International Politics Week 4: Why sacrifice sovereignty? A tale of two human rights agreements

1. International Politics Week 4:Why sacrifice sovereignty? A tale of two human rights agreements Instructor: James Raymond Vreeland, Professor 2.0

3. How do we build global cooperation?A tale of two human rights treaties

4. Plan • How do we build global cooperation? • Badass story • Wimpy story

5. How should we design institutions to best generate cooperation? • Tried to address the problems of financial flows at the global level (IMF solution) – failed • So Europe turned to a regional solution • But if the goal is true “global governance,” how should we proceed? How do we achieve broad, deepcommitments?

6. We can’t start “broad & deep”So, consider 2 alternatives: • Start with • Broad membership & shallow commitments • Then gradually deepen commitments • Or start with: • Narrow membership & deep commitments • The gradually broaden membership

7. Narrow & deep • Deep commitments may be possible with only a handful of states • Once they start cooperating, the benefits of cooperation will be evident & attractive to other states • We can gradually broaden membership • Rationalist/materialist approach

8. Broad & shallow • To get lots of members, commitments must be shallow • Once we get many states socializing together, • We can gradually deepen commitments • Normative approach

9. United Nations Approach to international cooperation • Broad membership • shallow commitments at first then deepen • Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) • International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) • International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (1976) • Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) (1981) • Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment (CAT) (1987) • the only one with UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION

10. On United Nations Human Rights Treaties… • They all have: • Domestic legal requirements • Enforced domestically… • International Committees • Can be invited to make reports… • Only the CAT has • UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION

11. Universal Jurisdiction Torture committed against citizens of country A by the government of country B while in country C can be prosecuted by country D!!!!!

12. Definition of torture • The CAT defines torture as any act inflicted under public authority by which severe pain or suffering (physical or mental) is intentionally inflicted on a person for the purposes of obtaining information or a confession, punishment, intimidation, coercion, or discrimination. • Note that “torture” is defined as a state-sanctioned crime • The CAT is radical: • governments hand over prosecuting authority to 3rd-parties for state-sanctioned crimes, perhaps committed against a state’s own citizens!

13. The CAT might have teeth! • Examples: Pinochet • http://www.allbusiness.com/north-america/united-states-illinois-metro-areas-chicago/1110433-1.html • The Bush Six • http://www.newyorker.com/talk/2009/04/13/090413ta_talk_mayer Alberto Gonzales (Attorney General) David Addington (Cheney Chief of Staff) John Yoo (DOJ "torture memos") William Haynes II (Pentagon Lawyer) Jay Bybee (Asst Attorney Gen) Douglas Feith (Deputy Defense Secretary) Douglas Feith (Former Gtown Prof)

14. February 2011: • Human rights groups alleged: Pres. George W. Bush cancelled Swiss trip • Concerned about being held accountable in Geneva for alleged torture in Guantanamo Bay • Bush Cancels Visit To Switzerland Due To Threat Of Torture Prosecution, Rights Groups Say (2011) • http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/05/bush-switzerland-torture_n_819175.html • http://uruknet.info/?p=m74649&hd=&size=1&l=e

15. Why sacrifice sovereignty? • A central question in this class! • The answer may depend on: Political Regime (Democracy vs. Dictatorship)

16. The Puzzle • The relationship between: • torture and CAT participation • Completely different for democracies & dictatorships…

17. Probability of democracies entering into the CAT Entering into the CAT Level of torture practiced

18. Probability of dictatorships entering into the CAT Entering into the CAT Level of torture practiced

21. The Puzzle:

22. What’s going on with dictatorships?Four Arguments • Political cover • Domestic institutions • Regional diffusion • Leader resolve (badass) Hathaway

23. Badass story Leader-resolve story • Addresses the puzzle that dictatorships with the worst human rights records are the most likely to sign • Argues that signing “commits” the leader to prison if he relinquishes power • Commitment is credible because of international enforcement • Signals to the domestic audience that the leader is a high-resolve type • May ironically lower torture as the domestic audience realizes it is futile to resist • Absent resistance, dictatorships need not practice as much torture • Low-resolve types do not sign because they fear going to prison if they fall from power, which they deem likely

24. Badass take-away • The strongest of the dictatorships – the most sure of survival – enter into the CAT

25. Rosendorff’s broader view: • International institutions as signals to domestic constituents • Trade agreements • Used by democracies to signal low-protectionism • World Bank • Collects data as a credible 3rd party for democracies to be transparent • The CAT • Used by dictatorships to signal leader-resolve

26. Central question in today’s class:Why sacrifice sovereignty? • The logic may depend on political regime

27. And now…The Wimpy Story Brought to you by: Moravcsik, Andrew. 2000. The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe. International Organization 54 (2):217–52.

28. New Puzzle: Europe post-WWII • Regarding: European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) • Who supports strict enforcement? Why were these countries willing to sacrifice sovereignty? But these countries were unwilling?

29. Why are democracies willing to sacrifice sovereignty? • Established-democracies & dictatorships opposed binding human rights enforcement (“sovereignty costs”) • Established-democracies: nothing to gain • Dictatorships: everything to lose • But fragile democracies: UNSURE of their survival • If they fear the return of autocracy, • They want to hand over prosecutorial authority to an international body • They give up some power so that their potential successors won’t have it either • Perhaps this also makes democracy more likely to endure because dictatorship less worthwhile?

31. We call this story: “LOCK-IN”

32. Can the Badass & Wimp stories fit together? • Were there any “badasses” (high-leader-resolve) dictatorships in Europe? • What if there had been?

33. Putting the stories together:What do each of the following want? Strongly established dictators: Can use HR agreements to CREDIBLY signal resolve (Rosendorff) Vulnerable dictators: Afraid of HR agreements because they commit torture, and might fall from power some day (Rosendorff) Vulnerable democracies: Can use HR agreements to LOCK-IN policy (Moravcsik) Strongly established democracies: Don’t need HR agreements to lock-in, and thus prefer to keep their sovereignty (Moravcsik)

34. Take-away • Domestic political determinants of international relations!

35. Thank you

36. Political cover: • Democracies are easy to explain. • Treaties become binding domestic law • So you sign iff you already have domestic laws prohibiting torture • You gain international reputation, and you lose nothing • For dictatorships, treaties do not usually affect domestic law • Dictatorships who torture the most need the most cover • So they are the most likely to sign/ratify • CAT has no real meaning for them • Domestic political institutions controlled by the dictatorship Hathaway

37. My argument begins with the logic of torture: • Torture is more likely when power is shared than when power is absolute (Kalyvas 2000, Arendt 1970). • How do I measure power-sharing? • Some dictatorships allow for • INDEPENDENT POLITICAL PARTIES (Gandhi 2003). • Under no-party & one-party states, limitations are obvious. • No ambiguity. • With multiple political parties, some degree of dissent is endorsed by the state. • Ambiguity. Some people go too far. • I predict torture to be ironically higher in more liberal dictatorships with multiple political parties.

38. Will no/one-party states enter into the CAT? • They are not anti-torture. • One reason we observe low levels of torture is because of the FEAR of torture. • They face no pressure from organized alternative political parties to adopt the CAT. • I predict no/one-party states are less likely to sign/ratify the CAT.

39. Will multi-party dictatorships enter into the CAT? • Institutions like multi-parties “encapsulate” parts of society into the regime (O’Donnell 1979, Gandhi and Przeworski 2006). • Regime faces pressure from organized political parties. • Policy concessions (Gandhi 2004). • Spend more on education, less on the military • Entering the CAT is a form of policy concession. • I predict more liberal dictatorships will be more likely to sign/ratify the CAT.

40. Evidence • Compared to one/no-party dictatorships… • First: • Show that multi-party dictatorships  torture??? • Class??? • More torture • Second: • Show that multi-party dictatorships  CAT??? • Class??? • Sign/Ratify CAT @ higher rates

41. Dictatorships with parties have higher levels of torture

42. To put this plainly:holding other things equal… • For every 100 observations of dictatorships with no political parties and low levels of torture during a year, one can expect 7 of them to practice high levels of torture the following year (plus or minus 4). • For every 100 observations of dictatorships with political parties and low levels of torture during a year, one can expect 14 of them to practice high levels of torture the following year (plus or minus 6). • I conclude that torture is, somewhat counter-intuitively, more prevalent in dictatorships with multiple political parties.

43. Dictatorships with parties are more likely to sign/ratify the CAT

44. Ratifying the CAT

45. The story explains… • Why governments with more torture enter into the CAT: • We observe more torture because power is divided (political parties). • Governments enter the CAT as a concession to the interest groups represented in the political parties. • Why governments without torture do not enter the CAT: • There is less torture because there is more fear of torture. • The last thing these regimes–that rely on fear–want to do is make a gesture that they oppose torture. • These regimes are not anti-torture, and face no pressure to enter into the CAT.