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Private Interests versus Public Debate: Two logics of collective action in the international climate change negotiations, 1991-2003. Simone Pulver Brown University 2008 International Studies Association. Collective action: Power through organization.
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Private Interests versus Public Debate:Two logics of collective action in the international climate change negotiations, 1991-2003 Simone Pulver Brown University 2008 International Studies Association
Collective action: Power through organization “Superior power also means superior ability to defend and reproduce power. The powerful are fewer in number, are less likely to be divided among themselves, have a clearer view of what they want to defend, and have larger resources for organized action, all of which imply that they are likely to succeed in recreating the initial situation” (Offe and Wiesenthal, 1980:78) Extend literature on collective action • Transnational collective action • Comparative assessment of collective action by capital and civil society
Research question • Are capital and civil society groups governed by different logics of collective action? • Comparative case study of the oil industry and climate change advocacy communities, over the course of the UN climate change negotiations, 1991-2003 • Oil industry versus Environmental Community • Associational practices • Shifting institutional terrain • Winners and losers • Data: Interviews with over 70 oil industry executives, environmental activists, and climate experts; participation in 4 rounds of the international climate change negotiations
Oil Industry 130 companies 15 leading players 6 companies active in climate debates Structural/material power Utilitarian: profit Non-utilitarian: business versus national identity Enviro. Community 200+ ENGO participants in UN climate negs. 15 active ENGOs in climate debates Discursive power Utilitarian: fundraising, membership, political access Non-utilitarian: shared goal of climate protection Facing climate change
Associational practices (I)Split in the oil industry (1997) BLOCKINGSUPPORTING
Climate Action Network (CAN) (1991-2003) 300+ member organizations 81 countries 20 million members US ENGO Environmental Defense breaks with CAN over policy differences Associational practices (II) • Climate Justice NGOs organize alternative Climate Justice Summits in 2000 and 2002
Shifting institutional terrain AGENDA SETTING IMPLEMENTATION
Winners and losers Phase I: 1991-1997 Targets & Timetables AOSIS European Union Wait & See OPEC JUSSCANNZ Oil industry Global Climate Coalition Climate Action Network Phase II: 1997-2003 “Plugging loopholes in KP” AOSIS Building carbon markets US, Japan, EU KP “out of touch with reality” OPEC ExxonMobil Climate Justice NGOs Climate Action Network BP, Shell Environmental Defense
Conclusions • Business and environmental communities faced similar challenges in organizing and mobilizing transnationally • Fractures were motivated by utilitarian interests • Discursive power of ENGOs depends on collective action. Material/structural power of oil industry persists without collective action