No Strategic Exit for FARC?

1. No Strategic Exit for FARC? Woodrow Wilson Center Washington April 3th, 2008

2. Key Strategic Features of FARC • A decentralized organization in military and financial terms. Each bloc and front collects its own money and recruits its own combatants. Combat units develop their own logistical networks independently. Each member of the Secretariat represents a particular regional bloc inside the leadership of the organization. • A peasant armed group in an urban country. Most of FARC combatants are of peasant origin. Increasing difficulties to find new recruits because of the decline in the Colombian rural population as a consequence of the quick urbanization process. FARC units resort to recruit women and children to compensate for the lack of young males willing to join its ranks. The lack of a significant number of combatants of urban origin means that FARC has confronted insurmountable problems to build terrorist major cities of Colombian.

3. Key Strategic Features of FARC • High level of corruption and criminalization A great proportion of FARC militants have been assigned tasks connected with different illegal business -trafficking, kidnapping, extortion, etc - instead of fighting against Colombian government troops. Sectors of the guerrilla highly cohesive in ideological terms and active in the military field have been struck particularly hard by the Colombian Armed Forces. (Example: Teofilo Forero Mobile Column ) The joining into the ranks of FARC of an increasing number of recruits coming from social sectors connected to the drug industry has increased the contamination of the organization with the “narco” culture. A number of guerrilla units have changed their organizational culture from having a revolutionary type morale to acquiring a more “narco” way of living. (Example: 16th Front). A significant number of middle rank commanders have deserted taking with them money from the organization.

4. Key Strategic Features of FARC • A Terrorist organization with a high level of internationalization. The guerrilla has the control of networks to smuggle cocaine through Venezuelan territory. FARC also has connections with Mexican and Brazilian drug cartels. FARC developed a close relationship with the Provisional IRA acquiring new military technology and new tactical procedures. The organization has been involved in black market operations in Central America, and Eastern Europe to acquire MANPADS. A 35kg. Uranium cache belonging to FARC captured by Colombian authorities shows the role played by the guerrilla in the smuggling of nuclear materials. FARC has developed connections with medium and high ranking officials in Venezuela and Ecuador.

5. The governmental military campaign • A structural increase in the lethality of Colombian Armed Forces military operations against FARC. - An improvement in the reaction capability of the Military Forces. - An increase in the accuracy of the attacks - An acceleration in pace of Counterterrorist Operations. - Better coordination between military and police units. • A break up of the guerrilla Command and Control structure because of: - The governmental improved capability to monitor guerrilla communications. - New demobilization program aimed at middle rank commanders. -The capability to neutralize the leadership of the organization. • An expansion of the programs of rewards to give incentives to the reporting of the localization of FARC units and leaders.

6. The impact of changes in the military balance • The break down of the combat morale of FARC There is an increase in the number of cases of collective defections and the total number of defectors • The dissolution of the guerrilla social base as a consequence of the expansion of State control over most of the Colombian territory. • The weakening of the Command and Control structure. • The change in the strategic value of time. The increased pace of attrition of FARC military structure changes the pressure from the government side to the guerrilla side in order to find a strategic rupture through: - An agreement for demobilization - A radicalization of the military response by the guerrilla resorting to alternative tactics (urban terrorism) or special weapons (MANPADS).

7. The political side of the strategic game • The strategy of FARC to improve its political image has failed at least temporarily: - FARC’s cheating during the negotiation with the Pastrana administration continues damaging the credibility of the organization as a potential participant in any negotiation process. -The ”Emmanuel affair” when FARC offered to release a child-hostage who was no longer in their hands. - The international rejection of president Chavez’s proposal to give FARC political recognition as a step to open negotiations. - The implication of FARC in nuclear material smuggling has increased the difficulties of taking them out of the international lists of terrorist organizations. -The Venezuelan-Colombian crisis makes the continuation of president Chavez’s role as mediator impossible.

8. The Venezuelan Factor • There are common political goals between Venezuela and FARC: -Both have a Bolivarian ideology understood as a populist and nationalistic political project. -Both of them share the same interest of erasing US influence in Latin America. -Both are equally interested in expanding the Bolivarian revolution to Colombia. • In this sense, the Venezuelan government has a strategic interest in: -Preventing the military defeat of FARC -Promoting FARC as a political actor which has to be taken into account in defining the political future of Colombia -Forcing a negotiation where FARC has a military position strong enough to be able to demand drastic changes in the Colombian political and economic system in exchange for peace.

9. The Venezuelan Factor • As a consequence, radical sectors of the Venezuelan administration could be interested in supporting FARC: - Allowing the use of Venezuelan territory as a safe heaven for guerrilla - Providing military equipment and training to FARC militants.

10. No Strategic Exit • A political option: Making additional concessions to improve the image of the organization (For instance, by liberating Mrs. Betancourt or other hostages) • But.. - It doesn't fit in the traditional strategic culture of FARC based on a systematic refusal to make unilateral concessions. - The unilateral release of hostage reduces the assets in the hands of FARC to capture public attention and press for concessions from the Colombian authorities and other governments. -Finally, the end of international attention aroused by the hostages in the hands of FARC would render a militarily weakened organization politically irrelevant.

11. No Strategic Exit • A military option: Abandon the idea of improving the international image of the group and turn towards a military escalation with two goals: -Increase the military attrition of the Colombian government. -Prolong war to wait for a new Colombian government prone to making political concessions to the guerrilla. • But: The improvement in the military performance of the Colombian armed forces is a structural one which is irreversible. The rebuilding of the guerrilla’s military capability would also require the active support of one or several of the countries surrounding Colombia. The US pressure will work as a powerful deterrent to prevent any Latin American country from deciding to support a terrorist organization such as FARC. The strategic dependence of FARC on any government supporting it would make the guerrilla looks like a proxy finishing with its nationalistic credentials and provoking a political crisis inside the organization.

12. The route to internal fragmentation Several factors would stimulate the internal division of FARC: • The financial and military autonomy of FARC blocs and fronts. • The lack of ideological cohesion and the weakening of internal discipline. • The increasing level of corruption • The weakening of FARC’s command and control structure • The lack of clear strategic options in a particularly difficult situation for the organization.

13. The Strategic Consequences of the FARC Split As a consequence, at least, two sectors would appear: • A pragmatic side Ready to opt for the “IRA option” Negotiating with the government for the demobilization of the group in exchange for a complete amnesty and some political concessions. • A radical side: Ready to opt for the “Shining Path option” Escalating military activity by resorting to urban terrorism And also… Ready to opt for the “Polisario Front option” Becoming a strategic proxy of one or several neighboring countries and increase military activity in the border areas of Colombia.