically, no contribution from nature; merely by agreement or choice); and because he has a broad understanding of natural justice (a claim of justice supported by appeal to the nature of the things talked about). E.g. in the debate over abortion, “I can do what I want with my own body” is an appeal to natural justice as much as “The unborn child has a right to life”. A claim of conventional justice would be uncommon and be something like: “It’s legal, so it’s not wrong”, or “Categories of right and wrong are merely social constructs”.

9. “that which everywhere has the same force and does not exist by people's thinking this or that” • This represents a definition which Aristotle evidently accepts and is setting down. • The definition has two parts: presumably the second part follows from the first part (the Greek term rendered by “and” is epexegetical). So the first part is the crucial part. • The phrase “nature has the same force” springs from a view of nature as involving powers and impediments; in this case, something in the nature of things has the same influence over our thoughts about what should or should not be done. His example later: the difference between wholesale and retail markets everywhere inclines men to think it best to choose larger measures for the former and smaller measures for the latter. A similar example: our common nature everywhere inclines men to think it wrong to murder. • Note: what he says here has important implications for interpreting his remarks on the difficulty of formulating general principles given the variability of the subject matter. The variability affects the “manifestation” of natures, not the natures themselves.

10. “that which is originally indifferent, but when it has been laid down is not indifferent” • It’s unclear whether this is meant to be a different type of conventional justice from the next. That examples of each are given suggests that it is. • A traditional example of this is a road: whether it is made one-way in one direction than another is a matter of indifference. But in fact the example is poor, because usually there are good reasons for making it one way rather than another. (Of course, these reasons do not derive from the nature of this road itself.) • Aristotle’s examples are chosen to illustrate cases in which there really is no fact of the matter of what counts as a satisfactory amount, because (in the first case) the things exchanged are incommensurable (a penny would be just as equal to a person’s life as a million dollars); and (in the second case) he is assuming that nothing we do for the gods even approaches repaying them.

11. “all the laws that are passed for particular cases” • Here there is no suggestion that there is indifference in how particular cases are settled. • But presumably there can be “differences in judgment” among persons of good will, and someone will have the authority to settle it nonetheless. • Suppose he settles it in a way we regard as less than ideal: nonetheless, following his decree is just, because he had authority to settle it. The correct explanation for why it’s just to follow the decree must appeal to his authority to decide, and to the decision, not to the nature of the case. • Note that Socrates’ acquiescence in the justice of the decision of the Athenian jury is like this.

12. Divisio: The second main section II. He refutes an objection Now some think that all justice is of this sort, because that which is by nature is unchangeable and has everywhere the same force (as fire burns both here and in Persia), while they see change in the things recognized as just. This, however, is not true in this unqualified way, but is true in a sense; or rather, with the gods it is perhaps not true at all, while with us there is something that is just even by nature, yet all of it is changeable; but still some is by nature, some not by nature. How would you divide this up? What are the main sections?

13. II. He refutes an objection Now some think that all justice is of this sort, because that which is by nature is unchangeable and has everywhere the same force (as fire burns both here and in Persia), while they see change in the things recognized as just. //This, however, is not true in this unqualified way, but is true in a sense;// or rather, with the gods it is perhaps not true at all, while with us there is something that is just even by nature, yet all of it is changeable; //but still some is by nature, some not by nature. - - -

14. Divisio: outline the section II. He refutes an objection • Now some think that all justice is of this sort, because that which is by nature is unchangeable and has everywhere the same force (as fire burns both here and in Persia), while they see change in the things recognized as just. • This, however, is not true in this unqualified way, but is true in a sense; • or rather, with the gods it is perhaps not true at all, while with us there is something that is just even by nature, yet all of it is changeable; • but still some is by nature, some not by nature.

15. Divisio: outline the section II. He refutes an objection • Now some think that all justice is of this sort, because that which is by nature is unchangeable and has everywhere the same force (as fire burns both here and in Persia), while they see change in the things recognized as just. • This <viz. that what is by nature is unchangeable>,however, is not true in this unqualified way, but is true in a sense; • or rather, with the gods <what is by nature> is perhaps not true at all <changeable>, while with us there is something that is just even by nature, yet all of it is changeable; • but still some <justice> is by nature, some not by nature.

16. “that which is by nature is unchangeable and has everywhere the same force” Note that the objection adds something to the definition of that which is by nature: that it be unchangeable. Aristotle does not endorse this formulation. Aristotle “hides” this change to make the objection seem more plausible.

17. “This <viz. that what is by nature is unchangeable>, however, is not true in this unqualified way, but is true in a sense;” • The sense in which it is true that nature is unchangeable is simply that a nature everywhere has the same force. • It’s not true that a nature is unchangeable without qualification (Latin: simpliciter), because the degree and way in which a nature is manifested, or its being impeded, can change in different circumstances. • Aristotle has so little sympathy with the objection that he regards it as enough to point out that the objection hinges on a false premise. He does not go out of his way to devise other plausible arguments for the view that all political justice is conventional.

18. “with the gods <what is by nature> is perhaps not true at all <changeable>,” • It was standard Aristotelian doctrine that the celestial bodies were gods or animated by gods, and that these has definite natures (to rotate spheres in the way that they do) but that they are unchanging their operation as well as in their nature.

19. “but still some <justice> is by nature, some not by nature” • This looks like a lead in to the next section and might appropriately be given as the heading of the third and last section, since this is what Aristotle tries to explain there.

20. Divisio: the third main section III. He explains how part of what is just in changeable things is by nature and part is by convention It is evident which sort of thing, among things capable of being otherwise, is by nature, and which is not but is legal and conventional, assuming that both are equally changeable. And in all other things the same distinction will apply; by nature the right hand is stronger, yet it is possible that all men should come to be ambidextrous. The things which are just by virtue of convention and expediency are like measures; for wine and corn measures are not everywhere equal, but larger in wholesale and smaller in retail markets. Similarly, the things which are just not by nature but by human enactment are not everywhere the same, since constitutions also are not the same, though there is but one which is everywhere by nature the best. Of things just and lawful each is related as the universal to its particulars; for the things that are done are many, but of them each is one, since it is universal.

21. Divisio: the third main section III. He explains how part of what is just in changeable things is by nature and part is by convention It is evident which sort of thing, among things capable of being otherwise, is by nature, and which is not but is legal and conventional, assuming that both are equally changeable.// And in all other things the same distinction will apply; by nature the right hand is stronger, yet it is possible that all men should come to be ambidextrous. //The things which are just by virtue of convention and expediency are like measures; for wine and corn measures are not everywhere equal, but larger in wholesale and smaller in retail markets.// Similarly, the things which are just not by nature but by human enactment are not everywhere the same, since constitutions also are not the same, though there is but one which is everywhere by nature the best. //Of things just and lawful each is related as the universal to its particulars; for the things that are done are many, but of them each is one, since it is universal.

22. III. He explains how part of what is just in changeable things is by nature and part is by convention [by nature] It is evident which sort of thing, among things capable of being otherwise, is by nature, and which is not but is legal and conventional, assuming that both are equally changeable, and in all other things the same distinction will apply; by nature the right hand is stronger, yet it is possible that all men should come to be ambidextrous. • [by convention, first kind] The things which are just by virtue of convention and expediency are like measures for wine and corn measures are not everywhere equal, but larger in wholesale and smaller in retail markets. • [by convention, second kind] Similarly, the things which are just not by nature but by human enactment are not everywhere the same, since constitutions also are not the same, though there is but one which is everywhere by nature the best. • Of things just and lawful each is related as the universal to its particulars; for the things that are done are many, but of them each is one, since it is universal.

23. “It is evident” • This shows he has little patience (as was said) for the view that everything is by convention. • In brief: something is not just by convention, if there is no convention. • A convention: an agreement, or a decree.

24. “by nature the right hand is stronger, yet it is possible that all men should come to be ambidextrous.” • This is usually misunderstood by commentators. Aristotle’s point is not one about the predominance of right-handed over left-handed, but rather a point about how universally (in different times and places) people are right-handed—therefore this is ‘by nature’, because it ‘everywhere has the same force’—and yet it would be possible to impede this dominance by an intensive intervention. • Such an intervention could hardly succeed in all cases, or uniformly in a small number of cases; and always it would require a kind of “violence” and much difficulty. Compare: Aristotle’s critique of Plato’s communism.

25. “wine and corn measures are not everywhere equal, but larger in wholesale and smaller in retail markets” • This example is meant to show the separate contributions of nature and convention when convention fixes something originally indifferent. • In all times and places, wholesale measures are larger than retail measures, by the nature of the case—this is the contribution of ‘nature.’ • But which units are used for each kind of measure (e.g. liter vs. quart) is a matter of convention, as it is purely indifferent.

26. “constitutions also are not the same, though there is but one which is everywhere by nature the best” • This seems a reference to Aristotle’s idea that political theory has two aspects: determining the best constitution, and determining which constitution would be best for a certain people in certain circumstances. • It looks like an a fortiori argument: if something so decisive and fundamental as the best instantiation of the ideal constitution varies in different circumstances, then it is hardly surprising that “human enactment” might generally realize the same ideal of justice differently in different circumstance.