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Australia-Indonesia Relations

Australia-Indonesia Relations. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Australia%E2%80%93Indonesia_relations. Indonesia some facts. Population : 229 million people – 88% of which are Muslim Per capita GDP : in $U.S - 4100 Capital : Jakarta

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Australia-Indonesia Relations

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  1. Australia-Indonesia Relations http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Australia%E2%80%93Indonesia_relations

  2. Indonesia some facts • Population: 229 million people – 88% of which are Muslim • Per capita GDP: in $U.S - 4100 • Capital: Jakarta • In 2006, 17.8% of the population was living below the poverty line. According to the 2006 estimates, nearly half of the population was living on less than US$2 per day. • Number of Islands: over 1300

  3. Historical Background President Suharto • Australia supported Indonesian independence from the Dutch in 1945. • The Cold War saw Australia threatened by Indonesia which had the largest communist party in the Asia at the time, and was led by the anti-western leader Sukarno • In 1965 General Suharto seized power. In the aftermath of coup – 500,000 to 1,000,000 communist sympathesizers were murdered but the pro-capitalist Suharto was embraced by Western governments including Australia. • This close relationship with Suharto was to continue until his downfall in 1998.

  4. Close ties with Suharto • Security: Suharto was supported because he was seen as a “strong man” who could hold together the disparate archipelago. Instability or the break of Indonesia was seen as a threat to Australian security • Economic: the pro-capitalist policies of Suharto were supported by the Australian government and business community. These over-riding economic and security concerns meant Australia was prepared to over look the corruption of the Suharto regime and the enormous human rights abuses that occurred in Indonesia throughout his rule.

  5. Australia’s Response to Timor Invasion • Australia’s did not protest the Indonesian invasion of Timor in 1975. • Australia even overlooked the murder of six Australian journalists by the Indonesian military during the invasion of East Timor – the Balibo Five plus Roger East. • http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Balibo_Five • In 1978 the Fraser government went as far as to formally recognise the Indonesian claim of sovereignty over Timor – we were the only Government in the world to do so.

  6. Why did we accept the invasion? • Australia accepted the invasion for 3 reasons: • 1) Security/economic: Australia wanted to retain good a good relationship with the Suharto dictatorship for both economic and security reasons. • 2) Security: Australia shared Indonesian’s concerns about allowing a left-leaning government survive in the region during the Cold War. This was confirmed in the recent release of cabinet documents from the time: • http://www.theaustralian.com.au/in-depth/cabinet-papers/timor-invasion-in-our-interests/story-e6frgd9o-1111118449723#809189D2-7517-4af1-BAF0-1A36C3BB8640&numResults=0&command=%20m_objCurrentDocument.getElementById%28%27veohrecs_fr%27%29.style.height%20%3D%20%27107px%27%3B%20m_objCurrentDocument.getElementById%28%27Veoh_SpaceDiv%27%29.style.height%20%3D%20%2712px%27%3B%20m_objCurrentDocument.getElementById%28%27VeohCompass.LoadingDiv%27%29.style.height%20%3D%20%270px%27%3B%20m_objCurrentDocument.getElementById%28%27VeohCompass.LoadingDiv%27%29.style.display%20%3D%20%27none%27%3B • 3) Economic: Australia had an interest in the oil and gas that lay in the Timor Sea.

  7. Paul Keating 1991-1996 • Under Paul Keating the relationship with Indonesia and Suharto was cultivated even more. • Keating did not respond to the Dili massacre in 1991 which saw footage of soldiers shooting Timorese protestors in Dili • Footage of the massacre here - www.youtube.com/watch?v=8NYdGad-0bs • http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Santa_Cruz_massacre • He visited Indonesia seven visits to Indonesia as PM

  8. Australia-Indonesia Agreement on Maintaining Security (AMS) • Security: The AMS security pact signed in 1995 was the highpoint of these relations. • It was the first bilateral security agreement that Indonesia had signed with any country • It stated that the two countries would “consult each other in case of adverse challenges to common security interests • Keating said “No relationship offers greater potential ..than this one with Indonesia”

  9. Fall of Suharto 1998 • Indonesia was badly affected by the 1997 financial crisis. First by a run on its currency and then by social unrest provoked by the austerity measures imposed on the country by the IMF. • Amidst this unrest – the 33 year old dictatorship was overthrown by a public uprising and democracy was re-introduced. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fall_of_Suharto

  10. In the post-Suharto period the new President Habibi decided to offer East Timor the chance to vote on autonomy or independance. (Howard had sent him a letter suggesting autonomy then a vote at a latter stage but Habibi decided to solve the problem “once and for all”. This precipidated the chain of events leading to the Australian intervention in 1999.

  11. 1999 East Timor Intervention • After the fall of Suharto in 1998, Indonesia acceded to a UN ballot to be held in East Timor on the issue of independance. • Australia sent AFP members to be part of United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) to over see the ballot. http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unmiset/background.html • Violence from militia’s broke out even before the vote was taken. After 78.5 voted for independance – massive retaliation occured from the militias and the Indonesian military who essentially burnt the country to the ground.

  12. The Australian government throughout this time maintained the fiction that the militias were acting independently from the Indonesian military – despite knowing from intelligence that this was not so. • Nevertheless: the post-referendum violence created enough international pressure that Indonesia accepted an international force, under the leadership of Australia intervening in East Timor. Although U.S. troops were not involved, U.S. pressure was crucial in this situation.

  13. InterFET • InterFET was maintained until East Timor formally declared independance in 2001. • At its height there were 11,000 Australian troops in Timor along with soldiers from many other nations. • http://pandora.nla.gov.au/parchive/2000/S2000-Nov-7/easttimor.defence.gov.au/index.html • http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Force_for_East_Timor • Some Australian soldiers stayed on after Independance under the banner of UNMISET – a mission to support East Timor whose mandate ended in2005 but after violence broke out between sections of the police and military in 2006 Australia again sent troops to East Timor – this time under the banner of UNMIT. • http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unmiset/background.html

  14. THE HOWARD DOCTRINE • Australia’s lead role in the United Nations Mission in East Timor in 1999 is seen by many as the start of the so-called 'Howard Doctrine', in which Australia commits itself to being the provider of first resort of regional security in the Pacific. Concerns about the nexus between state failure and new security threats from organized crime to communicable diseases animate this activist doctrine and has seen Australian police and military fan out across the Pacific from East Timor to the Solomon Islands. It is also behind the significant increase in defence spending over the last few years and the growth of the AFP’s International Deployment Group. • http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2008/02/12/The-limits-of-the-Howard-Doctrine.aspx

  15. Indonesia’s response • Both the Indonesian public and government responded with anger at the Australian intervention in East Timor – which they saw as meddling by a foreign power in their sovereign affairs. • Although the Indonesian government acceded to the intervention, it was very tense and the possibility of conflict between the two countries remain. There was an even an example of Australian and Indonesian forces exchanging fire across the East Timor border. • This was a low point in our relationship. Soon after we intervened, Indonesia ripped up the security agreement with Australia, signed in 1995 – the AMS

  16. Slow rebuilding of relationship • Ironically – over the next 8 years of the Howard Government it was joint or shared challenges, particularly terrorism that rebuilt the relationship between the two nations. • Third Order agenda issues such terrorism, people smuggling, drug trafficking have led to Australia and Indonesia again co-operating with each other.

  17. 2006 resigning of security pact • The signs that the security relationship had been repaired were seen in 2006 with: • Signed at Lombok, not yet in force pending ratification. Establishes a bilateral consultative mechanism. Scope of cooperation includes defence, law enforcement, counter-terrorism, intelligence, maritime security, aviation safety, WMD non-proliferation, and 'bilateral nuclear cooperation for peaceful purposes. Reiterated mutual respect for areas of sovereignty and territorial integrity

  18. Third Agenda issue 1: Terrorism Bali bombing 1: 12th Oct 2002 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2002_Bali_bombings 202 people killed – 88 Australians http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/asia_pacific/2002/bali/default.stm

  19. A car bomb and a suicide bomber blew up the Paddy’s Pub and the Sari Club killing mainly Western tourists but also many Balinese. A small bomb also went off outside the U.S. embassy. • The terrorists were from a radical Islamic network called JI Abu Bashir – JI Spiritual Leader JI supporters

  20. Who are JI? • JemaahIslamiah, meaning "Islamic Congregation", is a Southeast Asian militant Islamic organization dedicated to the establishment of a Islamic State in Southeast Asia incorporating Indonesia, Malaysia, the southern Philippines, Singapore and Brunei. JI was added to the United Nations list of terrorist organizations linked to al-Qaeda or the Taliban on 25 October 2002. • JI are known to have had links to al-Qaeda since the late 90’s.

  21. Why they attacked? • JI turned on Western targets after the start of the U.S. War on Terror. The attacks themselves occured on the second anniversary of the attack on the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen. • Imam Samudra, one of the key JI bombers said his targets in 2002 were “anti-Muslims, especially people from the USA, Australia, members of Nato, elements of what people call the alliance because they know it’s a crusader army”. http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article3466833.ece

  22. Other JI attacks or suspected attacks • 2004: Jack Rouche sentenced to nine years jail for confessing to be part of JI plan to blow up Israeli embassy in Canberra • 2004: Australian Embassy in which killed 11 Indonesians and wounded over 160 more • 2005Bali Bombings: were a series of terrorist suicide and car bombs occurred in south Bali killing 26 people – this time only 4 Australians were killed. • 2009:Marriot and Ritz Cartlon Hotels bombed.

  23. Australian Federal Police (AFP) –Indonesia Co-operation • Since the 2002 bombings when AFP went to Bali to help with the post-bombing forensic investigation, intelligence and police ties have been very close between the two countries. • The AFP set up a Bali based office in 2004 to help fight terrorism and they have work closely with the Indonesian police continuously since 2002 on this issue. • A number of top JI figures have been captured or killed and the campaign against them is generally considered to have been very successful. In 2010 their spiritual leader Abu Bashir was charged with terrorism offences.

  24. Details of links • Excellent media article – discussing how the common threat of terrorism has brought the two countries together • http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/programguide/stories/200710/s2057299.htm • Detailed article on the close police ties in anti-terrorism work between Australia and Indonesia. • http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/national/aussie-police-on-inside-with-agents-from-indonesia/story-e6frf7l6-1225720009389

  25. Third Agenda issue 2: Asylum Seekers

  26. Indonesia which is not a signatory to the UN refugee convention has become crucial to successive governments attempts to stop the flow of asylum seekers coming to Australia by boat. • Going back to 2001 the Howard Government ordered the AFP to work with Indonesian authorities to try and disrupt the people smuggling networks. Little is known of the AFP operations at the time and accusations have been made of people working for the AFP or Indonesia sabotaging boats. • 2009 AFP Press release discussing co-operation between AFP and Indonesia to stop asylum seekers : http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/media/pressrel/N7PS6/upload_binary/n7ps60.pdf;fileType%3Dapplication%2Fpdf

  27. The Indonesian Solution • When the boats started flowing again in 2009 – the Rudd government turned to Indonesia with the “Indonesian Solution” to help it solve the problem. • This involved asking Indonesia to try to stop asylum seekers leaving, if they did leave Rudd wanted them turned around by Indonesia and have the asylum seekers processed in Indonesia.

  28. Oceanic Viking: In Oct 2009 – an Australian customs vessel went to the aid of a boatload of Tamil boat people and picked them up in International waters. Australia then asked for permission to take them back to Indonesia for processing which was granted. The asylum seekers then created a storm when they refused to get off the ship in Indonesia until they received the right to come to Australia. Eventually a deal was made with the asylum seekers and they got off and after processing in Indonesia came to Australia. http://www.theage.com.au/opinion/rudd-hostage-to-78-sri-lankan-asylum-seekers-20091028-hl0e.html

  29. An Indonesian Governor expressed this opinion which summed up how many Indonesians felt about Australia’s actions: • after earlier telling reporters Indonesia was not a "dumping ground" for refugees, provincial governor Ismeth Abdullah softened his remarks but queried the detention centre's readiness. • "Who is going to give (the Sri Lankans) their food?" he asked The Australian. "Where is the money going to come from for all their expenses?" • Mr Abdullah insisted the asylum-seekers and the Australian ship they were on should not become his problem. • http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/nation/pm-kevin-rudds-indonesia-plan-all-at-sea-as-boatpeople-threaten-suicide/story-e6frg6nf-1225791914095 • 537 • http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/sri-lankans-threaten-to-blow-up-boat-in-indonesia/story-e6frg6so-1225786468

  30. Port of Merak boat • The port of Merak saw another boatload of Tamil asylum seekers return to Indonesia after their boat was intercepted after a call from Rudd to Indonesia's President, SusiloBambangYudhoyono. The Tamils also refused to leave their ship and demanded to come to Australia. After months they were forced off the boat by Indonesian authorities. • http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/rudds-indonesia-solution-prickly-20091025-hepz.html

  31. Regional Cooperation on People Smuggling Between Indonesia and Australia • From Oct 2009 Article: Australia is seeking Indonesia’s help to cut the number of refugees who arrive by boat in Australian waters. Australia has already spent $12 million on building and refurbishing Indonesian detention centres including the provision of medical facilities and diesel generators. Another $8 million has been spent on border control management programmes for Indonesian officials. • It is estimated that it will cost Australia around $50 million to cover costs for training and processing and detention of boat people if it wants Indonesia to stop a wave of illegal immigrants reaching Australia. The Rudd government is also planning to increase assistance to two key international refugee agencies, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees and International Organisation for Migration, to help meet the challenge posed by a surge in asylum seekers across the region. • http://australian-foreign-affairs.suite101.com/article.cfm/australia_and_indonesia_fight_people_smuggling

  32. Asylum Seeker Summary • Australia has had to rely heavily on Indonesia for co-operation in trying to stop the flow of boats. • At times this has caused tension with Australia due to the perception that Australia is trying to “dump” its problem on its poorer neighbour.

  33. Third Agenda 3- Climate Change

  34. The Rudd Government’s ETS scheme relied on Australia meeting its targets through purchasing carbon credits from overseas. • It has already started planning with Indonesia to pave the way for Indonesia to reap billions from selling carbon credits to Australia • In 2008, the two countries signed the Indonesia-Australia Forest Carbon Partnership: • http://www.climatechange.gov.au/government/initiatives/international-forest-carbon-initiative/action.aspx • In 2010: Australia and Indonesia made a joint submission on carbon credits to the climate talks in Germany • http://www.smh.com.au/environment/climate-change/australia-indonesia-push-rainforest-carbon-offsets-20090809-ee8u.html

  35. Tsunami 2004 – Australian Aid Australia’s relationship with Indonesia also benefitted from the immediate aid and the 1 billion dollars of subsequent reconstruction funding Australia gave to Indonesia – after the devasting Tsunami which killed over 200,000 people largely in Indonesia. http://www.ausaid.gov.au/hottopics/topic.cfm?Id=9562_2054_7529_7688_4864

  36. Other tensions - West Papua In 2006, 42 West Papuans claimed asylum in Australia after arriving by boat. When Australia gave them asylum, it angered the Indonesian Government greatly and raised fears in Indonesia that Australia, like it had in 1999 in East Timor was undermining Indonesian sovereignty.

  37. West Papua and other tensions • The tensions over the West Papua asylum seekers is just the latest in the tension between the desire of the Australian Government to have a close security relationship with Indonesia. • Ties to Suharto Regime • Acceptance of Indonesian Sovereignty over E.Timor • Joint training between Indonesian Special Forces – Kopassus and the ADF

  38. Tension: Drugs/Death Penalty • Drug smuggling has also at times created tensions with Indonesia, such as in the Schapelle Corby Case • The Bali 9 – some of who face the death penalty in Indonesia were actually arrested by the Indonesian police after a tip off by the AFP – another example of co-operation between the AFP and Indonesia • However the prospect of the death penalty for some of them raises difficult foreign policy dilemma for the Australian Government that does not support the death penalty.

  39. 2010 SBY addresses Parliament – ''fair dinkum partnership'' • INDONESIAN President SusiloBambangYudhoyono addressed the Federal Parliament in March 2010 and gave a frank speech that declared Australia and Indonesia now have a “fair dinkum partnership”. • He has visited Australia 3 times in 6 years and declared the need for even closer ties with Australia • He promised to criminalise people smuggling under Indonesian law. • Accepted a letter from one of the widows of the Balibo 5. • http://www.theage.com.au/national/yudhoyonos-plea-for-better-ties-20100310-pz9n.html?skin=text-only

  40. More analysis of visit by SBY • SBY sees big picture of opportunity • http://www.theage.com.au/opinion/editorial/sby-sees-big-picture-of-opportunity-20100311-q1go.html • SBY visit shows need for closer partnership • http://www.theage.com.au/opinion/editorial/sby-visit-shows-need-for-closer-partnership-20100308-psm7.html

  41. Economic ties to Indonesia • This tells us that our relationship with Indonesia has been dominated by security concerns for the last 30 years rather than economic concerns. This is contrast for example to our relationship with China. • http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/fs/indo.pdf Australia’s 2-way trade with Indonesia is surprisingly small. It only represented about 2% of our total trade in 2009 and they were our 13th largest trade partner.

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