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Join us in exploring the impact of Superfish attacks in cryptocurrency mining, analyzing SP20 profitability, and deciphering blockchain puzzles for cumulative income growth. Stay updated with the latest difficulty adjustments and learn about SSL security challenges.
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Class 12: Mostly About Superfish Cryptocurrency Café UVa cs4501 Spring 2015 David Evans Image from http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/02/22/lenovo_superfish_removal_tool/ (but I think they stole it from Monsters and Aliens)
Plan for Today Difficulty Update Project 2: Part 2 Superfish Calamity! (Attacks on Blockchain)
Last Class: Profitability (?) of SP20 >> cumulative_income(1) 79.12571644571238 >>> cumulative_income(12) 571.0928818228372 >>> cumulative_income(24) 562.7786595271843 >>> cumulative_income(17) 619.9072133191279
Old difficulty: difficulty = 46684376317 # updated 22 Feb 2015 # 44455415962 # from https://blockchain.info/stats, 15 Feb 2015 # this is a very low assumption - over past year, average rate was 0.35 rate_of_difficulty = 0.05 … defcumulative_income(months): income = 0.0 month = 0 while month < months: income += expected_income(month) month += 1 return income >> cumulative_income(1) 79.12571644571238 >>> cumulative_income(12) 571.0928818228372 >>> cumulative_income(17) 619.9072133191279 Note: actual increase since Jan 29: 0.13 New difficulty: >>> cumulative_income(1) 72.41808586293124 >>> cumulative_income(12) 508.6688931963315 >>> cumulative_income(16) 540.5796294385948 >>> cumulative_income(17) 540.5038281854024
Old difficulty: difficulty = 46684376317 # updated 22 Feb 2015 # 44455415962 # from https://blockchain.info/stats, 15 Feb 2015 # this is a very low assumption - over past year, average rate was 0.35 rate_of_difficulty = 0.13 … defcumulative_income(months): income = 0.0 month = 0 while month < months: income += expected_income(month) month += 1 return income >> cumulative_income(1) 79.12571644571238 >>> cumulative_income(12) 571.0928818228372 >>> cumulative_income(17) 619.9072133191279 Note: actual increase since Jan 29: 0.13 New difficulty: >>> cumulative_income(1) 72.41808586293124 >>> cumulative_income(12) 508.6688931963315 >>> cumulative_income(16) 540.5796294385948 >>> cumulative_income(17) 540.5038281854024 At 13%: >>> cumulative_income(1) 72.41808586293124 >>> cumulative_income(7) 239.03863987346259 >>> cumulative_income(8) 234.54128929077427
from Feb 18 (Class 11): this morning (Feb 23):
Project 2 Part 2 starts after class today Understand threats to the blockchain Attack the PointCoin network
Rules • The blockchain reported by http://blockexplorer.bitcoin-class.org/ is the blockchain that matters (if that node is taken down, the definitive blockchain will be one taken from the course staff nodes) • You may not use any active computing power for mining other than your EC2 nodes • You may not misuse any University resources • You may not do anything that violates Amazon’s acceptable use policy (http://aws.amazon.com/aup/)
Opportunities • Collusion is permitted (indeed, encouraged!) • You should have mutual distrust for your classmates (just for this assignment!) • If you join a mining pool, it is encouraged that you (attempt to) deceive the pool operator (or other pools) to gain an advantage • If you operate a mining pool, fine to attempt to cheat pool members
Do Something Else! • Posted Project 2 / Part 2 is the default. • I hope some students will do other things! • Alternatives: • Build a PointCoin exchange • Use scripts in interesting ways • Build naming service using PointCoin • … If you have an idea for something different to do, let me know.
SSL (Secure Sockets Layer) Client Server Hello KRCA[Server Identity, KUS] Verify Certificate using KUCA Check identity matches URL Generate random K DecryptusingKRS EKUS(K) Secure channel using K Simplified TLS Handshake Protocol
SSL (Secure Sockets Layer) Client Server Hello KRCA[Server Identity, KUS] Verify Certificate using KUCA Check identity matches URL Generate random K How did client get KUCA? DecryptusingKRS EKUS(K) Secure channel using K Simplified TLS Handshake Protocol
Certificates How does VarySign decide if it should give certificate to requester? VarySign.com petitions.gov, KUPetitions CP= KRVarySign[“petitions.gov”, KUPetitions] TJ CP Verifies using KUVarySign Petitions
$399 $1499 for 1 year
Internet explorer connects to a web server on port 443 using SSL. The data is encrypted. • Komodia’sSSL hijacker intercepts the communication and redirects it to Komodia’s Redirector. The channel between the SSL hijacker and the Redirector is encrypted. • At this stage, Komodia’s Redirector can shape the traffic, block it, or redirect it to another website. • Communication between the Redirector and the website is encrypted using SSL. • All data received from the website can be again modified and/or blocked. When data manipulation is done, it is forwarded again to Internet explorer. • The browser displays the SSL lock, and the session will not display any “Certificate warnings”. http://www.komodia.com/products/komodias-ssl-decoderdigestor (in archive.org)
SSL (Secure Sockets Layer) Client Server Hello KRCA[Server Identity, KUS] Verify Certificate using KUCA Check identity matches URL Generate random K DecryptusingKRS EKUS(K) Secure channel using K Simplified TLS Handshake Protocol
Charge Project 2 Part 2: Starts Now Due Thursday 5 March Quiz Wednesday