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Different MKD domain MPs communication method. Authors:. Date: 2008-07-09. Abstract. CID#1069,1070 , 505 bring forward the problem that two neighbor MPs authenticated through different MKD node could NOT build a secure link
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Different MKD domain MPs communication method Authors: Date: 2008-07-09 Changdong Fan, Amy Zhang, Huawei
Abstract CID#1069,1070 , 505 bring forward the problem that two neighbor MPs authenticated through different MKD node could NOT build a secure link We present a method the distribute the keys for the two neighbor MPs to build up the secure link Changdong Fan, Amy Zhang, Huawei
Agenda • Problem statement • Assumption • Solution Changdong Fan, Amy Zhang, Huawei
Authentication through MKD B Problem statement AS wired network • MP ONLY binds with the MKD to do the key management • MKD could distribute the keys to MP which should do the initial authentication through the corresponding MKD • Multiple MKD may exist in the mesh network • Merging & faster startup • Distribution of load MKD A MKD B MP MP MP MP MP MP MP Changdong Fan, Amy Zhang, Huawei
Assumption AS wired network • MKD could communicate with each other through mesh network • MKDs constitute ONE key management group • MKDs share one group key GK MKD B MKD A MP MP MP MP MP MP MP Changdong Fan, Amy Zhang, Huawei
Possible solution MKD1 MKD2 REQ:MeshID || req || LocalNonce || LocalMKDD-ID || PeerMKDD-ID||GKID • Add multi-hop communicating protocol between MKDs to do the key distribution • May reuse the abbreviated Handshake protocol • Result • Key Negotiation • LDK-MKD||PTK-MKD=PRF-length(GK,min(LocalNonce,PeerNonce)||max(LocalNonce,PeerNonce)|| min(LocalMKDD-ID,PeerMKDD-ID)||max(LocalMKDD-ID,PeerMKDD-ID)…) • LDK-MKD as the root key to compute PMK-MA • PTK-MKD as the key to protect the communication between MKDs , REQ:MeshID || req || LocalNonce || PeerNonce || LocalMKDD-ID || PeerMKDD-ID||GKID RESP:MeshID || resp || LocalNonce || PeerNonce || LocalMKDD-ID || PeerMKDD-ID || GKID || MIC RESP:MeshID || resp || LocalNonce || PeerNonce || LocalMKDD-ID || PeerMKDD-ID ||GKID|| MIC Changdong Fan, Amy Zhang, Huawei
PMK-MA distribution between MPs in different MKD domain MKD2 MKD1 2b PMK Res 2 aPMK Req • Procedure • MP invokes the PLM protocol • MPs both request the PMK-MA to the corresponding MKD node, when they find they are not in the same MKD domain • MKD separately compute the PMK-MA using the same LDK-MKD to distribute the key to MP • Both MP could do the normal 4-way handshake to derive PTK after getting the PMK-MA 2b PMK Res 2 aPMK Req 1 PLM MP1 MP2 3 4-way Handshake Changdong Fan, Amy Zhang, Huawei
The cross domain key management GK • GK, shared BY MKD group • LDK-MKD , Link distribution Key shared by MKD • Compute the PMK-MA to distribute the keys to authenticated MPs • PTK-MKD • Shared by MKD, update when LDK-MKD updates • PMK-MA • Pair-wise Master Key, shared by authenticated MPs • PTK • Pair-wise Transient Key LDK-MKD PTK-MKD PMK-MA PTK Changdong Fan, Amy Zhang, Huawei
Conclusion • The management of GK shared by MKDs • Not be suitable to define the GK management in 802.11 • The communicating protocol between MKDs • Need to be defined more clearly • need to design the state machine • Change to the PMK-MA negotiating procedure Changdong Fan, Amy Zhang, Huawei
References • IEEE 802.11s D2.0 Changdong Fan, Amy Zhang, Huawei