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BELENE NPP SAFETY I&C SYSTEMS BASED ON TELEPERM XS

BELENE NPP SAFETY I&C SYSTEMS BASED ON TELEPERM XS. BULGARIAN NUCLEAR ENERGY – NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND WORLD ENERGY SAFETY Varna 27-29.05.09. Speaker: Ognyan Trichkov (MSC) – AREVA NP GmbH Co-Author: Dipl.-Ing. Hartwig Blessing – AREVA NP GmbH.

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BELENE NPP SAFETY I&C SYSTEMS BASED ON TELEPERM XS

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  1. BELENE NPP SAFETY I&C SYSTEMS BASED ON TELEPERM XS BULGARIAN NUCLEAR ENERGY – NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND WORLD ENERGY SAFETY Varna 27-29.05.09 Speaker: Ognyan Trichkov (MSC) – AREVA NP GmbH Co-Author: Dipl.-Ing. Hartwig Blessing – AREVA NP GmbH

  2. Guideline for the Presentation • Requirements by Customer and IAEA • Identification of I&C Systems • Plant Control Philosophy • Overview System Platform Teleperm XS • Teleperm XS References

  3. Requirements by NEK and IAEACorrelation between Classification Concepts NEK requires a Safety function classification based on IAEA and International Electro technical Commission (IEC) Nuclear Standard The correlation between • Safety classes of fluid-retaining components • Classes of I&C systems according to IAEA NS-G-1.3 • Classes of I&C systems according to IEC 61513 • Categories of I&C FSE according to IEC 61226 is provided in this table.

  4. 1. Requirements by NEK and IAEASafety Philosophy Safety Philosophy • Concept of Defense in Depth • Distribution of I&C Functions • Availability • Reliability • Maintainability • Credibility • Integrity - Security • Redundancy and Single Failure Criterion, • Prevention of Common-Cause Failures • Diversity of I&C Systems • Independence and Separation

  5. The I&C functions are grouped as follows: Process information and control functions Reactor limitation functions Reactor power control functions Protection functions Automatic backup functions Post accident monitoring functions On the basis of the identification of functions that are required I&C systems are established to perform these functions. The main systems are: Process Information and Control System (PICS) Safety Information and Control System (SICS) Process Automation System (PAS) Safety Automation System (SAS) Reactor Limitation and Control System (RLCS) Protection System (PS) Passive Heat Removal System (PHRA) Post Accident Monitoring System (part of SICS) These I&C systems make up the architecture of the Instrumentation and Control System. 2. Identification of I&C Systems

  6. 3. Plant Control Philosophy

  7. 3.1 Protection System • Redundancy: fourfold • Functional Diversity • Automatically initiates the reactivity control system (Reactor Trip) • ESFAS (Engineered Safety Features Actuation System) • initiate and control safety systems that remove heat or otherwise assists in maintaining the integrity of the three physical barriers to radioactive release (cladding, reactor coolant pressure boundary and containment). • The Protection System design is carried out redundantly and diversely according to single failure criterion and with consideration of the common course failure.

  8. 3.2 Passive Heat Removal Activation System (PHRA) • Redundancy fourfold • Hardware diversity • Open air gates in case of Protection System failure (Power Supply is available) • Programmable logic control system with a different hardware (TXS PLD) This picture is taken from the presentation “Experimental Calculation basis parameter for Passive Heat Removal System”, Authors L. Egorova and A. Plakseev of Atomenergoprom, Bulatom Conference 2008

  9. 3.3 Reactor Limitation and Control System • Redundancy fourfold • Limitation functions for reactor power and other important process parameters • Support functions in case of actuation of Protection System • Reactor control functions (twofold redundancy) • The design is carried out redundantly according to single failure criterion.

  10. 3.4 Priority Actuation Control System (PACS) Solution by AV42 (special type of function modules dealing with all actuator control tasks, especially for priority control, and monitoring for each single actuator) Organization of priority commands(from high to low) • Protection System • Reactor Limitation and Control System • Safety Automation System • Process Automation System • Manual control signals from SICS

  11. 3.5 Supervision and Control Level • As human machine interface serves the Process Information and Control system (PICS), it is used for process monitoring and operating in all plant situations. • Safety Information and Control System (SICS) contains 4 safety panels for operating and monitoring of ESFAS functions and the Reactor Protection Panel (RPP) with all indications for messages from the Protection System and the most important messages from RLCS.

  12. 4.Overview System Platform Teleperm XS Tools for Engineering andMaintenance TXSSystemSoftware TXSSystemDocumentation TXSSystemHardware GatewaysandInterfaceSolutions

  13. TELEPERM XS Qualification and Licensing Project-Specific Qualification of Application has to be performed in each project Site Tests Factory Acceptance Test Manufacturing Tests Hardware Software Sequence of Qualification Steps Verification of Specification Generic System Qualification performed once and maintained for the TELEPERM XS system platform Integration and System Test Component Type Tests Hardware Software Concept Review of System Development

  14. 5.ReferencesTELEPERM XS, SPPA-T2000 and SIMATIC S5/S7 Implementations and orders Plant Units 72 Plants 45 Countries 17 Reactor Supplier* 11 * Chinese Designs have been merged

  15. THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION

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