270 likes | 428 Views
American Unipolarity and the Rise of China. Theo Farrell, CSI Lecture 3, 2011. Realist worldview. Why power matters. Offensive Realist. Defensive Realist. What states do. Balance Bandwagon Buck-passing Chain-ganging. Why polarity matters. More stable – less prone to war
E N D
American Unipolarity and the Rise of China Theo Farrell, CSI Lecture 3, 2011
Why power matters Offensive Realist Defensive Realist
What states do • Balance • Bandwagon • Buck-passing • Chain-ganging
Why polarity matters • More stable – less prone to war • Bipolar orders are simple to manage. • Multipolar orders can slip into war due to ‘chain-ganging’ (WWI) and ‘buck-passing’ (WWII).
European hegemons • The Hapsburg Empire (Charles V and Philip II) • Napoleonic France • Victorian Britain • Nazi Germany
Wohlforth’s ”big 3” • World system is unabiguously unipolar. • Unipolarity is prone to peace. • Current unipolarity is stable.
Extent of American unipolarity • 2 – 1 = 1? • Quantitative + qualitative material advantages • Largest high-tech economy • Expenditure on R&D = rest of G7 combined
Unipolarity = peace • No hegemonic rivalry • International institutions and hegemonic self-restraint (Ikenberry) • Social foundations of hegemony (Reus-Smit)
Why US unipolarity is stable • Totality of power gap • Geography – ‘stopping power of water’ • No rising challengers: EU, Japan, China
Soft balancing • ‘Actions that do not directly challenge U.S. military preponderance but that use nonmilitary tools to delay, frustrate, and undermine aggressive unilateral U.S. military practices.’ • Logic: containing U.S hegemonic power • Trigger: unilateralism under Bush • Soft balancing strategies: territorial denial, entangling diplomacy, economic strengthening, and signaling resolve
‘Back to the future’: the world in 2025.. • ‘…will be a global multipolar one’ • China and India in C18th: 30% and 15% of global wealth • China = world’s second largest economy • Chinese problems: failing social security net, poor business regulation, hunger for foreign energy, corruption, and environmental devastation
Long-range forecasting: reasons to be cautious • Leaders and their ideas matter • Economic volatility and political change • Geopolitical rivalry and discontinuities
Revisionist state? • Revisionist states value what they covet more than what they currently possess • They will employ military force to change the status quo and extend their values Randall Schweller, ‘Bringing the Revisionist State Back In, International Security 19: 1 (1994)
Implications of Chinese military modernisation • Disrupt US freedom of movement in the region • Narrow US strategic options SecDef Robert Gates (2009)
Bad debts • US current account deficit = 1.4 of global GDP and China current account surplus = 0.7 of global GDP (2007) • Sept 2008, China replaced Japan as largest foreign holder of US debt (= $1.5 trillion or 46% of US debt) Daniel Drezner, ‘Assessing China’s Financial Influence in Great Power Politics’, Int Security 34: 2 (2009).
‘Responsible power?’ ‘It is time to take our policy beyond opening doors to China’s membership into the international system. We need to urge China to become a responsible stakeholder in that system.’ Deputy Sec of State Robert Zoellick (2005).
China as a ‘social state’ 1. Participation in int institutions 2. Compliance with int norms: (sovereignty, free trade, non-prolif, HR) 3. Attitude towards the ‘rules of the game’ A. I. Johnston, ‘Is China a Status Quo Power,’ Int Security 27: 4 (2003)