World War II: Normandy

1. World War II: Normandy Lesson 26

2. ID & SIG: • airborne forces, amphibious forces, coalition warfare, Cobra, Eisenhower, mass, Montgomery, objective, Rommel, Runstedt, surprise

3. Early Planning • In Sept 1941, British Prime Minister Churchill ordered his planners to, “prepare for the invasion of Europe… You must devise and design the appliances, the landing craft, and the technique… The whole of the South Coast of England is a bastion of defense against the invasion of Hitler; you’ve got to turn it into the springboard for your attack.” • The British drafted a proposal, code named Roundup, for an attack across the English Channel

4. Early Planning • The Americans developed a proposal, code named Bolero, for the establishment in Britain of a million man force trained and equipped for an invasion tentatively scheduled for 1943 • In the meantime however, both the Americans and British agreed that the Allies should concentrate on wearing down Germany’s resistance through air attacks, operations along the North African coast, and assistance to the Soviet Union Winston Churchill observed, “Sometimes I think the whole war depends on some damned thing called an LST.”

5. Early Planning • At a series of conferences– Casablanca, Quebec, Cairo, and Tehran– the Allies honed their strategy • It soon became apparent however that there was a difference of opinion about this idea of wearing down German resistance • The British favored a peripheral strategy while the Americans thought the proper course was a direct assault that would mass the Allied resources

6. Americans Had vast resources available Had suffered relatively few casualties in World War I Had not suffered the disaster at Dunkirk in World War II British Had lost an entire generation in World War I Had conducted amphibious peripheral operations, albeit unsuccessfully, at Gallipoli in World War I Had already borne heavy losses in World War II, including at Dieppe Churchill cautioned that, if conducted prematurely, the channel would be “choked with the bodies of the flower of American and British manhood” Some Reasons for the Differences

7. Result • Although the British agreed in principle to the cross-channel invasion they nonetheless shifted resources away from the project; first to North Africa and then to Italy • Without the necessary landing craft, ships, and planes for a cross-channel attack, the Americans had no choice but to go along • Pressure from Stalin to open up a second front gave the Americans additional leverage

8. Eisenhower • One of the tangible ways to show Stalin progress was being made on the invasion planning was to appoint a supreme commander • By this point in the war, the American contribution had surpassed the British one, so the post would go to an American • George Marshall was strongly considered but Roosevelt felt Marshall’s presence in Washington to be critical so Dwight Eisenhower got the job As Army Chief of Staff, Marshall was credited by Churchill as being the “organizer of victory”

9. Unity of Command • To accommodate British sensitivities, Eisenhower selected his principal commanders from the British • Tedder (British) • Deputy • Ramsey (British) • Naval • Leigh-Mallory (British) • Air • Bradley (US) and Montgomery (British) • Ground

10. Unity of Command: German Defenses • Debate between Rundstedt and Rommel over whether to deny the initial landing on the beaches or to destroy them with strong, mobile counter attack forces Rundstedt Rommel

11. German Defenses: Rommel’s Plan • Rommel was appointed commander of Army Group B in 1943 • Began to reinforce the Atlantic Wall in order to immediately and absolutely defeat any Allied landings

12. Weakness of Rommel’s Plan • Atlantic Wall had no true depth to its defenses • An enemy force that breached the thin Atlantic Wall would face no further fortified positions of significance

13. German Defenses

14. German Defenses: Rundstedt’s Plan • Rundstedt, the overall commander in the west, placed great reliance on mechanized reserves that could respond quickly and flexibly to an enemy penetration • He stationed a newly created armored command, Panzer Group West, near Paris • From there, the force could move toward the site of an enemy assault in either Pas de Calais or Normandy

15. Weakness of Rundstedt’s Plan • Rundstedt lacked the authority he needed • Hitler exercised direct control over Rundstedt’s forces • The navy commanded most of the coastal artillery that would be called upon to repel an Allied attack. • The air force controlled the bulk of the antiaircraft and parachute units stationed in the region. • Some armor units also came under the administrative supervision of the SS which answered first to Hitler and Berlin rather than to its supposed commanders in the field. Hitler’s “Wolf’s Lair” Headquarters in Gierłoż

16. German Defenses: Compromise • Rundstedt and Rommel couldn’t settle their disagreement over which defensive strategy was best so they compromised and combined the two plans • This resulted in the worst of both • Beach defenses not strong enough to stop landing; reserves not strong enough to destroy the beachhead Rommel inspecting the beach defenses

17. Operation Overlord • At the Trident Conference the Allies had agreed to plan for a cross-channel invasion in May 1944 • The planners rejected Pas de Calais as being too obvious a choice and instead selected Normandy • However they would mount a significant deception campaign to convince the Germans Pas de Calais was the intended landing site

18. Surprise • “… it is more effective to find out what the enemy is predisposed to believe and to reinforce those beliefs while at the same time altering your plans to take advantage of these reinforced false beliefs.” (John Chomeau) • Fictitious army • Inflatable tanks • Targets • Ultra • Weather

19. Surprise: Fictitious Army • By spurious radio transmissions, the Allies created an entire phantom army, “based” in southeast England (opposite Pas de Calais) and alleged to be commanded by Patton. • In addition, on the night of the invasion itself, airborne radar deception presented to German radar stations a “phantom” picture of an invasion fleet crossing the Channel narrows, while a radar blackout disguised the real transit to Normandy.

20. Inflatable Tanks

21. Surprise: Ultra • At the same time, through the top-secret Ultra operation, the Allies were able to decode encrypted German transmissions, thus providing the Overlord forces with a clear picture of where the German counterattack forces were deployed.

22. Surprise: Targets • The air campaign was designed not only to disrupt German anti-invasion preparations but also to serve as a deception operation. • Two-thirds of the bombs were dropped outside the invasion area, in an attempt to persuade the enemy that the landings would be made northeast of the Seine, particularly in the Pas de Calais area, rather than in Normandy.

23. Surprise: Weather • Germans had a false sense of security about the weather • Rommel was visiting his wife on D-Day • “There is not going to be an invasion. And if there is, then they won’t even get off the beaches!”

24. Allied Plan • The Allied plan would involve amphibious landings on the Normandy beaches supported by airborne assaults behind the beaches to block German counterattacks

25. The American 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions jumped over the Cotentin Peninsula to secure the exits from the westernmost American Beach of Utah The British 6th Airborne Division dropped on the eastern flank to capture the crossings over the River Orne and the Canal de Caen Airborne Forces

26. Pegasus Bridge and Point du Hoc • A special glider force from the 6th Airborne captured the crucial Pegasus Bridge over the canal and the Orne • American Rangers secured the cliffs of Pointe du Hoc where there was expected to be a massive German coastal battery Major John Howard led the British glider unit that secured Pegasus Bridge

27. Caen • The capture of Pegasus Bridge was designed to block German counterattacks and give the British an exit into the open country to the east of Caen • The Operation Overlord plan called for the British to capture Caen, about ten miles inland, on D-Day • Instead the attack stalled

28. German Defense • Although Rommel had been unable to prevent the Allies from establishing a beachhead like he had hoped, he continued his strategy of a static defense to hold them to their initial landing area • On June 11 Hitler issued an order forbidding any withdrawals • The stiff German resistance inland caught the Allies by surprise

29. Breakout: Planning • Allied planners had assumed the Germans would withdraw toward the Seine River and fight a delay along the river’s lines • Consequently, the planning had focused on the challenges of getting ashore rather than subsequent operations • The Allies were also unprepared for the challenges presented by the bocage country

30. The restrictive nature of the bocage required an average of five Americans to displace one German The normal planning figure was three to one Bocage: Result

31. Breakout: Ingenuity

32. Breakout: Allied Friction • In addition to the terrain and determined German resistance, Allied breakout efforts were hindered by: • A lack of a sense of urgency on Montgomery’s part • A terrible storm which hit the English Channel June 19-21 and temporarily damaged the logistics build-up • Two distinct battles soon developed in Normandy with the British and Canadians fighting in the east and the Americans in the west

33. Limited Gains • By July the Allies had a beachhead 70 miles wide, but except for Cherbourg, their lodgment was in no place more than 25 miles deep and in most areas was little more than five miles

34. Breakout: Carpet Bombing • The narrow Allied beachhead and the slower than expected advance inland bread fears of a stalemate • One attempt to breakout was Operation Charnwood • On July 7 the RAF Bomber Command dropped 2,300 tons of bombs on the northern outskirts of Caen • This technique of carpet bombing relied on mass rather than precision

35. Breakout: Carpet Bombing • The bombing caused huge German casualties but also missed many German defensive positions and heavily damaged Caen’s infrastructure • By July 9 the Allies controlled Caen north of the River Orne, but could go no further • Nonetheless the initiative was shifting to the Allies British soldiers amid the wreckage in Caen

36. Breakout: Operations Goodwood and Cobra • On July 18 the British attempted a large breakout in their sector called Operation Goodwood • The Americans planned to launch their own breakout, Operation Cobra, the next day, but it would be delayed by bad weather • Montgomery’s intentions for the exact relationship between these two operations is the subject of some conjecture, but the end result was that it worked

37. Breakout: Operations Goodwood and Cobra • Operation Goodwood began with a two hour aerial bombardment • Montgomery seemed overly reliant on air power • Montgomery’s slow pace greatly frustrated Eisenhower who complained that by July 20 Montgomery had advanced just seven miles at the rate of a thousand tons of bombs a mile • Still Goodwood drew reinforcements to the British sector which facilitated the American attack

38. Breakout: Operations Goodwood and Cobra • The British now had three armored, ten infantry, and one airborne division facing seven armored and six infantry divisions • The Americans had four armored and thirteen infantry divisions facing two armored, one mechanized, three infantry, one airlanding, and two parachute divisions

39. Breakout: Mass • The Allies were able to effect a massive build up of forces after the initial landing • The logistical operation was made possible by Mulberry artificial harbors and Whale floating piers

40. Breakout: Operations Goodwood and Cobra • After several weather delays Operation Cobra began on July 25 with a massive bombing campaign • Several bombs fell short, causing much fratricide including the death of Lieutenant General Lesley McNair, the highest ranking Allied officer killed in Europe • Unlike the British attack the Americans had sufficient ground forces to follow through after the air bombardment As commander of the Army Ground Forces, McNair was responsible for the organization, training and preparation of the Army for overseas service

41. Breakout: Operations Goodwood and Cobra • The breakthrough began on July 27 • On Aug 1, Patton’s Third Army officially became operational and within 24 hours Patton passed four divisions through Avranches, out of the bocage, and on to the roads to France

42. The Breakout • http://www3.sympatico.ca/angels_eight/campaign.html

43. The Allied Soldier

44. The Allied Soldier At low tide, the assaulting troops had to cross more than 300 meters of completely exposed beach to gain entrance to the Vierville draw.

45. 506th PIR Drop Dispersal

46. The Allied Soldier • The Germans launched no tactical counteroffensives against the American airborne assault. • American paratroopers gathered in ad hoc small groups and executed operations in accordance with the commander’s intent. • SLA Marshall

47. The German Soldier • “… the performance of the Wehrmacht’s high command, middle-ranking soldiers, and junior officers was just pathetic. The cause is simply put: they were afraid to take the initiative. They allowed themselves to be paralyzed by stupid orders coming from far away that bore no relation to the situation on the battlefield. Tank commanders who knew where the enemy was and how and when he should be attacked sat in their headquarters through the day, waiting for the high command in Berchtesgaden to tell them what to do.” • Stephen Ambrose

48. How it Ends • July 25: Beginning of Operation Cobra • Aug 15: Operational Anvil landings in southern France • Sept 17: Operational Market Garden • Dec 16: Beginning of the Battle of the Bulge • Apr 20, 1945: Russians take Berlin • Apr 25: Americans and Russians meet at the Elbe River • Apr 30: Hitler commits suicide

49. Surrender of Germany

50. Next • World War II: Pacific and Beginnings of the Cold War