Political Changes in Post-Soviet Russia Vladimir Gel’man (EUSP/University of Helsinki)

1. Political Changes in Post-Soviet Russia Vladimir Gel’man (EUSP/University of Helsinki) Sciences Po Bordeaux, lecture 3, 29 March 2019 Post-Soviet Political Institutions (I): Presidents, Parliaments, and Governments

2. Post-Soviet Political Institutions • What are the governing institutions in Russia? • Do formal institutions matter or, rather, they just serves as a façade for a one-person rule? • How decision-making process is conducted within the corridors of power? • What about effectiveness of Russia’s governing institutions?

3. Post-Soviet Political Institutions • Formal framework of separation of power in Russia – presidential-parliamentary model (Shugart, Carey,1992); • President is able to appoint and dismiss cabinet of minsters upon some (limited) agreement of parliament (or, rather, its lower chamber); • President is able to dismiss parliament under certain conditions; • In case of mutual jeopardy between parliament and the cabinet of ministers president is able to dismiss both

4. Post-Soviet Political Institutions • Alternatives to presidential-parliamentary model: • ”pure” presidential model – USA, Latin America • ”pure” parliamentary model (president not existed – UK, Sweden, or largely a ceremonial figure – Germany, Czech Republic) • Premier-presidential model (president is powerful but the cabinet of ministers accountable only to the parliament not to the president – France, Poland); • Presidential-parliamentary model considered as worst combination – Weimar Germany;

5. Post-Soviet Political Institutions • Why excessively strong presidents are dangerous for democracy? • “perils of presidentialism” (Linz, 1990): • President is elected for a fixed term; no way to remove unpopular president before the end of term; • Presidential elections are “zero-sum game” – great polarization, especially if checks and balances are weak (and incentives to avoid loss of presidency at any costs); • “Dual legitimacy” and conflicts between presidents and parliaments; • Problems with building of efficient party systems under presidential rule

6. Post-Soviet Political Institutions Why Communist one-party regimes did not coincided with popularly elected presidents? Problem of dual legitimacy and risks of political conflicts: 1936 – Joseph Stalin rejected the idea of Soviet presidency and his author (Bukharin) was executed; 1964 – Nikita Khrushchev attempted to establish the Soviet presidency but was ousted from his position as a first secretary of the Communist party; 1985 – Gorbachev openly rejected the proposal of his advisors about making of Soviet presidency but returned to it later on and initiated the major constitutional changes in March 1990;

7. Post-Soviet Political Institutions • Late-Soviet presidency: • Not popularly elected – Gorbachev was elected by the parliament by less than 60% of votes of MPs, and was rather unpopular during the period of his rule; • Gorbachev occupied two posts: leader of the Communist party (since 1985) and president (since March 1990): the Communist party was disbanded in August 1991, and the Soviet Union ceased to exist in December 1991; • In 1990-1991, the Soviet central government faced with the major conflicts with republics (sub-national units), and presidency became a chip in these conflicts

8. Post-Soviet Political Institutions • Russia – established the popuarly elected presidency in March 1991 via a referendum; • Which presidential model to choose – discussion on two constitutional projects, and choice made by Boris Yeltsin; • June 12, 1991 – first presidential elections in Russia, six candidates, Yeltsin won by 57% of votes;

9. Post-Soviet Political Institutions Mikhail Gorbachev (b. 1931) – long Communist party career up to the top ladder, attempts of major liberalization and democratization, end of the Cold War, but unsuccessful economic transformation and failure to resolve numerous tensions within the Soviet system (power loss and the Soviet collapse); Boris Yeltsin (1931-2007) – Communist party career until 1987, ousted from the post of Moscow city Communist party secretary, major rivalry with Gorbachev, played a decisive role in dissolution of the Soviet Union; Yeltsin on role of the president in Russia: ”someone should be the boss in the country: that’s it” (1994: 15) To what extent Yeltsin was ”the boss in the country” and what about his legacy?

10. Post-Soviet Political Institutions October 1993 constitutional crisis: Conflicts between president and the parliament over economic reforms, then the major rivalry, use of military force by Yeltsin (”auto-golpe”);

11. Post-Soviet Political Institutions December 1993 – the new constitution of Russia: adoption of the hard version of presidential-parliamentary model; President – above all three branches of power: Over legislature – possibility to dismiss the lower chamber (State Duma), full-swing veto power (could be over-riden by 2/3 majority in both chambers), virtually no way for impeachment; Over government – full control over appointments and dismissals, presidential decrees (executive orders), parallel mechanisms of governing (presidential administration), unilateral control over power ministries and services (military, security, foreign affairs and much beyond); Over judiciary – presidential appointment power for all judges

12. Post-Soviet Political Institutions Yeltsin – not governed Russia like ”the boss”: after 1993 – a series of compromises with various political and economic actors: why? Presidential power is only partly based upon constitution: presidential support from elites and society-at-large is no less important; Yeltsin was rather unpopular president due to his poor economic performance (overall public approval as single digits), numerous intra-elite conflicts, etc. Poor health conditions (especially after 1996 stroke), hard drinking

13. Post-Soviet Political Institutions

14. Post-Soviet Political Institutions December 31, 1999 – Yeltsin resigns, officially passed his power to then prime minister Vladimir Putin (officially elected as a president in March 2000 – 52% of votes); Putin (b. 1952) – a former KGB officer, served as a deputy mayor of St.Petersburg (1991-1996), then appointed to presidential administration, and picked up as a potential successor by Yeltsin and his family; Putin’s ascendance to power – coincided with the rapid economic growth after the transformation recession (6-8% annual growth in 1999-2008), popular approval rate skyrocketed (never was below 60%); While Yeltsin was unable to be “the boss in the country”, Putin soon took this role; BUT! – presidential two consecutive terms limit is the major obstacle for unconstrained rule

15. Post-Soviet Political Institutions

16. Post-Soviet Political Institutions Dmitry Medvedev (b.1965) – a lawyer from St.Petersburg, served in Putin’s office since 1999, appointed as a deputy prime minister in 2006, in 2008-2012 – president of Russia, since 2012 – prime minister of Russia; 2008-2012 – tandem (Putin as a prime minister, but kept control over key decisions, Medvedev remained loyal to his ”boss” during his presidency); 2012 – new job swap: Putin re-elected as a president for the third term; 2018 – new presidential elections: fourth term for Putin

17. Post-Soviet Political Institutions • Beyond presidentialism – the weak parliament: • Two chambers: • Upper chamber – the Federation Council (2 members from each of Russia’s regions, not popularly elected but appointed by regional legislatures and chief executives, respectively) – a weak entity in both political and in institutional terms; • Lower chamber – the State Duma (450 popularly elected MPs across Russia’s territory (in most cases, while one mentions “parliament”, he/she have in mind the State Duma only

18. Post-Soviet Political Institutions • State Duma: • - approve federal laws, including annual budgets (both Federation Council and the president have veto powers); • - approve prime minister, appointed by the president; • - approve some other officials (head of Central Bank, etc.) • - may request resignation of government through no confidence vote (but the choice is up to the president);

19. Post-Soviet Political Institutions • State Duma composition vis-a-vis the president: • Mixed (1993-1995): neither pro-Yeltsin nor anti-Yeltsin (ad hoc coalitions); • Opposition-leaning (1996-1999): anti-Yeltsin’s majority, mutual blockade; • Loyal (1999-2003): pro-Putin’s coalition of supporters; • Since 2003: ”parliament is not the site for discussions”: turn towards a rubber-stamp legislature (2016 – all seats are distributed among pro-government parties)

20. Post-Soviet Political Institutions

21. Post-Soviet Political Institutions • Government of Russia – divided model, partly inherited from the past: • Pre-1917 monarchy: division between the court and the cabinet of ministers; • Soviet decades: division between the Communist party leadership (in charge of political decision-making) and the Council of Ministers (in charge of policy implementation); • No collective decision-making, no collective political appointments and responsibilities, technical cabinets?

22. Post-Soviet Political Institutions • Prime ministers – officials, subordinated to the president (except for Putin in 2008-2012); • ”Political” prime ministers and their cabinets – Yegor Gaidar (1992); Yevgeny Primakov (1998-1999); • Ministers: • technocrats (especially in finance, economy etc.), • nominees of friends and cronies (especially in industry, energy, agriculture, etc.), • or political loyalists (especially in education, culture, etc.) • … and presidential decisions above all

23. Post-Soviet Political Institutions • Q: what are the major advantages and disadvantages of nation-wide governing institutions in contemporary Russia?