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CREW, AUTOMATION & SAFETY

CREW, AUTOMATION & SAFETY . Glasgow ASAS TN2 September 12th 2006. Safety Level. TODAY SITUATION During the last ten years, aircraft safety has improved. Progress mostly due to : Development of avionics (large displays, situation awareness, status of A/C trajectory, GPS)

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CREW, AUTOMATION & SAFETY

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  1. CREW, AUTOMATION & SAFETY Glasgow ASAS TN2 September 12th 2006 SL2006-51 ASAS TN2 Glasgow 060912.ppt

  2. Safety Level • TODAY SITUATION • During the last ten years, aircraft safety has improved. Progress mostly due to : • Development of avionics (large displays, situation awareness, status of A/C trajectory, GPS) • Development of Collision avoidance (ground GCAS, air TCAS) • TOMORROW EXPECTATIONS • Users expect a safety improvement by a factor of "ten", meaning no more than one accident in Europe in commercial transportation every three to five years. • Achievement of this ambitious objective will request efforts in all domains with : • A new approach of aircraft systems (better monitoring, fail passive & fail operative generalization) • A large effort in the domain of continuous airworthiness • A redefinition of the crew role (pilot misjudgment is becoming the prime source of accident) • Nevertheless for years and years the pilot will remain the "ultimate computer" GCAS : Ground Collision Avoidance System TCAS : Traffic Collision Avoidance System SL2006-51 ASAS TN2 Glasgow 060912.ppt

  3. Crew Role • TODAY SITUATION • In RVSM airspace (cruise condition) aircraft are in autopilot mode • On most aircraft low visibility approaches (Cat 3) are only possible in autopilot mode • Pilots understand that in most situations automatic systems performed better than them • MORE AND MORE AUTOMATION WILL IMPROVE FLIGHT SAFETY • Generalization of automation in all phases of flight • What is "normal" today in bad weather conditions (turbulence, low visibility) must become the general rule and this whatever the weather conditions • Generalization of automatic check lists following system failures • AN ABSOLUTE NECESSITY "KEEP THE PILOT IN THE LOOP" • Pilot must stay the "Boss" (the ultimate computer) • Better tactical situation, generalization of the use of flight path vector, vertical path display • Large horizon display with "Synthetic Vision System" • "Head Up Display" with "Enhanced Flight Vision System" RVSM : Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum SL2006-51 ASAS TN2 Glasgow 060912.ppt

  4. Crew Role • CREW WORKLOAD • In terminal area, under critical circumstances crew workload can be high (too high) • Communications in use today represent a large part of the pilot workload Solution is to use datalink and to limit voice coms to a minimum (specific procedures) • Aircraft configuration management is an other oneSolution is to develop automatic management of Slats, Flaps, A/B, Landing gear and to use FBW to maintain the aircraft in its flight envelope and to counter engine failure • CREW COORDINATION • Generally airliners are proud of their "crew procedures" • Unfortunately these procedures are sources of misunderstandings and errors • Solution : One pilot in charge of the flight behavior, the other one in charge of the monitoring • PILOT FORMATION • It's a new and difficult challenge. Aviation will need more & more pilots. • Pilot selection criteria are changing "less skill, more expertise" FBW : Fly by Wire SL2006-51 ASAS TN2 Glasgow 060912.ppt

  5. Cockpit Crew Organization • COCKPIT "1+1" PILOTS (CS/FAR 25-1523) • Purpose of this cockpit is : • To Allow long duration fights with only two pilots • To improve the safety of the flight • In cruise, "1" pilot controlling the aircraft, "1" pilot resting in his seat • Flight in fail passive / fail operative mode (no need of pilot immediate action) • In TMA "1" pilot controlling and flying the aircraft, "1" pilot monitoring the flight • In case of abnormal situation the copilot is in charge to order and to proceed to a "Go Around" • COCKPIT "1" PILOT + "1" QCM (Qualified Crew Member) (CS/FAR 25-1523) • The QRM has the minimum qualification to land the aircraft in case of pilot incapacity • Purposes are to allow : • FAR 25 BizJets to operate in a similar way than FAR 23 VLJ (maintaining a better safety level) • Non professional pilots to flight a modern business jet (under pilot control) TMA : Terminal Area VLJ : Very Light Jet SL2006-51 ASAS TN2 Glasgow 060912.ppt

  6. Cockpit Crew Organization • COCKPIT "1" QCM (Qualified Crew Member) (CS/FAR 23/25-1523) • Purpose of this cockpit • To allow FAR 25 aircraft (Cargo) operations with only one crewmember • To allow FAR 23/25 Business Jet operations with only one crewmember • Aircraft configuration • The aircraft is configured as a UAV (flight might be made in complete automatic mode) • The crewmember monitors the flight operation and intervenes in case of malfunction • The crew can flight the aircraft through the FBW but only using upper modes • Less crew qualificationNo direct flight operation in "roll" mode (to avoid spatial disorientation effects) • Initial application • VLJ aircraft ( Eclipse is envisaging on its VLJ "an automatic aircraft recovery system in the event of pilot incapacitation). • AC 25-1523-1 Minimum Flight Crew 4.c.(4)(vi)(B) • Although Part 25 does not specifically disallow certification of single piloted transport category airplanes, the FAA • has been reluctant to approve this operation when all aspects of the intended use of the airplane and the consequence of pilot incapacitation are considered, as well as the historical accident record noted in paragraph (A) above. SL2006-51 ASAS TN2 Glasgow 060912.ppt

  7. The Future "One Pilot & a Dog" "I bite… If the pilot try to touch any control" SL2006-51 ASAS TN2 Glasgow 060912.ppt

  8. COLLISION PREVENTION &ASAS ASAS : Airborne Separation Assistance System SL2006-51 ASAS TN2 Glasgow 060912.ppt

  9. Aircraft Separation & Collision Avoidance • TODAY METHOD • In controlled airspace, ATC controllers are in charge of the aircraft separation, pilots are in charge of collision avoidance (see & avoid principle) • Aircraft separation and collision avoidance are relevant of application of operational rules • PROPOSAL • Is to apply to “Aircraft Separation and Collision Avoidance” a method similar to the method used for certification of aircraft system (CS 25 or CS 23 paragraph 1309) • Method based on “safety targets” validated by “safety analysis” (no longer on see & avoid principle) • CONSEQUENCES • Elimination of all common points, no single failure must have catastrophic effect (baro-alt) • More independence between “Aircraft Separation” and “Collision Avoidance” functions • All flying machines must become cooperativeTransponder for aircraft (machine with electrical power source)Equipment to be developed for ultra light machine (AGPS can be a candidate) AGPS : Assisted GPS (a combination of GPS and mobile phone) SL2006-51 ASAS TN2 Glasgow 060912.ppt

  10. ASAS • ASAS (Airborne Separation Assistance System) • Traffic increase will increase the number of actions to maintain proper A/C separation • There is a need to put the "pilot in the loop" and so to develop ASAS methods • ASAS means also additional workload for the crew • ASAS CONCERNS & PROPOSALS • Symbology must be "crystal clear" (Controller in absolute mode, crew in relative motion) • Actions must always follow the same rules and must be coordinated (ATC & crews) • A PRELIMINARY PROPOSAL FOR "AIRCRAFT CROSSING" • The procedure will have to be initiated by the ATC controller (normal case) • Only one aircraft will do the maneuver, the aircraft which is passing "aft" (wake vortex) • The maneuver will consist in a turn (track change) in the direction of the intruder • To minimize the trajectory change, the maneuver will be initiated when the track change will correspond to a predetermined selected value (20°) • The procedure can be made in automatic mode (pilot arming the sequence) SL2006-51 ASAS TN2 Glasgow 060912.ppt

  11. ASAS Symbology (first draft) SL2006-51 ASAS TN2 Glasgow 060912.ppt

  12. Concerns • FIRST CONCERN • It is important to keep independent aircraft separation (ADS-B) from collision avoidance • In case of TCAS alert (TA), ASAS symbology must be removed and replaced by TCAS one • There is a risk that a pilot involved in an ASAS action will not thrust the TCAS order • Solution might be to implement an automatic TCAS • SECOND CONCERN • A communication party (A/C crews & controller) must be implemented (Data link & voice)Party organized by ATC controllerCoordination by messages (A/C doing the maneuver, start and end of maneuver) • THIRD CONCERN • Accuracy of A/C positions (accuracy and time delay) • Integrity of aircraft positions (GPS), (possibility to correlate aircraft distance (mode S)) • Use of a common means of communication (TCAS mode S, ADS-B 1090 ES) • POSSIBILITY • Possibility to reduce separation distance without wake vortex effect, by increasing the "aft aircraft" altitude to flight slightly above the intruder (~100 ft baro-alt & GPS alt) • In any case "separation distance" must be sufficient to not trigger TCAS TA SL2006-51 ASAS TN2 Glasgow 060912.ppt

  13. Questions ? SL2006-51 ASAS TN2 Glasgow 060912.ppt

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