1 / 25

TETRA Security meeting needs of Military

TETRA Security meeting needs of Military. Security mechanisms in TETRA and how to ensure that the solution is secure… ”Jeppe ” Jepsen M otorola. What we want to achieve with Security. Confidentiality No one can eavesdrop on what we are saying Authenticity

travis
Download Presentation

TETRA Security meeting needs of Military

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. TETRA Security meetingneeds of Military Security mechanisms in TETRA and how to ensure that the solution is secure… ”Jeppe” Jepsen Motorola

  2. What we want to achieve with Security • Confidentiality • No one can eavesdrop on what we are saying • Authenticity • The people we are talking to are the right people • The wrong people can’t try and join us • Integrity • The information gets there completely intact • Availability • Communications are possible where and when they are needed • Accountability (Non repudiation) • Whoever said something, can’t deny it later

  3. Threats to communication and the threats to security • Message related threats • interception, eavesdropping, masquerading, replay, manipulation of data • User related threats • traffic analysis, observability of user behavior • System related threats • denial of service, jamming, unauthorized use of resources

  4. Dispatcher Base Station Base Station Infrastructure “ “ ????” ????” “ XYZ” 1. Authentication 1. Authentication 3. End - to - End Encryption 3. End - to - End Encryption 2. Air Interface Encryption 2. Air Interface Encryption Key Functions of TETRA Security • TETRA has several security features allowing most customers security needs to be met in a cost efficient way. • Authentication - ensures only valid subscriber units have access to the system and subscribers will only try and access the authorized system • Air Interface Encryption – protects all signalling, identity and traffic across the radio link • End-to-End Encryption - protects information as it passes through the system

  5. Authentication Authentication Centre Challenge • Authentication provides proof identity of all radios attempting use of the network • Radio can authenticate the network in turn, protects against ‘fake base stations’ etc • A session key system from a central authentication centre allows highly secure key storage • Secret key need never be exposed • Authentication process derives air interface key (TETRA standard) – automatic key changing! Session keys Calculated Response Switch Secret keys Mutual Challenge MS Calculated Response

  6. Radio Security Provisioning And Key Storage • TETRA MoU SFPG Recommendation 01 provides a standardised format for importing authentication and other air interface encryption keys • Use of Recommendation 01 files will allow multi vendor terminal supply • Separation of logical key programming step from factory can allow all keys to be loaded in country • Meets national security requirements SCK, GCK etc… from national security authority AuC Standardised format Imports key material from any vendor TEI Factory TETRA SwMI TEI Key Programming K K, TEI

  7. What is Air Interface Encryption? • First level encryption used to protect information over the Air Interface • Typically software implementation • Protects almost everything – speech, data, signalling, identities… • 3 different Classes • Class 1 • No Encryption, can include Authentication • Class 2 • Static Cipher Key Encryption, can include Authentication • Class 3 • Dynamic Cipher Key Encryption • Individual Derived Cipher Key • Common Cipher Key • Group Cipher Key • Requires Authentication • Includes over the air key management protocols • Allows seamless key management

  8. The air interface was considered vulnerable. • Air Interface encryption was designed to make the air interface as secure as the fixed line connection Fixed Links Air Interface Encryption Clear Air Interface! The purpose of Air Interface Encryption • Network fixed links are considered difficult to intercept. Operational Information

  9. Important properties of Air Interface encryption • Many threats other than eavesdropping • traffic analysis, observance of user behaviour • AIE protects control channel messages and identities as well as voice and data payloads • End to end encryption - if used alone - is insufficient (it only protects the voice payload) • Continuous authentication • Encryption key generated from authentication process • Encrypted registration protects ITSIs even at switch on • Security classes can be changed in operation – essential for fallback measures if authentication cannot operate

  10. End to end encryption in TETRA • ETSI Project TETRA provides standardised support for end to end Encryption • ETSI EN302109 contains specific end to end specification • Ensures TETRA provides a standard alternative to proprietary offerings and technologies • Ensures compatibility between infrastructures and terminals • Many organisations want their own algorithm • Confidence in strength • Better control over distribution • TETRA MoU – Security and fraud Protection Group • Provides detailed recommendation on how to implement end to end encryption in TETRA • The result – Standardisation and compatibility, with choice of algorithm • A big strength of TETRA

  11. End To End Encryption ‘Standardisation’ • TETRA MoU SFPG Recommendation 02 • Framework for end to end encryption • Recommended synchronisation method for speech calls • Protocol for Over The Air Keying • Sample implementations including algorithm mode and key encryption for IDEA, but AES128is now preferred • DOES NOT specify implementation – can be implemented with module, software, SIM card etc.. • DOES NOT provide module interface specification

  12. Related Recommendations • TETRA MoU SFPG Recommendation 01 • Key transfer specification • Currently being updated to include end to end encryption key import formats • TETRA MoU SFPG Recommendation 07 • Short data service encryption • Currently being updated to reflect larger algorithm block sizes, e.g. 128 bits for AES • TETRA MoU SFPG Recommendation 08 • Framework for dividing encryption functionality between a SIM (smartcard) and a radio • No defined bit level interface (export control issue) • TETRA MoU SFPG Recommendation 11 • IP Packet data encryption • Work in process • Will provide a suitable means for high security packet data encryption, with commonality with voice encryption

  13. TETRA Network Other Network Other Network Other Network Implementing TETRA security • TETRA security measures are by no means the complete picture • How well they are implemented – and how the implementation is evaluated is critical • The rest of the network – what else connects to TETRA – is equally important • The operational process and procedures equally provide countermeasures to the threats Link Landline

  14. Implementation considerations – Air Interface Encryption • AIE should provide security equivalent to the fixed network • There are several issues of trust here • Do I trust that the AIE has been implemented properly? • Does AIE always operate (during registration, in fallback modes etc)? • Do I trust the way that the network (or radio) stores keys? • Do I trust the fixed network itself or can someone break in? • A strong AIE implementation and an evaluated network can provide essential protection of information • An untested implementation and network may need reinforcing, for example with end to end encryption

  15. Useful Recommendations • TETRA MoU SFPG Recommendation 03 – TETRA threat analysis • Gives an idea of possible threats and countermeasures against a radio system • TETRA MoU SFPG Recommendation 04 – Implementing TETRA security features • Provides guidance on how to design and configure a TETRA system • Both documents are restricted access requiring Non Disclosure Agreement with SFPG

  16. Assuring your security solution • There are two important steps in assuring the security of the solution: Evaluation and Accreditation • Evaluation of solutions should be by a trusted independent body • Technical analysis of design and implementation • Accreditation is the continual assessment of risks • Assessment of threats vs solutions • Procedural and technical solutions • Should be undertaken by end user representative

  17. Maximising cost effectiveness • Evaluation can be extremely expensive – how to get best value for money? • Establish the requirements in advance • as far as they are known – security is always a changing requirement! • Look for suppliers with track record and reputation • Look for validations of an equivalent solution elsewhere • Consider expert help on processes and procedures

  18. EVALUATED Standard Summary: The essentials of a secure system • A strong standard • A good implementation • Experienced supplier • Trusted evaluation • Continual assessment of threats and solutions

  19. Military Operational Requirements (MOR) • NATO C3 Board has approved the MOR from a policy point of view • MOR has to be implemented in 2002-2006 • MOR covers the use of Mobile Communications for Support Elements of NATO Activities • The MOR addresses the use of Mobile Communications, within a non-hostile environment, allowing interoperability with systems of other NATO Forces, PfP nations and civil organisations, ensuring an appropriate level of security

  20. NC3A SET - 2 SHF SATCOM Terminal 13 meter antenna located in the dunes near Nc3A-NL connected to the SATIN lab typical of a large NATO SGT

  21. Example 4: SET 12(System parameters) • Diameter size of the dish 1.2 m • Transmit Gain: 37 dBi • G/T 13 dB/K • Maximal EIRP 55 dBW • Power: 100 W • antenna tracking (open loop) • controlled via a laptop (rs 232) • transportable , • 6 transit cases, total weight < 350 kg • fast setup and teardown by 2 persons Datarate depends on link budget and allocated resource 128 kbps duplex between Set 2 and Set 12 in Denmark on NATO IV

  22. TETRA ExtensionDemonstration NATO IV (channel 4) RS 449 64/128 kbps Copenhagen : SET 12 NC3A-NL TETRA BS modem modem RS 449 interface (satcom boundary) TETRA Switch

  23. What security level do you want? • TETRA Class 1 • TETRA Class 2 • TETRA Class 3 • TETRA w/ E2E algoritm on Smart Card • TETRA w/ E2E SW algorithm in radio • TETRA w/ E2E hardware solution using AES128 • TETRA w/ E2E hardware solution using own algorithm TETRA is @ your Service

  24. Thank You www.motorola.com/tetraJeppe.Jepsen@Motorola.com www.etsi.orgwww.tetramou.com

More Related