Semantics and Cognition

1. Lecture 6 2 Nov., 2005 Semantics and Cognition Helena Gao

2. Required readings: • Jackendoff, R. (2002). Foundations of Language: Brain, Meaning, Grammar, Evolution. Oxford University Press.Chapter 10: Reference and Truth. pp. 53-67; Chapter 11: Lexical Semantics. pp. 333-377 • Wierzbicka, A. (1984). Apples are not a ‘kind of fruit’: the semantics of human categorization. American Ethnologist , Vol. 11, No. 2, 313-328. Recommended readings: • Talmy, L. (2000). Toward a Cognitive Semantics. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Vol. 1. Chapter 7: Force dynamics in language and cognition. pp. 409-47

3. The Key Tenets of Cognitive Semantics • Semantic structure is conceptual structure • Semantic structure (the meanings conventionally associated with words and other linguistic units) is equated with concepts. • Conceptual structure is embodied • The nature of conceptual organization arises from bodily experience

4. The Key Tenets of Cognitive Semantics Cont’d • Meaning-representation is encyclopedic • Words (and other linguistic units) are treated as “points of access” to vast repositories of knowledge concerning a particular concept. • Meaning-construction is conceptualization • Meaning construction is equated with conceptualization, a dynamic process whereby linguistic units serve as prompts for an array of conceptual operations and the recruitment of background knowledge.

5. Issues in Cognitive Semantics • Conceptual structure • a) Conceptual structure vs. conceptual content • b) profile/base organization • c) mappings: projection, pragmatic-function, schema • Word-meaning • Categorization • Bodily basis of meaning • a. John got the highest score on the test. • b. Oil prices have fallen lately. • c. Be nice to people on your way up because you meet them on your way down.

6. According to Jackendoff (1992), Within a cognitive theory Conceptual Well-Formedness Rules linguistic structures conceptual structures perceptual and action Inference rules

7. the resources available in the brain for forming concepts Conceptual Well-Formedness Rules the brain’s combinatorial organization linguistic structures conceptual structures perceptual and action Inference rules Similar to logical inference

8. Contributions from perceptual modalities for the structure of meaning (Jackendoff, 2002) • How perceptual structures are stored? • According to Jackendoff, a major division in the structure of meaning appears to lie between conceptual structure (CS) and spatial structure (SpS) (see Jackedoff, 1978, 1996b; Landau and Jackendoff, 1993)

9. Conceptual Structure (CS) • CS is a hierarchical arrangement built out of discrete features and functions. • It enables such aspects of understanding as category membership (taxonomy) and predicate-argument structure.

10. Spatial Structure(SpS) • SpS is concerned with encoding the spatial understanding of the physical world – not just moment by moment appearance, but the integration over time of the space, motion, and layout of objects in space (and possibly the forces among them). • The “upper end” of the visual system • Also receives and integrates inputs about shape and spatial somatosensory system (felt position of one’s own body) • This integration is what enables you to know by looking at an object where to reach for it, and what it should feel like when you handle it. • Thus SpS should be thought of as a system of central cognition, to some degree modality-independent.

11. SpS • SpS must encode the shape of objects in a form that is suitable for recognizing an object at different distances and from different perspectives. • E.g., it must solve the classic problem of object consistency • It must be able to encode spatial knowledge of parts of object that cannot be seen (e.g., the hollowness of a balloon). • It must support visual object categorization as well as visual object (identification) • e.g., making explicit the range of shape variations possible among different cups • It must be able to encode the degrees of freedom in objects that can change their shape • e.g., human and animal bodies. • It must be suitable for encoding the full spatial layout of a scene , and for mediating among alternative perspectives.

12. The Difference between Image and SpS • An image is restricted to a particular point of view, whereas SpS is not. • An image is restricted to a particular instance of a category, whereas SpS is not. • An image can’t include the unseen parts of an object – its back and inside – whereas SpS does. • An image is restricted to the visual modality, whereas SpS can equally well encode information received haptically or through proprioception.

13. Functions of CS and SpS • Judgments and inferences having to do with predicate-argument relations, category membership, the type-token distinction, quantification, and so forth can be formulated only in terms of CS. • Judgments and inferences having to do with exact shapes, locations, and forces can be formulated only in terms of SpS.

14. Overlap between CS and SpS • The notions of physical object, part-whole relationships, locations, force, and causation have reflexes in both systems. • It is these shared components that enable the two systems to communicate with each other through an interface of the usual sort.

15. Jackendoff’s (1996) Hypothesis • The grammatical aspects of language make reference only to CS, not to SpS. • Nothing in grammar depends on detailed shapes of objects. • SpS is language’s indirect connection to visual, haptic, and proprioceptive perception, and to the control of action. • It is through the SpS connection that we can talk about what we see.

16. Incorporating the CS-SpS split in meaning (Jackendoff, 2002, 348) Visual system Object SpS Noises Language Haptic system CS F- MIND Action system WORLD However, not all lexical terms have a SpS component. e.g., abstract concepts such as fairness and values and logical concepts such as and, if, not

17. Two ways of thinking about the CS-SpS connection (Jackendoff, 2002, 349) • a. Lexical items supplemented by SpS + SpS Phonology + Syntax + CS ??? LANGUAGE SpS falls outside the standard tripartite organization of language

18. Two ways of thinking about the CS-SpS connection (Jackendoff, 2002, 349) • b. Non-linguistic concept attached to words • An evolutionary perspective: Suppose one deletes the phonological and syntactic structures • What is left is a non-linguistic association of cognitive structures in memory, much of which could be shared by a non-linguistic organism. • Phonological and syntactic structures can then be viewed as further structures tacked onto this concept to make it linguistically expressible. Phonology + Syntax + CS + SpS LANGUAGE “CONCEPT”

19. Wierzbicka, A. (1984). Apples are not a ‘kind of fruit’: the semantics of human categorization • Our principle categorization of theworld does seem to be taxonomic, both in the areas of biological kinds and of “manufactured” environment. • But, above this basic level of categorization, it is only with respect to the biological environment that we group kinds of things into superkinds • With respect to the manufactured environment, we proceed differently – • we group kinds of things into supercategories on a different basis. • We no longer ask, what kind of thing is it?; rather we ask, what is it for? How can one use it? Where does it come from? Why is it there? (Wierzbicka, 1984: 325).

20. Taxonomic supercategories (Wierzbicka, 1984: 314) • Taxonomic categorization does play a role in human thinking as reflected in natural language, but it does not dominate that thinking as has been assumed. • Other classification principles also play an important role; and in some areas of the lexicon, a more important role at that.

21. Taxonomic supercategories (Wierzbicka, 1984: 315) • Scientific classification, according to which a bird, a fish, or a spider is a kind of animal, is not at issue. • In ordinary language they are not so classified. • One would say of a parrot, a fish, or a spider: “A beautiful creature!” or “A repulsive creature!” but not “A beautiful animal!” or “A repulsive animal!” • In nonscientific English the word animal does not apply to everything that zoologists call animal, and the word plant does not apply to everything that botanists call plant.

22. Taxonomic supercategories (Wierzbicka, 1984: 316) • When we define a cat as akind of animal, a parrot as kind of bird, a rose as a kind of flower, or an oak as a kind of tree, we are implying that conceptually a cat is above all a kind of animal, a parrot is a kind of bird, and so on, and that all the other defining features are subordinate to this one. • A concept that identifies a kind of thing stands for something that has certain perceptual characteristics and can therefore be imagined or drawn. • Thus, one can draw not only a parrot but also an unspecified bird, not only a rose but also a flower, not only an oaktree but also a tree in general.

23. Functional concepts (Wierzbicka, 1984: 316) • Functional concepts stand for artifacts if any kind made with a particular function in mind • The crucial differences between taxonomic supercategories such as birds or flowers or trees and nontaxonomic ones such as toys or weapons or ornaments can be seen immediately when one tries to represent them pictorially. • One cannot draw a toy, a weapon, a container, or a utensil “in general.” • purely functional and thus imply no visual or more generally perceptual properties.

24. Functional concepts vs. taxonomic concepts (Wierzbicka, 1984: 318) • For taxonomic concepts (concepts that stand for a kind of thing), such as tricycles or balls, visible characteristics are crucial. • But a concept such as toy or weapon stands neither for “a kind of thing” nor strictly speaking, for “a kind of function”. It stands for anything that has a particular function. • “Imaginability” is a useful criterion to distinguish concrete concepts that stand for “a kind of thing” from other concrete concepts.

25. Semantic “fuzziness” (Wierzbicka, 1984: 318) • The difference between taxonomic and functional concepts is reflected in the greater semantic “fuzziness” of the latter. • This “fuzziness” has been presented as a fundamental feature of human categorization reflected in natural language (e.g., cup, knife, etc.)

26. The concept of contiguity (Wierzbicka, 1984: 319) • The concept of contiguity plays crucial role in natural language in the area of concrete lexicon. • A concept based on anthropologists distinction between taxonomies (systems of kinds) and partonomies (systems of parts). • Thus a nose is not a kind of thing (that sticks out in the middle of the face, etc.) but a part of the face (that sticks out in the middle of the face, etc.).

27. singularia tantum (Wierzbicka, 1984: 320-321) • Collective concepts based on contiguity and function, such as furniture, are singularia tantum. • A misconception to assume that tables are semantically a kind of furniture; shirts, a kind of clothing; or apples, a kind of fruit. • There is nothing wrong to say so but semantically they are not. • E.g., cockroaches can be described as vermin, but semantically they are not a kind of vermin – they are a kind of bug. • Vermin is a collective concept and cockroach is an individual one. • The grammatical difference between vermin (a mass noun) and a cockroach (a countable) reflects a difference in the conception.

28. pluralia tantum (Wierzbicka, 1984: 321) • Collective concepts based on contiguity without a reference to function, such as leftovers and contents, are pluralia tantum. • E.g., goods, , clothes, goodies groceries, refreshments, odds-and-ends, bits-and-pieces, remains, belongings, supplies, trappings, trimmings, spoils, valuables, nuts-and-bolts, covers, dishes. • All these words are designate heterogeneous collections of things: things that at some particular time are, or are expected to be, in the same place. • In some instances the lack of a common function is transparent. • In other instances a common function does seem to be implied.

29. singularia tantum vs. pluralia tantum (Wierzbicka, 1984: 321) • The two types of supercategories are both based on contiguity. • Singularia tantum such as furniture stand for categories the members of which are physically separate from one another and therefore could be counted together. • Memebers of categories designated by pluralia tantum such as groceries are not only heterogeneous but also not fully discrete. • The pluralia tantum class has a nontaxonomic character while the singularia tantum one does not.