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Exercise TIGER 2

Exercise TIGER 2. Canary Wharf Estatewide Business Continuity Exercise 2008. Richard Kemp CBE. Director of Group Security & Business Continuity Canary Wharf Group plc. The Mass Psychology of Emergency Evacuation Dr John Drury Department of Psychology University of Sussex.

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Exercise TIGER 2

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  1. Exercise TIGER 2 Exercise TIGER 2 Canary Wharf Estatewide Business Continuity Exercise 2008

  2. Exercise TIGER 2 Richard Kemp CBE Director of Group Security & Business Continuity Canary Wharf Group plc

  3. Exercise TIGER 2 The Mass Psychology of Emergency EvacuationDr John DruryDepartment of PsychologyUniversity of Sussex Some of the research referred to in this presentation was made possible by a grant from the Economic and Social Research Council Ref. no: RES-000-23-0446

  4. Exercise TIGER 2 Two models of mass behaviour in emergencies ‘Mass panic’ vs Collective resilience

  5. Exercise TIGER 2 ‘Mass panic’ In the face of threat: • ‘Instinct’ overwhelms socialization • Emotions outweigh reasoning • Reactions are disproportionate to the danger • Competitive and selfish behaviours predominate • Lack of co-ordination and disorder • Ineffective evacuation (exits blocked etc.)

  6. Exercise TIGER 2 BUT! • Panic is rare in emergency crowds Example: • People died in the Beverly Hills Supper Club fire (1977) not because they were selfish but because they stayed behind with their weakest group members!

  7. Exercise TIGER 2 Collective resilience • Assumes that crowd behaviour in emergencies will be adaptive because it is meaningful, cognitive and social • Sources of resilience: affiliation and identification (‘all in the same boat’) encourage mutual trust, communication, co-ordination

  8. Exercise TIGER 2 Collective resilience Evidence Co-operation, helping and order are common in mass emergencies • Examples: London bombings of 7/7/2005, 9-11, King’s Cross fire, Hillsborough tragedy

  9. Exercise TIGER 2 Collective Resilience ‘…this Australian guy was handing his water to all of us to make sure we were all right. I was coughing quite heavily from smoke inhalation and so [ ] I’d got a bit of a cold anyway which aggravated it [ ] and also I mean he was really helpful but when the initial blast happened I was sat next to an elderly lady a middle aged lady … and I just said to her “are you all right?”’ (Edgware Road)

  10. Exercise TIGER 2 Each model of the crowd has different implications for the management of mass emergencies!

  11. Exercise TIGER 2 Implications for the management of mass emergencies 1.Preparation 2. Information 3. Trust 4. Talking about ‘panic’ 5. Enhancing cohesion and resilience 6. Accommodating the public urge to help

  12. Exercise TIGER 2 1. Preparation • The importance of practicedrills and fire wardens (‘cognition’) • An inconvenience? • The difference between life and death could be seconds!

  13. Exercise TIGER 2 1. Preparation Example: Comparisons of WTC attacks of 1993 and 2001 Tower 1: 2001: 1hr 42 min before collapse. If people had exited in at the same rate as 1993 (median 2.5 hrs) many more would have died. After 1993: 6-monthly drills!

  14. Exercise TIGER 2 2. Information If crowd behaviour is understood as prone to mass panic then: • Withhold information about danger • Restrict information about danger

  15. Exercise TIGER 2 2. Information BUT …the assumption of ‘mass panic’ is part of the problem! ‘When people die in fires, it’s not because of panic, it’s more likely to be the lack of panic.’ (Neil Townsend, Divisional Officer, London Fire & Rescue Service, 2003)

  16. Exercise TIGER 2 2. Information Limited information, architectural design ‘solution’: • Width of exits • Simple alarm BUT …‘false alarms’ and ‘tests’ routinely ignored: • The most significant predictor of survival in an emergency is the time taken to recognize the emergency as such!

  17. Exercise TIGER 2 2. Information In general, collective behaviour is adaptive the more practical information available. • After 1993, WTC introduced voice communication on each floor. • Study of Newcastle Metro found more effective evacuation with more information.

  18. Exercise TIGER 2 3. Trust The presumption of ‘mass panic’ implies a lack of trust in the crowd and the public: • This informs the practice of withholding information BUT… To be seen to be withholding information: • lack of trust • reverse ‘crying wolf’ syndrome: real info not believed!

  19. Exercise TIGER 2 3. Trust The contemporary need (a) to communicate information in emergencies (b) hence to foster trust is greater than ever. Example of CBRN Information on: • quarantine (not dispersal) and • decontamination needs to be communicated, trusted and complied with for the safety of the wider population!

  20. Exercise TIGER 2 4. Talking about ‘panic’ Coupled with mistrust, the advice ‘don’t panic’ makes us believe there is something to ‘panic’ about! • If others are described as ‘panicking’, this serves to undermine the natural social bonds we will need in the emergency! • Information needs to be practical

  21. Exercise TIGER 2 5. Enhancing cohesion and resilience

  22. Exercise TIGER 2 5. Enhancing cohesion and resilience A Model of Collective Resilience • Resiliencerefers to organizational/structural resistance to damage, as well as the individual’s capacity to survive in adverse conditions. • Psychologically, the group/collective is a mechanism for such resilience. • Being psychologically part of a group enables survivors to express and expect solidarity and cohesion, and thereby to coordinate and draw upon collective sources of support and other practical resources, to deal with adversity.

  23. Exercise TIGER 2 5. Enhancing cohesion and resilience • Collective resilience is largely endogenous (i.e. arises anyway from shared experience). • The key to collective resilience is shared identification. • BUT certain practices can facilitate (or undermine) shared identification and hence resilience in an emergency.

  24. Exercise TIGER 2 5. Enhancing cohesion and resilience Undermining shared identification and resilience? • Distrusting ‘the masses’ • Restricting information • Pathologizing the mass and the ‘other’ in our midst • Excluding the public/employees (authorities versus public/employees)

  25. Exercise TIGER 2 5. Enhancing cohesion and resilience Facilitating shared identification and resilience? • Trusting the crowd and the public to self-organize • Providing practical information • Promoting unity: ‘we’ (the authorities, public, employees etc.) are ‘all in the same boat’ • Including the public (catering for the public desire to help)

  26. Exercise TIGER 2 6. Accommodating the public urge to help • Survivors & witnesses try to help (whether or not they have expertise) • Inevitable • Builds unity and trust • Makes them feel better • Might actually be necessary! (7/7)

  27. Exercise TIGER 2 Conclusion • The emergency crowd presents a logistical problem (e.g. assembly points) not a psychological problem • The crowd is also a resource • Facilitate (don’t inhibit) natural resilience

  28. Exercise TIGER 2 Summary 1. Preparation – drills. 2. Information – contentful, practical. 3. Trust – needs to be fostered so that messages are credible. 4. Talking about ‘panic’ is counter-productive. 5. Resilience is natural but can be inhibited as well as facilitated. 6. Accommodating the public urge to help can be part of this facilitation.

  29. Exercise TIGER 2

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