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Security. 802.11 Security Fundamentals. Secure 802.11 is a three stage process Association – Establish Link Authentication – 802.1X/EAP Encryption – TKIP or AES. Association Process. Management Frames are not encrypted Addressed by Management Frame Protection (MFP) –Discussed later.
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802.11 Security Fundamentals • Secure 802.11 is a three stage process • Association – Establish Link • Authentication – 802.1X/EAP • Encryption – TKIP or AES
Association Process • Management Frames are not encrypted • Addressed by Management Frame Protection (MFP) –Discussed later
802.11 Security • Enterprise WLAN Security relies upon 802.1x authentication. • 802.1x is port based security. • The association process establishes a virtual port • Encryption protects that virtual port
EAP / 802.1XOverview • 802.1X authentication has three key components • Supplicant - WLAN Client • Authenticator -WLC • Authentication Server – AAA Server
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) and WPA 2 • Components of WPA: • Authenticated Key Management using 802.1X: • EAP-TLS and RADIUS are the nominated EAP test mechanism • Unicast and Broadcast Encryption Key Management • TKIP: Per-packet Keying • IV expansion: 48 bit IVs • Message Integrity Check (MIC) • Migration Mode – coexistence of WPA and WEP devices • Why WPA? • Migration from WEP using the same hardware, fixed known WEP issues • WPA 2 uses: • AES CCMP Encryption rather than TKIP
WPA 4 way handshake • WPA and WPA2 perform a 4 way handshake to establish encryption keyes • Unlike earlier 802.1X WEP implementations. WPA doesn’t use the derived key (PMK) directly • A 4 way handshake is used to generate a temporal key, and multicast group key
EAP Protocols: Feature Support 1 Windows OS supplicant requires machine authentication (machine accounts on Microsoft AD) 2 Greater operating system coverage is available from Meetinghouse and Funk supplicants 3 PEAP/GTC is supported on CCXv2 clients and above 4 Cisco 350/CB20A clients support EAP-FAST on MSFT XP, 2000, and CE operating systems EAP-FAST supported on CB21AG/PI21AG clients with ADU v2.0 and CCXv3 clients 5 Supported by PEAP/GTC only 6 Supported with 3rd party supplicant
EAP Protocols: Feature Support 1 Strong password policy mitigates dictionary attacks; please refer to: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/hw/wireless/ps430/prod_bulletin09186a00801cc901.html
Gold • WPA2/802.11i • EAP-Fast • AES • Silver • WPA • EAP-Fast • TKIP • Lead • Dynamic WEP • EAP-Fast/LEAP • VLANs + ACLs Wi-Fi Protected Access • What are WPA and WPA2? • Authentication and encryption standards for Wi-Fi clients and APs • 802.1x authentication • WPA uses TKIP encryption • WPA2 uses AES block cipher encryption • Which should I use? • Gold, for supporting NIC/OSs • Silver, if you have legacy clients • Lead, if you absolutely have no other choice (i.e., ASDs)
Key WLC Behaviors • Default operation is no Multicast/broadcast traffic is sent out to the WLANs • WLC acts as ARP Proxy for WLANs • ARPs and Gratuitous ARPs are not sent to the WLANs • WLC blocks duplicate IP Spoofing • WLC acts as DHCP relay for WLAN clients • DHCP requests are checked against associated client MAC
Cisco Unified Wireless Network 4.1 • Management Frame Protection • Provides for the authentication of 802.11 management frames by the wireless network infrastructure • Allows detection of malicious rogues that are spoofing a valid AP MAC or SSID in order to avoid detection as a rogue AP, or as part of a man-in-the-middle attack • Increases the fidelity of rogue AP and WLAN IDS signature detection • Provides protection of client devices with CCX v5 • Also supported with Autonomous AP/ WDS/ WLSE in version 12.3(8)/ v2.13
MFP Protected MFP Protected Management Frame Protection Function • A solution for clients and infrastructure (APs) • Clients and APs add a MIC (signature)into every management frame • Anomalies are detected instantly andreported to Controller/WCS • E.g. no threshold or rate checks required to detect anomalies FUTURE- CCXv5
Benefits of MFP • Protection- for Rogue AP, Man-in-the-Middle exploits, other Management Frame attacks • Prevention- will be available with clients capable of decrypting the signature • Integration with other Cisco Security Monitoring solutions in order to characterize “attack vectors”- rules based correlation • Cisco Security Leadership and Innovation
Rogue AP Detection • Rogue AP detection has multiple facets: • Air/RF detection—detection of rogue devices by observing/sniffing beacons and 802.11 probe responses • Rogue AP location—use of the detected RF characteristics and known properties of the managed RF network to locate the rogue device • Wire detection—a mechanism for tracking/correlating the rogue device to the wired network • A WIDS may require different deployments to effectively address all of these facets • For example, it is typically required to use a scanning-mode AP as a “rogue traffic injector” to attempt to trace the rogue’s connected port
Radio (Air/RF) Monitoring Network Core NMS Wireless Control System (WCS) Distribution Wireless LAN Controller Access Auto-RRM RLDP ARP Sniffing Rogue AP Rogue AP RogueDetector RogueAP
X X A Complete Solution for Handling Rogues • Controlled by administrator • Multiple rogues contained simultaneously • Detect Rogue AP • (generate alarm) 2. Assess Rogue AP (Identity, Location, ..) 3. Contain Rogue AP 4. View Historical Report
Rogue AP Detection and Suppression • Rogue AP detection methodology • WLAN system collects (via beacons and probe responses) and reports BSSID information • System compares collected BSSID information versus authorized (i.e., managed AP) BSSID information • Unauthorized APs are flagged and reported via fault monitoring functionality • Rogue AP suppression techniques • Trace the rogue AP over the wired network to verify that the rogue is internal and should be contained • Use of managed devices to disassociate clients from unauthorized AP and prevent further associations via 802.11 de-authentication frames
Cisco Unified Wireless:Rogue Containment • Rogue AP, Rogue-Connected Client, or Ad-Hoc Client May Be Contained by Controller Issuing Unicast De-Authentication Packets • Maximum number of APs participating in containment is configurable • Maximum of three simultaneous containments may operate on a single LWAPP AP • Rogue client devices may be authenticated to a RADIUS (MAC address) database • Maximum time for auto-containment is configurable
Client Exclusion • WLC can deny access to suspect clients • Exclusion Policy is global • Exclusion enabled on a per WLAN basis
Wireless IDS • The WLC comes with built in Wireless IDS signatures that can be augmented with additional customer signatures
Integration into Cisco Network • Cisco Unified Wireless Network Integration features • Layer 2 Connection for WLAN client makes for easy integration of • Firewall and IDS Modules • NAC Appliance • Integration features with Cisco IDS/IPS
WAN WLC 4.1 Feature - Local EAP Termination • Terminate EAP on Controller for 802.11i, WPA, and WPA2 authentication • Supports LEAP, EAP-FAST, EAP-TLS, MD5 • No RADIUS Server Required • Ideal for Remote Sites with unreliable WAN Links • Define Users on Controller or in an LDAP Database (e.g. Active Directory) • If the central RADIUS server is un-reachable, Local EAP can be used to authenticate users. RADIUS Server Cisco Wireless LAN Controller LDAP Server(Optional) Cisco AironetLightweight Access Point Regional Office