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International tobacco companies. David Simpson Director, International Agency on Tobacco and Health Visiting Professor, London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine Honorary Fellow, Clinical Trial Service Unit, Oxford Editor, News Analysis, Tobacco Control journal. World’s smokers.
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International tobacco companies David Simpson Director, International Agency on Tobacco and Health Visiting Professor, London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine Honorary Fellow, Clinical Trial Service Unit, Oxford Editor, News Analysis, Tobacco Control journal
World’s smokers From the US Bureau of the Census and World Bank, Curbing the epidemic: Governments and the economics of tobacco control, 1999.
Smoking prevalence: men WHO data
Smoking prevalence: women WHO data
World tobacco deaths WHO World Health Report 1999.
Cumulative tobacco deaths WHO World Health Report 1999.
Tobacco addiction is a communicated disease: The vector? Big tobacco
Trans-national tobacco companies’ sales (1990) US$ billions
TNC sales &developing countries’ gross domestic product (GDP) Philip Morris BAT Japan Tobacco Peru Bangladesh Hungary Sri Lanka Ghana Senegal Kenya US$ billions
Annual earnings: BAT(highest paid director) IATH (total income) &
The international tobacco industry Philip Morris – PM (holding company now known as ‘Altria’) Marlboro, Chesterfield, Philip Morris British American Tobacco – BAT (includes Rothmans) State Express 555, Lucky Strike, Benson & Hedges, Rothmans Japan Tobacco International – JTI (still state-controlled; former JT + non-US business of RJR Reynolds) Mild Seven, Salem also: Altadis (France/Spain, formerly SEITA & Tabacalera); Imperial (UK), incl. Reemtsma (Germany) ; ITC India (part-BAT); Monopolies, e.g. Tekel (Turkey), Sampoerna (Indonesia), etc
A brief tobacco industry history of the tobacco epidemic 1940s +50s 1960s + 70s 1980s 1990s 2000-2003 - scientific evidence forces health-related scientific research - development of government health policy; - industry scientists lose power to marketing executives - expand international activities; - use toxic reduction health policy as hostage to preserve advertising - litigation increases; - Minnesota case releases millions of papers; - health advocacy increases - ‘We’ve changed!’ programmes, e.g. BAT’s ‘Social reports’; - FCTC process puts tobacco on health agenda worldwide; - continue to expand markets as fast as possible
Two unique aspects of the tobacco industry: The product: highly addictive very dangerous, at any level of consumption; largest cause of disease, disability & premature death The people: self-selected group, not concerned by scientific evidence of diseases caused by tobacco
One simple truth about the tobacco industry: The companies will always fight every effective health policy measure
Tobacco industry ‘We’ve changed’ strategy: - “We don’t want kids to smoke”- global ad code (self-regulation…)- “Let us back into the scientific community”- community aid programmes
Tobacco industry ‘We’ve changed’ strategy:“We don’t want kids to smoke”
Industry ‘Youth Prevention’ programmes: • public relations strategy: improve image • ‘proactive’ - industry avoids ad bans • programme says little on dangers of tobacco • programmes shown to be ineffective* • - “adult activity” - may encourage kids to smoke * • * DiFranza J & McAfee T. The Tobacco Institute: Helping youth to say ‘yes’ to tobacco. • J Fam Prac 1992,34(6)
“The youth program... support[s] the [Tobacco] Institute’s objective of discouraging unfair... federal, state and local restrictions on cigarette advertising, by...” US Tob. Inst. 1/1991
“Reinforcing the belief that peer pressure - not advertising - is the cause of youth smoking. US Tob. Inst. 1/1991
“Reinforcing the belief that peer pressure - not advertising - is the cause of youth smoking. • “Seizing the political center and forcing the antismokers to an extreme…” US Tob. Inst. 1/1991
“The strategy is fairly simple: “1. Heavily promote industry opposition to youth smoking.” US Tob. Inst. 1/1991
“The strategy is fairly simple:“1. Heavily promote industry opposition to youth smoking.“2. Align industry with broader, more sophisticated view of the problem - that is, parental inability to offset peer pressure.” US Tob. Inst. 1/1991
“The strategy is fairly simple: “1. Heavily promote industry opposition to youth smoking.“2. Align industry with broader, more sophisticated view of the problem - that is, parental inability to offset peer pressure.”“3. Work with and through credible child welfare professionals and educators to tackle the ‘problem’.” US Tob. Inst. 1/1991
“The strategy is fairly simple: “1. Heavily promote industry opposition to youth smoking.“2. Align industry with broader, more sophisticated view of the problem - that is, parental inability to offset peer pressure.” “3. Work with and through credible child welfare professionals and educators to tackle the ‘problem’.” “4. Bait anti-tobacco forces to criticise industry efforts.” US Tob. Inst. 1/1991
Industry youth programmes: Uzbekistan
Industry youth programmes: Middle East
Tobacco industry ‘We’ve changed’ strategy:‘global advertising code’ (self-regulation)
Tobacco industry global advertising code - a Wall Street analyst’s view: “We have analyzed the 9-page agreement and believe that the multinationals' strategy is proactive and is a way to improve their image.” - Herzog B, Credit Suisse , investors’ briefing. Oct ‘01
Tobacco industry ‘We’ve changed’ strategy:“Let us back into science”
‘Tobacco industry ‘We’ve changed’ strategy: “Let us back into science” - make health policy dependent on tobacco- split the scientific community- tie up research resources on non-tobacco topics- corporate ‘blackmail’ against legislation
Tobacco industry’s ‘science’ programmes - a note from Pakistan: “We alldecidednot to accept the tobacco company [money] in the end & now trying to find alternate source of funding … “Some time I feel isolated in Pakistan when I give my strong feelings against the tobacco..” IATH Contact, Karachi, Nov ‘01
International Agency on Tobacco and Health (IATH)Contacts’ e-mail & web access, Nov 2001