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Secure and efficient key management in mobile ad hoc networks

Secure and efficient key management in mobile ad hoc networks. Authors: Bing Wu, Jie Wu, Eduardo B. Fernandez, Mohammad Ilyas, and Spyros Magliveras Sources: Journal of Network and Computer Applications, 30(3), pp. 937-954, 2007. Reporter: Chun-Ta Li ( 李俊達 ). Outline. Motivation

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Secure and efficient key management in mobile ad hoc networks

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  1. Secure and efficient key management in mobile ad hoc networks Authors: Bing Wu, Jie Wu, Eduardo B. Fernandez, Mohammad Ilyas, and Spyros Magliveras Sources: Journal of Network and Computer Applications, 30(3), pp. 937-954, 2007. Reporter: Chun-Ta Li (李俊達)

  2. Outline • Motivation • Secure and Efficient Key Management (SEKM) • Comments 2 2

  3. Motivation • Key management (PKI) • CA (certificate authority) • Secret sharing (distribute the central trust to multiple entities)

  4. Motivation • Secure and Efficient Key Management (SEKM) • Share updating • Certificate updating • Certificate expiration/revocation

  5. Secure and Efficient Key Management • Notations • Structure of a certificate

  6. SEKM scheme (cont.) • Server group substructure snapshot in SEKM

  7. SEKM scheme (cont.) • Group creation JoinServeReq {IDi, SEQi, TTL, [h(IDi, SEQi)]Ki-1||(TTL)Ki-1} Server node 1  14, 20 {ID1, SEQ1, TTL, [h(ID1, SEQ1)]K1-1||(TTL)K1-1} JoinServeReply Forwarding node 20  9, 21 {ID1, SEQ1, TTL-1, [h(ID1, SEQ1)]K1-1||(TTL-1)K20-1} JoinServeReq

  8. SEKM scheme (cont.) • Server group mesh and table snapshot • Group maintenance (soft state) • JoinServerRequest and JoinServerReply

  9. SEKM scheme (cont.) • Share updating (k, m) • Selects k active servers to perform the share update phase • Each active server i generates a (k-1)-degree polynomial • Server i broadcasts the witness for polynomial coefficient and its hashed signature to the server group • Each active server i computes a share for server j with Sij=gi(j) mod p and sends {[Sij]Kj} to the corresponding server j (1<j<k) • Server j’s new share

  10. SEKM scheme (cont.) • Certificate updating • Regular node 14  1 CertUpdateReq m’ CertUpdateReq = {ID14, SEQ5, [h(m’)]K14-1} • Server node 1  20 (2 tickets) • Server node 1, 16 and 22 produces a partial certificate for regular node 14 by computing Certj=1,16,22i=14 = (K14)Sj*lj(0) mod p k=3, node 1 receives a certificate updating request from regular node 14 or itself • Server node 1 combines 3 partial certificates into one certificate by computing

  11. SEKM scheme (cont.) • Handling certificate expiration and revocation • Expired certificate  off-line or in-person reconfiguration • Certificate revocation • Refuse to issue certificates • Issues wrong partial certificates • Any misbehavior or malicious attacks • Accusation (signature of initiator) • CRL (Certificate Revocation List)

  12. Comments • Group communications <{1,2}, {gN2,gN1}, gN1N2> N1 N2 N3 N4 <{1}, {g}, gN1> <{1,2,3}, {gN2N3,gN1N3,gN1N2}, gN1N2N3> N4 multicasts <{1,2,3,4}, {gN2N3N4,gN1N3N4,gN1N2N4,gN1N2N3}> to the group The group key = gN1N2N3N4 Attacker intercepts the packets and multicasts <{1,2,3,4}, {gN2N3N4’,gN1N3N4’,gN1N2N4’,gN1N2N3}> to the group Signature For N1, N2 and N3, the group key = gN1N2N3N4’ For N4, the group key = gN1N2N3N4

  13. Comments (cont.) • Solutions • Group key validation process • Symmetric encryption N1, N2 and N3 send EGK{IDi, T} to N4 EDH23{<{1,2}, {gN2,gN1}, gN1N2>} N1 N2 N3 N4 EDH12{<{1}, {g}, gN1>} EDH34{<{1,2,3}, {gN2N3,gN1N3,gN1N2}, gN1N2N3>}

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