Outcome of the EU Nuclear Safety Stress Tests

1. Outcome of the EU NuclearSafety Stress Tests Andrej Stritar Chairman, ENSREG

2. ENSREG – who are we?

3. European Scene • In European Union … • … there are almost 150 power reactors… • …in 15 EU member countries, • producing ~1/3 of all electricity in EU We must keep them operating safe!

4. Country 1 Country 2 Country 3 Regulator Regulator Regulator Rules Rules Rules Operator Operator Operator Before 2000 • Nuclear Safety was only national responsibility E. Commission DGTREN …

5. Country 1 Country 2 Country 3 Regulator Regulator Regulator Rules Rules Rules Operator Operator Operator WENRA, a voluntary club • “Bottom up” approach to harmonisation WENRA – nuclear regulators E. Commission DGTREN Regulator Regulator Regulator Regulator Regulator Regulator Regulator Regulator Regulator Regulator Regulator Regulator Regulator Regulator Regulator Regulator …

6. Country 1 Country 2 Country 3 Regulator Regulator Regulator Rules Rules Rules Operator Operator Operator ENSREG – after 2007 • “Top down” advisory body ENSREG – 27 EU regulators + EC E. Commission DGTREN E. Commission DGTREN Regulator Regulator Regulator Regulator Regulator Regulator Regulator Regulator Regulator Regulator Regulator Regulator Regulator Regulator Regulator Regulator Regulator Regulator Regulator Regulator Regulator Regulator Regulator Regulator Regulator Regulator Regulator …

7. Country 1 Country 2 Country 3 Regulator Regulator Regulator Rules Rules Rules Operator Operator Operator What is now better? WENRA – nuclear regulators ENSREG – 27 EU regulators + EC E. Commission DGTREN WENRA Reference Levels Nuclear Safety Directive, RW Directive,Stress Tests …

8. Nightmare of 11 March 2011

9. Nightmare of 11 March 2011 • Beneficial conversion of mass to energy turned into a disaster

10. G Public ELECTRICITY • The feedback loop for assuring perfection has failed! • Trust of the society was lost! Regulators DOUBT Media DOUBT Operators TRUST CONFIDENCEPERFECTION

11. Stress Tests were about restoring confidence and regaining trust by further improving nuclear safety

12. Why Fukushima has happened? • Tsunami is a very rare natural disaster. • It was underestimated during the design, there was not enough knowledge about it. • Safety margins were too small. • Uncertainty of our understanding of natural phenomena should have been compensated by bigger conservatism – higher protective dikes!

13. Fukushima concerns The main lessons learned from Fukushima were actually the main objectives of our Stress Tests: • Did we properly take into account uncertainties of all potential external hazards? • Are our plants robust enough, are safety margins big enough? • Are we able to cope even with extremely low probability events?

14. EU response to Fukushima

15. Stress Tests • 11 March: Fukushima accident occurs • 24 – 25 March: European Council Requests • Stress tests to be developed by European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG), the Commission and WENRA • Safety of all EU plants should be reviewed • Scope of review developed in light of lessons learned from Japan • Assessments conducted by national Authorities • Assessments completed by a peer review

16. Development of Stress Test Methodology • Methodology drafted by WENRA in April • Agreed to by ENSREG in May • On 25 May 2011 ENSREG including the European Commission published the ENSREG declaration that described EU Stress Tests methodology

17. Stress Test Implementation 15. 8. 2011 Operators submitted progress reports 15. 9. 2011 National progress reports submitted 31. 10. 2011 Operators submitted final reports 8. 12. 2011 EU Council informed about progress 31. 12. 2011 Final National reports submitted

18. The Peer Review Process

19. The process • WENRA prepared first draft in June • Task Force formed in July • Involvement of stakeholders • Number of meetings and discussions • The Methodology endorsed by ENSREG on 12 October

20. The process • The Peer Review Board • Three topical reviews in parallel, January and February 2012 • Initiating Events • Loss of Safety Functions • Severe Accident Management • 17 country visits in 6 parallel groups,March 2012 • About 80 experts involved • ENSREG Report + 17 Country Reports

21. Milestones • EU Council expected the final report in June 2012 • EC needed the report from ENSREG by end of April • Peer Review started on 1 January • Majority of work was done in February/March • The report was finalised in April

22. Main Results of the Peer Review

23. General conclusion over Europe • Significant steps taken in all countries to improve safety of plants • Varying degrees of practical implementation • Regulatory systems • Extent of programs

24. Consistency of approaches in European countries • Global consistency over Europe in identification of: • Strong features • Weaknesses • Measures to increase robustness

25. Measures to increase robustness of plants • Significant measures to increase robustness already decided or considered, such as: • Additional mobile equipment • Hardened fixed equipment • Improved severe accident management with appropriate staff training • Details available in Country Reports and Main Report

26. Example: New equipment in Krško NPP Additional connection points Pumps Portable external diesel generators Portable fire system

27. Assessment of natural hazards and margins • Recommendation no.1: • WENRA, involving the best available expertise from Europe, shoulddevelop guidance on natural hazards assessments, including earthquake, flooding and extreme weather conditions, as well as corresponding guidance on the assessment of margins beyond the design basis and cliff-edge effects.

28. Periodic safety review • Peer review demonstrated efficiency of periodic safety reviews • Maintain and improve safety and robustness of plants • Specially relevant, in the context of the peer review, for protection of installations against external hazards

29. Periodic safety review • Recommendation no. 2: • ENSREG should underline the importance of periodic safety review. In particular, ENSREG should highlight the necessity to re-evaluate natural hazards and relevant plant provisions as often as appropriate, but at least every 10 years.

30. Containment integrity • Fukushima disaster highlighted once again the importance of the containment function • Last barrier to protect people and the environment against radioactive releases • Issue already considered as follow-up of previous accidents and possible improvement already identified

31. Containment integrity • Recommendation no. 3: • National regulators should consider urgent implementation of the recognized measures to prevent containment integrity.

32. Containment integrity • Measures vary depending upon the design of the plants • For water cooled reactor, they include equipment, procedure and accident management guidelines to: • Depressurize primary circuit to prevent high pressure core melt • Prevent hydrogen explosions • Prevent containment overpressure

33. Prevention of accidents resulting from natural hazards and limiting their consequences • Preliminary lessons learned from Fukushima: Necessary increase of defense in depth to take into account severe accidents resulting from extreme natural hazards exceeding design basis or current safety requirements applicable to plants

34. Prevention of accidents resulting from natural hazards and limiting their consequences • Such situation can result in: • Devastation and isolation of site • Event of long duration • Unavailability of numerous safety systems • Simultaneous accidents in several plants, including their spent fuel pools • Radioactive releases

35. Prevention of accidents resulting from natural hazards and limiting their consequences • Recommendation no. 4: • National regulators should consider necessary implementation of measures allowing prevention of accidents and limitation of their consequences in case of extreme natural hazards

36. Prevention of accidents resulting from natural hazards and limiting their consequences • Typical measures: • Bunkered equipment including instrumentation and communication means • Mobile equipment protected against extreme natural hazards • Emergency response centers protected against extreme natural hazards and radioactive releases • Rescue teams and equipment rapidly available to support local operators

37. Follow-up • Most actions are being prepared and implemented by operators and national regulators • Special Task Force is preparing EU action plan to be endorsed by ENSREG on 3 July

38. What is still missing? • The Security Track of EU Stress Tests was conducted in parallel. • During the year the issue of off-site emergency preparedness has proven to deserve even more attention. • Long term ENSREG action plan is being prepared.

39. Global Impact • EU Stress Tests became a global model • Directly used in some countries (Japan, UAE, South Africa, Russia) • Important reference for all the others, including IAEA

40. What next? • Stress Test campaign is over! • All lessons learned and actions to be done will be included in our normal working processes. • Majority has to be done by operators and national regulators. • Common technical issues will be dealt by WENRA. • ENSREG’s special Task Force is preparing our action plan. • Additional plant visits will be organised after proper objectives are defined.

41. Proper focus • Stress Tests were about the • design of plants and • mitigation of accidents. • Equally or more important is • operational safety. The focus of operators and regulators must be properly balanced between these three cornerstones of nuclear safety!