CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS “Rules of the Game”

1. CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS“Rules of the Game” DRAWING OF HOUSE DISTRICTS --Process for allocating each state its share of House seats--Effects of fixing the size of the House at 435

2. CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS“Rules of the Game” • District-drawing process within the states • --Initial judicial reluctance to interfere • --Relevant Constitutional provisions • --Baker v. Carr, Wesberry v. Sanders, and the “Reapportionment Revolution”

3. CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS“Rules of the Game” • GERRYMANDERING • ---Partisan gerrymandering: “cracking and packing,” “wasting votes,” “trading security for seats” • --Is partisan gerrymandering legal? What about midterm gerrymandering? • --Why partisan gerrymandering is less common/effective than people think

4. CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS“Rules of the Game” • RACIAL GERRYMANDERING • --1965 Voting Rights Act • --1980 Bolden v. City of Mobile • --1982 Voting Rights Act Amdendments • --1986 Thornburg v. Gingles • --Dramatic 1990 Redistricting • (from 25 Afr.-Amer./10 Hispan.Reps in 1992 to 38 and 17 in 1993)

5. CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS“Rules of the Game” • RACIAL REDISTRICTING CONT’d • --Shaw v. Reno (1993) NC • --Miller v. Johnson (1995) GA • Reasons for Controversy • --related to Affirmative Action • --MMDs help GOP? • --is votitng always racially polarized?

6. CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS“Rules of the Game” • EFFECTS OF DISTRICT-DRAWING PROCESS ON HOUSE ELECTIONS IN GENERAL • 1.) Unnatural districts may aid incumbents? • 2.) Minimizes role of television in some House races due to bad fit between media markets and districts • 3.) Local party orgs more interested in city, county, state races

7. CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS“Rules of the Game” • CAMPAIGN FINANCE • No real meaningful reform until 1970s Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) and Amendments • 1.) Disclosure of campaign contributions and expenditures • 2.) Disclosure of “independent spending” on candidates’ behalf • 3.) $1000 limit on individual contribution to campaign • 4.) PACs legalized (explain how they originated), limited to $5K contributions • 5.) Party contributions: higher limits, “coordinated expenditures” • 6.)***Attempts to limit overall spending by a campaign, self-contributions, and independent expenditures

8. CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS“Rules of the Game” • Buckley v. Valeo (1976) struck down *** overall spending limits ind. Spending limits, and self-contributions (explain why) • 1980s (“Old School”) proposed campaign finance reforms: outlawing PACs, partial Fed. Funding of campaigns coupled with spending limits

9. CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS“Rules of the Game” • 1990s-2000s proposed reforms, sparked by • A.) Republican takeover of Congress in 1994 • B.) Turnover meant less concern about incumbency advantages • C.) New (or newly discovered) loopholes in FECA • In mid1990s • ---unlimited raising and spending of “soft money” by parties • ---”independent spending” that wasn’t really independent’ • ---”issue advocacy” campaign advertising that avoided limits/regulation by avoiding use of “magic words”

10. CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS: “Rules of the Game” • Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA, a.k.a. “McCain-Feingold” bill); finally passed in 2002 after many attempts • 1.) Raised indiv contribution limit to $2000 • 2.) Banned raising and spending of soft money by national parties, and by state parties for Fed. Candidates • 3.) Authorized FEC to tighten restrictions on independent spending • 4.) Brought “electioneering” (i.e., issue advocacy) communications under FEC regulation (define “electioneering”)---unlimited, but could only be done by PACs, not by corporations or labor unions themselves---electioneerers had to disclose contributors

11. CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS: The Incumbency Advantage • High re-election rates, especially for House members (why is Senate re-election rate lower?) • Esp. since late 1960s: incumbents winning by larger margins “vanishing marginals” • Measures of incumbency PERSONAL advantage---sophomore surge, retirement slump---on the rise

12. Rules of the Game: Finale • SUPREME COURT action on BCRA---2003 McConnell vs. FEC: act as a whole facially valid---2007 FEC v. Wisconsin RTL: ban on corporate $ invalid as applied in this case---2008 Davis v. FEC: millionaires amdt. invalid---2010 Citizens United v. FEC: ban on corporate $ invalid, totally

13. CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS: The Incumbency Advantage • EXPLANATIONS FOR INCREASE IN INCUMBENCY ADVANTAGE • 1.) Not 1960s redistricting (although 1990s and 2000s may have mattered) • 2.) Increase in “independent” (nonpartisan voters)---but that’s not entirely it either • 3.) Mayhew “Congress: the Electoral Connection” 1974 • a.) Advertising • b.) Credit-claiming (includes both non-legislative “casework” and “pork barrel legislation” • c.) Position-taking on issues of concern to the district • (In all of these activities, Congressional resources---i.e., personal and committee staff, exposure on C-SPAN, franking privilege of free mailing to the districts, more paid trips home---increasingly and aggressively used to promote re-election)

14. CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS: The Incumbency Advantage • EXPLANATIONS FOR INCREASE IN INCUMBENCY ADVANTAGE CONT’D • Morris Fiorina, “Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment” (1977), emphasized casework, argued that Congress deliberately keeps the bureaucracy big and confusing so they can “rescue” constituents • Even though few ever ask their member of Congress for help, the few that are helped spread the word; most members acquire a general reptuation for helpfulness

15. CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS: The Incumbency Advantage • INCUMBENTS’ FINANCIAL ADVANTAGE • --Corporate and trade association PACs (biggest and wealthiest) tend to favor incumbents and the majority party • --Only labor unions and ideological (nonconnected) PACs are willing to help challengers • THE SCARE-OFF EFFECT • Possibly the biggest consequence of incumbents’ activities and fundraising is to scare off qualified potential opponents • “Strategic” candidates only run when they believe they can win; if incumbents look unbeatable, only unqualified opponents will run • Paradoxically, the strongest incumbents end up facing the weakest opposition • Paradoxically, even though they find it easier to raise money, spending doesn’t appear to help incumbents that much (‘cuz incumbents get so much free publicity); pre-emptive vs. reactive spending may have different effects

16. CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS: are they local or national affairs? --Long-time trradition of “coattails” and midterm losses for president’s party --Since 1980, most presidents have lacked coattails, and in 1998 and 2002 midterms presidents gained seats --Size of presidents’ party gains and losses seems to reflect presidential approval and ups and downs in the economy; but do voters really consider these national factors when voting for Congress?

17. CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS: Local or National Affairs? • Jacobson and Kernell’s “Strategic Politicians Theory” tried to explain how cong. Elections could be both national and local • Candidates, potential candidates, and contributors all make decisions in response to national factors (presidential approval, economy, war, etc.) • National factors influence the quality of candidates voters get to choose from, and voters respond primarily to candidate quality • So voters don’t have to be consciously thinking of national factors in order for those factors to have an effect; what influences cong. Elections most is national factors EARLY in the year (when elites are making decisions) rather than in November • Some argue that in elections like 1994 and 1998 (Clinton impeachment) voters DO payattention to national factors) e.g. commercials featuring local candidates “morphing” into Clinton or Gingrich