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This study delves into the detrimental effects of delayed responses to drought in the Horn of Africa, focusing on missed early warnings, inadequate humanitarian aid, and the need for proactive measures. It analyzes the root causes of late responses and presents strategies for improvement.
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A Dangerous Delay:The cost of late response to the drought in the Horn of Africa Benedict Dempsey, Save the Children
The Warnings Timeline 2010 2011 Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Mar: Below-average Mar-May rains forecast: crisis likely to worsen. Localized famine conditions possible Joint agency Nov: Pre-emptive action needed now to protect livelihoods and avoid later costly lifesaving emergency interventions FSNWG 20 July: UN declares famine. FSNAU Aug: All seasonal forecasts indicate poor rains due to La Niña. FEWSNET Jun: Food security emergency: humanitarian response inadequate. Joint agency Jan: Extreme food insecurity in the eastern Horn of Africa is likely FEWSNET
More than 70% of funding, and almost 90% of mainstream US and UK media coverage came after UN famine declaration in July 2011
Early warnings – inadequate response Aug: Clear forecast of poor rains Nov: A call for pre-emptive action now Jan: Extreme food insecurity predicted Mar: “Localized famine conditions possible” July: UN declares famine GAM rates in South Central Somalia
Early warnings – inadequate response • Early warnings were correct, accessible and well disseminated • Humanitarian agencies relied on information from intermediaries, like FEWSNET, not direct use of climate/weather information • There was some response, but not at scale • The inevitable impact was increased suffering, loss of life and livelihood, development gains reversed, and increased cost of response The opportunity to avert a crisis was missed.
why was the response inadequate? • Fear of getting it wrong? – both financial and reputational risk; an inability to act in uncertainty • Fear of being too interventionist? – risk of undermining local communities • Fatigue? – resignation to high levels of chronic malnutrition • Critically, the warnings themselves were not considered the main problem – the problem lay in the response of the aid system
The international (humanitarian) system Donor Governments National Civil Society UNAgencies Communities National Governments ?Military? NGOs Private Sector
Approaches to Aid Resilience DRR Social Protection Preparedness CCA Capacity Building Development Humanitarian
What is needed for improvement? • Humanitarian responsemust shift more into prevention and early action. This requires: • Managing the risk – dealing with uncertainty • Developing triggers for earlier response • Institutionalising ‘no regrets’ measures • Long term development work must be the first response. This requires: • 4. Embedding DRR into long term work • 5. Making programmes flexible and building crisis response out of development work
Implications for weather and climate science • Levels of risk and uncertainty need to be integrated into developing response frameworks • Responders need to accept a level of uncertainty in their triggers for action • Information needs to be meaningful and accessible to a diverse group of actors – particularly communities themselves • Climate information must be combined with other indicators of oncoming crisis (e.g. food prices, nutrition)