120 likes | 212 Views
“Improving the Homeland Security Advisory System: An Experimental Analysis of Threat Communication for National Security”. August 2004 Philip T. Ganderton David S. Brookshire Department of Economics University of New Mexico Richard L. Bernknopf US Geological Survey. Background I.
E N D
“Improving the Homeland Security Advisory System: An Experimental Analysis of Threat Communication for National Security” August 2004 Philip T. Ganderton David S. Brookshire Department of Economics University of New Mexico Richard L. Bernknopf US Geological Survey
Background I • HSAS: A flawed, but critical system • Established March 2002 • 5 color-coded threat levels • Default is 3 – yellow • Raised to 4 – orange 6 times • Most recently August 1, 2004 • Is it the level, or changes in the level?
Background II • Threat level change announcement contains risk and response information • Risk information non-specific in nature of threat, spatial and temporal detail • HSAS has attracted considerable attention and criticism, from all directions: government (GAO) and private (PPW) and media (NYT)
Goals of HSAS • Translate intelligence into threat warnings via risk assessment • Provide timely relevant information • Emphasis on actions as appropriate response to threat • Protect icons, infrastructure and human life
Criticisms of HSAS • System is purely symbolic • Levels and announcements too vague • Lacks spatial detail • Lacks when, and how long, detail • Inconsistent with other, pre-existing warning systems • Relies too heavily on media reporting
Research Goals • 1. System design issues • What information, when, to whom? • What geographical detail is minimal, optimal, unnecessary? • How should uncertainty be communicated? • How to use existing systems and multiple messages?
Research Goals • 2. Behavioral responses • What threat/risk information do people value, and how does response vary with this? • Are people sensitive to levels, or changes in levels? • Are preferred responses consistent with HSAS advisory responses? • What is at risk to the individual?
The Experiments • Web-based • Individuals face threats with varying spatial distribution of risk/loss. • More detailed spatial threat map is available at a cost • Subjects choose appropriate response to threat
Data, Results • No data generated as yet. Panel data • Hypotheses: • H1: More spatially detailed threat information has value as expressed by a positive willingness to pay. • H2: The demand for more spatially detailed threat warnings is cost sensitive. • H3: Costly response actions are more likely at higher threat levels. • H4: People are not subject to the “Cry Wolf” syndrome postulated by Gruntfest and Carsell (2000.) • H5: Responses match threat levels better for those people with higher HSAS awareness.
More to Come • Explicit cost of response • Introduce warning uncertainty • Model alternative warning systems, including existing systems • Introduce temporal elements-time to attack, duration of attack • Model trade-off in all-hazard environment