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Lec. 7 (Seminar on “Sharing Experience on Nuclear Power for Development” in Vietnam). Outline of LWR Design -featured on safety-. - LWR in Japan - Basic Philosophy of Safety Design - Design Comparison of PWR & BWR. 2013 The Japan Atomic Power Company.
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Lec. 7 (Seminar on “Sharing Experience on Nuclear Power for Development” in Vietnam) Outline of LWR Design -featured on safety- -LWR in Japan -Basic Philosophy of Safety Design -Design Comparison of PWR & BWR 2013The Japan Atomic Power Company The following materials may contain JAPC’s proprietary and confidential information; and all or any part of these materials or information contained herein may NOT be used for any purposes other than originally intended or may NOT be reproduced, disclosed, transferred, distributed or in any manner transmitted in any tangible, electronic or any other form to any third party without prior written consent thereto by JAPC. May contain JAPC’s proprietary information. Subject to JAPC’s prior written consent before using for any other purposes than originally intended or before disclosing to any third party
LWR( Light Water Reactor) in Japan May contain JAPC’s proprietary information. Subject to JAPC’s prior written consent before using for any other purposes than originally intended or before disclosing to any third party
May contain JAPC’s proprietary information. Subject to JAPC’s prior written consent before using for any other purposes than originally intended or before disclosing to any third party
▲ △ △ △ △ △ ▲ ▲ △ △ ○ ○ ○ △ △ △ △ ▲ ▲ ▲ △ △ ○ ● ● Rokkasyo Recycling Plant △ △ △ △ △ △ ▲ ▲ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ △ △ △ △ ○ ○ ○ ○ △ Earthquake center:20111/23/11 △ △ ▲ △ △ ▲ ▲ ▲ ▲ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ● ○ ○ ○ ○ ▲:ABWR △:BWR ●:APWR ○: PWR Those units needed decontamination by the accident after earthquake and tsunami May contain JAPC’s proprietary information. Subject to JAPC’s prior written consent before using for any other purposes than originally intended or before disclosing to any third party
Basic Philosophy of Safety Design May contain JAPC’s proprietary information. Subject to JAPC’s prior written consent before using for any other purposes than originally intended or before disclosing to any third party
Inherent Safety onLWR (Physical Self Control Mechanism) Fission Temperature U238 Absorption goes down Neutrons move slower ↑ Water density up VoidEffect :moderator temperature effect Water Density down leads neutron absorption rateby U-235 goes down DopplerEffect U238 more neutron absorption Temperature Fission Self-Control Mechanism No Self-Control Mechanism Unstable naturally Stable naturally PowerCondition PowerCondition High← Power →Low High← Power →Low
Defense in Depth Prevention of Abnormal Event Enough Safety Design Margin Fail Safe / Interlock System If abnormal events occurred... Mitigation of Abnormal Event Prevention of Accident Detection of Abnormal Event Automatic Reactor Shutdown If accidents occurred... Three Principal Methods for Reactor Safety Mitigation of Accident Prevention of Abnormal Release of Radioactive materials Emergency Core Cooling System Reactor Containment System May contain JAPC’s proprietary information. Subject to JAPC’s prior written consent before using for any other purposes than originally intended or before disclosing to any third party
Safety Design based on Defense in Depth Prevention of Abnormal Event Enough Safety Design Margin Fail Safe / Interlock System If abnormal events occurred... Mitigation of Abnormal Event Prevention of Accident Detection of Abnormal Event Automatic Reactor Shutdown If accidents occurred... Mitigation of Accident Prevention of Abnormal Release of Radioactive materials Emergency Core Cooling System Reactor Containment System Concept of Safety Assurance of NPP Education & Training Quality Control Inspection&Test SafetyAssurance Safety Culture-Top Priority on Safety Compliance with Law and Standard / Engineer’s Moral May contain JAPC’s proprietary information. Subject to JAPC’s prior written consent before using for any other purposes than originally intended or before disclosing to any third party
Defense in Depth Prevention of Abnormal Event Enough Safety Design Margin Fail Safe / Interlock System If abnormal events occurred... Mitigation of Abnormal Event Prevention of Accident Detection of Abnormal Event Automatic Reactor Shutdown If accidents occurred... Three Principal Methods for Reactor Safety Mitigation of Accident Prevention of Abnormal Release of Radioactive materials Emergency Core Cooling System Reactor Containment System Integrated Safety Assurance Countermeasures for Severe Accident Accident Management Phase-1 AMPrevention of Severe Core Damage Phase-2 AMMitigation ofInfluence of Severe Core Damage Emergency Off-site Action Plans May contain JAPC’s proprietary information. Subject to JAPC’s prior written consent before using for any other purposes than originally intended or before disclosing to any third party
Main Guidelines for Safety Examination for LWRs Siting Site Examination Guidelines ECCS Performance Evaluation Guidelines Safety Evaluation Guidelines Meteorological Guidelines for Safety Analysis Evaluation Reactivity Initiated Event Evaluation Guidelines Dose-objectives Guidelines Dose Target Evaluation Guidelines Radioactive Material Emission Measurement Guidelines Safety Design Guidelines Fire Protection Guidelines Design Seismic Design Guidelines Radiation Measurement Guidelines Priority Classification Guidelines May contain JAPC’s proprietary information. Subject to JAPC’s prior written consent before using for any other purposes than originally intended or before disclosing to any third party
Regulatory Guide for Reviewing Safety Design of LWR Facilities <http://www.nsr.go.jp/archive/nsc/NSCenglish/guides/lwr/L-DS-I_0.pdf>
Safety Design Guidelines (1) Guideline 1: Compliance to Codes & Standards Guideline 2: Consideration of Natural Phenomena Earthquake Flooding, Tidal wave(=Tsunami), Wind, Snow, etc. Seismic Design Guidelines Guideline 3: Consideration of External Events Physical Protection Airplane Crash If frequency of air plain crash into the important facilities is below 10-7/RY, it is not necessary to consider its load in plant design. Guideline 4: Internally Generated Missile Pipe Break, Rotating Equipment, etc. Guideline 5: Fire Protection Fire Prevention, Fire Detection, Extinguish, Mitigation of damage Fire Protection Guidelines May contain JAPC’s proprietary information. Subject to JAPC’s prior written consent before using for any other purposes than originally intended or before disclosing to any third party
Safety Design Guidelines (2) Guideline 6: Environmental Conditions for Equipment ex) Safety related equipment inside containment shall be available even in LOCA condition. Guideline 7: Sharing Facilities If a safety related equipment is shared between reactors, it shall not influence to safety. ex) ECCS shall not be shared between reactors. Guideline 8: Man-machine Interface Proper measures to prevent human errors shall be provided Guideline 9: Reliability of Safety Facilities Redundancy or diversity and Independency Emergency Power Supply are need for especially important equipment Guideline 10: Testability May contain JAPC’s proprietary information. Subject to JAPC’s prior written consent before using for any other purposes than originally intended or before disclosing to any third party
Design Comparison of PWR & BWR May contain JAPC’s proprietary information. Subject to JAPC’s prior written consent before using for any other purposes than originally intended or before disclosing to any third party
PWR BWR Reference Plant Ohi-3&4 Kashiwazaki-Kariwa 3&4 Owner Kansai Electric Power Co. Tokyo Electric Power Co. Supplier Mitsubishi Toshiba & Hitachi C/O Start 1991 / 1993 1993 / 1994 Electric Power Output 1,180MWe 1,100MWe NSSS Power Output 3,423MWt 3,293MWt Heat Efficiency 34.5% 33.4% Coolant Pressure 157 kg/cm2g 70.7 kg/cm2g Coolant Temperature inlet 289℃ / outlet 325℃ inlet 279℃ / outlet 286℃ Coolant Flow Rate 60,100 ton/h 48,300 ton/h Main Specifications May contain JAPC’s proprietary information. Subject to JAPC’s prior written consent before using for any other purposes than originally intended or before disclosing to any third party
Main Fluid Systems of PWR Reactor Cooling System Reactor Cooling System (RCS) Chemical & Volume Control System (CVCS) Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS) Component Cooling Water System (CCWS) Sea Water System (SWS) Reactor Containment System Containment Vessel (CV) Containment Spray System (CSS) Annulus Air Purification System Secondary Cooling System Main Steam & Feed Water System (MS/FWS) Auxiliary Feed Water System (AFWS) Turbine & Condenser Other Systems Spent Fuel Purification System (SFPCS) Refueling Water System (RWS) Instrumentation Air System (IAS) Waste Disposal System (WDS) Heating, Ventilating & Air Conditioning System (HVAC) May contain JAPC’s proprietary information. Subject to JAPC’s prior written consent before using for any other purposes than originally intended or before disclosing to any third party
Main Fluid Systems of BWR Reactor Cooling System Primary Loop Recirculation System (PLR) Reactor water Clean-up System (CUW) Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS) Main Steam & Feed Water System (MS / FW) Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System (RCIC) Turbine & Condenser Reactor Building Component Cooling Water System (RCW) Reactor Service Water System (RSW) Reactor Containment System Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) Containment Spray System (CS) Flammability Control System (FCS) Stand-by Gas Treatment System (SGTS) Reactor Shutdown System Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System Stand-by Liquid Control System (SLC) Other Systems Fuel Pool Cooling & Clean-up System (FPC) Instrumentation Air System (IAS) Radioactive Waste Treatment System (RW) Heating, Ventilating & Air Conditioning System (HVAC) May contain JAPC’s proprietary information. Subject to JAPC’s prior written consent before using for any other purposes than originally intended or before disclosing to any third party
Safety Design Guidelines (3) Guideline 11-18: Reactor & Reactor Shutdown System - Integrity of Core and Fuels in normal operation and abnormal events - Inherent Safety - Stability of Power Control - Installation of Reactivity Control Systems - Two Reactor Shutdown Systems with diversity and independency - Enough Reactor Shutdown Margin (One Rod Stuck) May contain JAPC’s proprietary information. Subject to JAPC’s prior written consent before using for any other purposes than originally intended or before disclosing to any third party
Core Size 3.7mH x 3.4mD 3.7mH x 4.8mD Power Density 105kW/l 50kW/l Uranium Loading Approx. 90MTU Approx. 130MTU Type of Fuel Assembly 17 x 17 9 x 9 No.of Fuel Assembly 193 764 Fuel Rods / Assembly 264 74 Clad Material Zirconium based alloy Zirconium based alloy Fuel Rod Size 3.7m x 9.5mm 3.7m x 11.2mm Max.Linear Power Density 41.5kW/m 44kW/m Core & Fuel PWR BWR May contain JAPC’s proprietary information. Subject to JAPC’s prior written consent before using for any other purposes than originally intended or before disclosing to any third party
Name Reactor Vessel Reactor Pressure Vessel Height 13m 22m Inner Diameter 4.4m 6.4m Minimum Thickness 130 - 270mm 100 - 160mm Material Low Alloy with Stainless Cladding Low Alloy with Stainless Cladding MOP(Maximum Operating Pressure) 175kg/cm2 87.9kg/cm2 MOT(Maximum Operating Temperature) 343℃ 302℃ Weight 400ton 800ton Reactor Pressure Vessel PWR (1,180MWe) BWR (1,100MWe) May contain JAPC’s proprietary information. Subject to JAPC’s prior written consent before using for any other purposes than originally intended or before disclosing to any third party
Coolant (Hot) 13m Coolant (Cold) Fuel ControlRod Comparison of RPV BWR PWR Control Rod Drive Mechanism Steam Separator Steam 22m Coolant (FW) PLRInlet PLROutlet Image Fuel ControlRod Control Rod Drive Mechanism May contain JAPC’s proprietary information. Subject to JAPC’s prior written consent before using for any other purposes than originally intended or before disclosing to any third party
Primary System Component PWR (1,180MWe) BWR (1,100MWe) Primary Loop Recirculation (PLR) Pump Coolant Pump Reactor Coolant Pump Number 4 2 Design Flow Rate 20,100 m3/h 9,700 m3/h Design Head 84m 243m Motor Power 4,500kW 5,800kW Flow Control No Yes Steam Generator Number 4 Steam Generation Rate 1,700t/h Height 21m Diameter 4.5m Pressurizer Height 16m Inner Diameter 2.1m May contain JAPC’s proprietary information. Subject to JAPC’s prior written consent before using for any other purposes than originally intended or before disclosing to any third party
Reactor Coolant System of PWR (Tsuruga-2) Steam Generator Pressurizer Dryer Separator Anti-VibrationBars HeatTransferTube ChannelHead Reactor Coolant Pump Reactor Vessel Image May contain JAPC’s proprietary information. Subject to JAPC’s prior written consent before using for any other purposes than originally intended or before disclosing to any third party
CAPACITY INCREASE OF PWR PLANT 2-Loop(500MW class) 3-Loop(800MW class) Increase of Loop Increase of Loop Component Scale-up 4-Loop (1100MW class) APWR (1500MW class) May contain JAPC’s proprietary information. Subject to JAPC’s prior written consent before using for any other purposes than originally intended or before disclosing to any third party
Primary Loop Recirculation System of BWR ReactorPressureVessel Jet Pump Valve PLR Piping PLR Pump May contain JAPC’s proprietary information. Subject to JAPC’s prior written consent before using for any other purposes than originally intended or before disclosing to any third party
Reactivity Control & Shutdown Method PWR (1,180MWe) BWR (1,100MWe) Reactivity Control Method (1) Control Rod PositionControl Control Rod PositionControl Method (2) Boron ConcentrationControl (as Chemical Shim) Reactor RecirculationFlow Control Reactor Shutdown Method (1) Emergency Insertion of Control Rod Emergency Insertion of Control Rod (Reactor Trip) (Reactor Scram) Method (2) Boron Injection Boron Injection Chemical VolumeControl System Stand-by LiquidControl System May contain JAPC’s proprietary information. Subject to JAPC’s prior written consent before using for any other purposes than originally intended or before disclosing to any third party
PWR (1,180MWe) BWR (1,100MWe) Control Rod Type Cluster Cross Number of Assembly 53 185 Material Ag-In-Cd B4C or Hf Active Length 3.6m 3.6m Shutdown Margin One Rod Stuck One Rod Stuck Drive Mechanism Drive Force Normal Magnetic Jack Hydraulic Pressure Emergency Gravity Hydraulic Pressure Shutdown Period <2.2sec (for 85% stroke) <1.62sec (for 75% stroke) Control Rod & Drive Mechanism May contain JAPC’s proprietary information. Subject to JAPC’s prior written consent before using for any other purposes than originally intended or before disclosing to any third party
Fuel Assembly & Rod Control Cluster (RCC) of PWR Fuel Rod Fuel Assembly Rod Control Cluster Rod Control Cluster Control Rod Fuel Assembly Image May contain JAPC’s proprietary information. Subject to JAPC’s prior written consent before using for any other purposes than originally intended or before disclosing to any third party
Fuel Assembly & Control Rod of BWR Control Rod Fuel Assembly Fuel Rod Channel Box Control Rod Fuel Assembly Image May contain JAPC’s proprietary information. Subject to JAPC’s prior written consent before using for any other purposes than originally intended or before disclosing to any third party
Control Rod Drive Mechanism BWR PWR POWER OFF MG-Set Accumulator CondensateStorage Pool N2 OPEN SDV* CRD Pump *SCRAM Discharge Volume May contain JAPC’s proprietary information. Subject to JAPC’s prior written consent before using for any other purposes than originally intended or before disclosing to any third party
PWR - Neutron Flux - Hi- Neutron Flux Variation - Hi- ECCS Actuation- Excessive temp. dT - Hi - Excessive press. dT - Hi- Reactor Press. - Hi- Reactor Press. - Lo- Pressurizer Water Level - Hi- RCS Flow Rate - Lo- RCP Rotation Rate - Lo- Turbine Trip- SG Water Level - Lo- Earthquake Acceleration - Hi BWR - Neutron Flux - Hi- Unavailability of Neutron Monitor- Reactor Press. - Hi- Reactor Water Level - Lo- Dry Well Press. - Hi- Scram Discharge Volume Water Level - Hi- Main Steam Isolation Valve - Closed- Turbine Stop Valve - Closed- Turbine Governor Valve - Rapidly Closed- Main Steam Line Radioactivity Hi- Earthquake Acceleration - Hi Reactor Trip Scram Emergency Automatic Shutdown Reactor Shutdown Signals of PWR & BWR May contain JAPC’s proprietary information. Subject to JAPC’s prior written consent before using for any other purposes than originally intended or before disclosing to any third party
Boron Injection System of PWR Chemical Volume Control System (CVCS) Heat Exchanger Demineralizer F Filter SG PureWater Heat Exchanger VolumeControlTank Blender Boron AcidTank RV RCP Charging Pump Boron Acid Pump May contain JAPC’s proprietary information. Subject to JAPC’s prior written consent before using for any other purposes than originally intended or before disclosing to any third party
RPV Boron Injection System of BWR Stand-by Liquid Control System (SLC) SLC Tank SLC Pump M M M M May contain JAPC’s proprietary information. Subject to JAPC’s prior written consent before using for any other purposes than originally intended or before disclosing to any third party
ECCS Design Requirement - Prevention of severe core damage in Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) - Automatic start of Core Injection by safety protection signals - Redundancy or diversity and independency - Consideration of Single Failure - Actuation without off-site power (ex. supplied by Emergency Diesel Generator) - Seismic Integrity, Adaptation to environmental condition, testability, etc. May contain JAPC’s proprietary information. Subject to JAPC’s prior written consent before using for any other purposes than originally intended or before disclosing to any third party
PWR (1,180MWe) BWR (1,100MWe) Emergency Core Cooling System High Pressure Injection System x 2 High Pressure Core Spray System x 1 Pump : 320m3/h x 960m x2 Pump : 350 -1,580m3/h x 860-200m x1 Low Pressure Injection System x 2 Low Pressure Core Spray System x 1 Pump : 1,020m3/h x 91m x2 Pump : 1,440m3/h x 210m x1 Common with Residual Heat Removal System Low Pressure Core Injection System x 3 Pump : 1,690m3/h x 85m x 3 2 systems are common with Residual Heat Removal System & Containment Spray System Accumulator Injection System x 4 Tank : 38m3 x 4 Automatic Depressurization System Valve : 375t/h x 7 Common with Safety Relief Valve May contain JAPC’s proprietary information. Subject to JAPC’s prior written consent before using for any other purposes than originally intended or before disclosing to any third party
SG SG SG SG ECCS of PWR Refueling WaterStorage Pit ContainmentSpray System Spray Header Spray Header Spray Header゙ ACC ACC AccumulatorInjection System RV ACC ACC Sump High PressureInjection System CS LP HP HP LP CS RWSP Low PressureInjection System May contain JAPC’s proprietary information. Subject to JAPC’s prior written consent before using for any other purposes than originally intended or before disclosing to any third party
HPCS LPCS LPCI LPCI/RHR LPCI/RHR ECCS of BWR ADS RCIC Division III RCIC LPCI LPCS Division I Division II LPCI/RHR LPCI/RHR HPCS May contain JAPC’s proprietary information. Subject to JAPC’s prior written consent before using for any other purposes than originally intended or before disclosing to any third party
Safety Design Guidelines (4) Guideline 19-27: Reactor Cooling System • - Integrity of Reactor Cooling Pressure Boundary in accident • - Residual Heat Removal System • - Heat Sink System • - Consideration for Station Black Out in Design ( guideline 27) • Long time “Station Black Out” is no need to consider because quick recovery of external power supply or repair of emergency power systems are expected. • and assumption of “Station Black Out” is not necessarily in design in the case of emergency power system reliability is extremely high. May contain JAPC’s proprietary information. Subject to JAPC’s prior written consent before using for any other purposes than originally intended or before disclosing to any third party
Safety Design Guidelines (5) Guideline 28-33: Reactor Containment System - Integrity of Containment Boundary in accident - Testability of Containment System - Prevention of Brittle fracture of Containment Vessel - Installation of Containment Isolation Valves - Containment Heat Removal System - Containment Atmosphere Control System (Removal of Iodine, Hydrogen Control) May contain JAPC’s proprietary information. Subject to JAPC’s prior written consent before using for any other purposes than originally intended or before disclosing to any third party