1 / 12

Managerial compensation in a two-level gift-exchange experiment

Managerial compensation in a two-level gift-exchange experiment. Fernanda Rivas Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona Nils Hesse Albert-Ludwigs Universität Freiburg. Motivation.

taffy
Download Presentation

Managerial compensation in a two-level gift-exchange experiment

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. Managerial compensation in a two-level gift-exchange experiment Fernanda Rivas Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona Nils Hesse Albert-Ludwigs Universität Freiburg

  2. Motivation • In times of increasing international competition, firms demand employees to make concessions to carry out necessary restructuring measures, that can partly be resisted by the workers, whose behavior at work can not be fully contracted upon • Excessive management compensations contradict justice preference of a majority, in particular in times of downsizing Managerial compensation in a two-level gift-exchange experiment

  3. Research questions • Is workers’ effort influenced by the perception of managerial compensation? • Is high executive pay particularly salient during downsizing? • Do workers still exert their effort in response to wage offers if the wage-setter gets only a small part of the benefits generated by the workers? Managerial compensation in a two-level gift-exchange experiment

  4. Experiment • Subjects divided into three groups: Firm’s owners, Managers, Workers • 4 groups of 5 subjects per session: 1 Firm, 1 Manager, 3 Workers • 30 rounds per session. Stranger matching • TREATMENTS: 4 treatments determined by: • Salary of the Manager: Public / Private information • Decides the Workers’ wage: Firm / Manager • Endowment of the Firm: 15 LE in the first 15 periods, 10 LE after period 15 Managerial compensation in a two-level gift-exchange experiment

  5. Experiment : stages in each period IN MD SESSIONS • Firm decides Manager’s wage • Manager decides Workers’ wage (the 3 workers receive the same wage) • Manager and workers choose a level of effort • Manager and Firm are informed about the decision of Workers, Workers are informed about the total revenue IN FD SESSIONS • Firm decides Manager’s and Workers’ wage (the 3 workers: same wage) • Manager and workers choose a level of effort • Manager and Firm are informed about the decision of Workers, Workers are informed about the total revenue Managerial compensation in a two-level gift-exchange experiment

  6. Experiment Payoffs Firm's payoff = Initial Endowment + Total Revenue - Total Salaries Manager's payoff = Manager's Wage + Bonus - Cost of Effort Worker's payoff = Worker's Wage - Cost of Effort • Total salaries = fixed salaries workers and managers + Bonus manager • Bonus = 20% of Profit provided by Workers = Revenue provided by the workers – Salaries paid to the workers • The Bonus is paid if Revenue > Salaries Revenues and costs of effort Managerial compensation in a two-level gift-exchange experiment

  7. Results Does the perception of the managerial compensation have an impact on the workers' effort choices ? • Independent variable: the workers' effort choice • Panel data model (also clustering) • We report the coefficient of the variable Manager's wage of the estimations • We control for: each worker's wage, period, sex, age, field of study, person choosing the workers' wages (firm or manager) • We have: period, age and gender effect • Result 2: Workers' effort decisions are negatively correlated with the manager's wage, especially after the wage cut Managerial compensation in a two-level gift-exchange experiment

  8. Results : wage and effort Result 5: There exists a strong positive relation between own wage and effort levels for workers  the higher the own wage the more effort while the managers' effort reaches a maximum for middle wages and then decreases for very high wages Managerial compensation in a two-level gift-exchange experiment

  9. Results : wage and effort • MD and FD: very similar, especially with public information Managerial compensation in a two-level gift-exchange experiment

  10. Results : wage and effort Result 6: The ratio effort/wage for the workers decreases from part I to part II with private information, but increases with public information Managerial compensation in a two-level gift-exchange experiment

  11. Results : wage and effort The ratio for workers is higher in PuW than in PrW in the MD-sessions, and the opposite is observed in FD-sessions  when the manager decides workers' wage it has a positive effect to disclose the managerial compensation Managerial compensation in a two-level gift-exchange experiment

  12. Conclusions • Workers' effort decisions are negatively correlated with the manager's wage, especially after wage cuts • MD and FD: very similar, especially with public information • Negative effect of manager’s wage  wage compression is in fact a good strategy • Regardless of the negative effects of high managerial wages, the opportunity to observe the managerial compensation had a positive impact on workers' effort choices, when the managers set the workers' wages. Under these realistic circumstances, it seems that to disclose managerial wages is a good strategy in terms of workers’ effort Managerial compensation in a two-level gift-exchange experiment

More Related