210 likes | 355 Views
Joining Forces. Quality in contracts for public transport. Brussels, 29.06.2005. Denmark. North Sea. Baltic Sea. Poland. Netherlands. Belgium. Czech Republik. Lux. Stuttgart. France. Region. Austria. Switzerland. Stuttgart Region within Germany. Hamburg. Berlin. Bonn.
E N D
Joining Forces Quality in contracts for public transport Brussels, 29.06.2005
Denmark North Sea Baltic Sea Poland Netherlands Belgium Czech Republik Lux. Stuttgart France Region Austria Switzerland Stuttgart Region within Germany Hamburg Berlin Bonn Frankfurt Munich
Integration area Integration area: 3,012 km2 Inhabitants: 2.366 million Employees: 0.9 million Cities and villages: 141 26 years of experience with integration One integration company for - hosting the sharing of the revenue - informing passengers about timetables and fares
Full integration - zone system for determination of the ticket fare - one ticket for all modes - same fare for all modes - several interchanges are possible - fare is not depending on number of interchanges Integration system
Operators in the Region • German Rail: Regional Rail + S-Bahn • WEG (Connex): Regional Rail • SSB (Operator of the City of Stuttgart): Light Rail, Trams and Buses • 40 more or less private bus operators: regional buses
The PTAs in the Stuttgart Region • State of Baden-Württemberg: all regional trains despite: • Stuttgart Region: S-Bahn + some regional trains within the region • 4 districts: regional buses • City of Stuttgart: light rail, tram and city-buses
The Suburban Rail System S-Bahn • 6 lines • 248 line-km • 8.5 million train-km/year (plus 0.4 mn train-km for regional trains) • Total costs around 140 million Euro • Subsidies: around 50 million Euro • Duration of contract : 01.07.2003 – 12/2013
Objectives of the quality chapter • Get an overview if there is a (major) gap between the quality delivered and the quality as contracted. • In case of a major gap: in which field of the quality does it exist? • Find out if it is only a problem of the operator or a sytematic one (f.ex. bad infrastructure). In the latter case: What can we do to minimize the gap (based on the malus-payments)?
Indicators included in the contract I Total amount for bonus/malus: 954.677 €
Indicators included in the contract II Objective indicators
Indicators included in the contract III Subjective indicators
Method of measurement of the indicators I Objective: • Punctuality: complete inventory count on at least 3 stations for each train • Cleanliness: 4 waves with total 220 trains per year, trained personnel • Management of complaints: complete inventory count of complaints and time for answering • Function of ticket machines: 4 waves with 2 days per wave, personnel of DB
Method of measurement of the indicators II Subjective: • 6 waves per year • 640 passengers are interviewed • external personnel
Method of computation of bonus and malus • if measured value is outside field of tolerance: bonus (if better) or malus has to be paid • amount is rising linear • bonus/malus is cut off at defined levels • all in all the operator can not realize a bonus; bonus is only for minimizing the malus (in the best case to 0 €) • trains that don‘t run are outside this malus-system and don‘t have to be paid by the PTA
Conciliation procedure • conciliation procedure is only defined for the rest of the contract but not for the quality measurement system, for every step is clear and the maximum penalty is defined • reality shows that in case of any irritations the operator and the PTA are talking to each other for solving it
Thank you for your attention Frank Zerban Verband Region Stuttgart zerban@region-stuttgart.org