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PLANNING OF SECURITY SECTOR CAPABILITIES FOR PROTECTION OF MARITIME SOVEREIGNTY. Capt. (Navy) Ass. Prof. PhD Boyan Mednikarov Ass. Prof. PhD Todor Tagarev NATO ARW “SCIENTIFIC SUPPORT FOR THE DECISION MAKING IN THE SECURITY SECTOR” Velingrad, Bulgaria, 21-25 October 2006.
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PLANNING OF SECURITY SECTOR CAPABILITIES FOR PROTECTION OF MARITIME SOVEREIGNTY Capt. (Navy) Ass. Prof. PhD Boyan Mednikarov Ass. Prof. PhD Todor Tagarev NATO ARW “SCIENTIFIC SUPPORT FOR THE DECISION MAKING IN THE SECURITY SECTOR” Velingrad, Bulgaria, 21-25 October 2006
The main reasons for our interest in the subject: • the dynamic changes of the economic, political, and military-strategic environment in the Black Sea region after the end of the bi-polar world; • the membership of Bulgaria in NATO; • the forthcoming accession to the EU, which brought the need for radical rethinking of the views on maritime sovereignty of our country. Broader definition of maritime sovereignty - the state retains the right to exercise control both on the territorial waters and the other parts of the Black Sea where it has internationally recognized rights. The main task of the research - the adequate justification of the planning of security sector capabilities for protection of maritime sovereignty. Sub-tasks: • developing a model for planning the national capabilities for maritime sovereignty protection; • testing this model and putting it into practise within the maritime institutions.
Analysis of the security environment Security sector missions, Levels of ambition Planning scenarios Task lists (generic) Mission Essential Task List Security Sector Capabilities CONCEPTUAL APPROACH TO DEFINING THE CAPABILITIES OF THE SECURITY SECTOR
KEY FACTORS • Objectives in the area of maritime sovereignty, including those to be achieved through military means; • Strategy for achieving the objectives; • Roles of the institutions, engaged in protecting maritime sovereignty; • Scenarios, describing plausible materialization risks and threats to the national interests related to the maritime space; • Tasks to be performed in neutralizing the plausible risks and threats (often structured in a Universal Task List, or UTL); • Capabilities required to perform tasks for protection of maritime sovereignty; • Ways to provide these capabilities (coordination of the development of the variety of capability components within a selected capability model).
FRAMEWORK PROCESS FOR CAPABILITIES DEVELOPMENT • Formulate the policy for protection of maritime sovereignty; • Analyse the environment and assess threats to maritime sovereignty; • Analyse the status of the system for protecting maritime sovereignty; • Define and agree on planning scenarios; formulate hypotheses for the simultaneous (or near simultaneous) occurrence of these planning situations • Create a structured list of tasks for protection of maritime sovereignty; define the subset of tasks that are critical for performing plausible missions in the protection of maritime sovereignty across scenarios; • Define the full set of capabilities required to protect maritime sovereignty; • Test the set against the hypotheses on simultaneous occurrence of two or more planning scenarios; • Distribute the required capabilities among organisations; • Assess planning risks; • Program the development of capabilities.
PLANNING THE CAPABILITIES FOR PROTECTION OF MARITIME SOVEREIGNTY
TESTING THE MODEL IN PRACTICE 1. Formulating of the national policy for protection of maritime sovereignty: • The main problem was identified: the lack of coordination among the different institutions responsible for the protection of the national interests in the Black sea region. • the first step was to define the scope of the term ‘maritime sovereignty’ • the next step was to formulate the objectives of the policy for maritime sovereignty protection, which include the protection of all the aspects of the national interests, the enforcement of the provisions of international and national maritime law, the defence of the Black Sea coast, etc.
LEVELS OF AMBITION • To protect the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the country from seaside aggression, including neutralisation of terrorist activities in the territorial waters; • To protect the outer borders of the European Union in the Black Sea; • To prevent acts of violation of international and national law, related to the use on the national maritime space; • To guarantee security and safety of shipping in the territorial sea and the internal waterways; • To react adequately in emergencies in the national maritime spaces with primary goal to prevent casualties and to minimise material losses; • To preserve the ecological balance of the sea and safeguard its life resources; • To conduct an active policy for upholding the peace and security in the region and to enhance the international cooperation on key humanitarian and law enforcement issues.
NEXT STEPS • Analysis of the participation of the Republic of Bulgaria in a variety of international initiatives in the Black sea region– this analysis proved the fact that the increased number of activities enhances the security within the region. • Evaluation of the ways and the level of providing resources for the maritime institutions - this showed that the situation was not very optimistic although it can be improved by actively utilising the funds provided by the EU. • Analysis of the environment where the protection of maritime sovereignty is realised. As a result, the main threats for the sea-related national interests of the Republic of Bulgaria were identified.
MAIN THREATS • Armed aggression • Violation of the safety of shipping and other regulations • Trafficking in human beings and illegal emigration by sea • Trafficking in narcotics • Smuggling • Trafficking in weapons and military technology, including WMD components • Illegal or indiscriminate use of the bio-resources of the sea • Maritime terrorism • Piracy • Maritime pollution • Information security threats • Incident on a vessel or aircraft endangering the life of the crew/passengers • Geology-, hydro-geology-, or weather-induced contingency
ANALYSIS OFTHE CURRENT STATE OF THE SYSTEM FOR PROTECTION OF MARITIME SOVEREIGNTY • Bulgarian Navy and Air Force • Border Police • Maritime and Port Administration Executive Agencies • Other organisations We can sum up that their capabilities leave a lot to be desired.
DEFINITION OF THE PLANNING SCENARIOS, RELATED TO THE PROTECTION OF MARITIME SOVEREIGNTY 12 hypotheses for the simultaneous occurrence of the scenarios were formulated.
FORMULATION OF STRUCTURED LIST OF THE TASKS OF THE INSTITUTIONS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PROTECTION OF MARITIME SOVEREIGNTY Two existing approaches to this were analysed: • developing a universal task list (the approach used by the Armed Forces of the US, United Kingdom and Canada) • the approach used by the Department of Homeland Security of the US In result, we agreed on the following structure of the tasks of the maritime institutions:
1. Management of the Maritime Security Organisations as part of the security sector 1.1. Management of the Maritime Security Organisations (MSO) 1.1.1. Planning the development of the Maritime Security Organisations (MSO) 1.1.2. Resource Management 1.1.2.1. Human Resource Management: education, qualification, certification 1.1.2.2. Acquisition Management 1.1.2.3. Finance Management 1.1.2.4. Crisis Resource Management 1.1.3. Training and exercises of the Maritime Security Organisations (MSO) 1.1.4. Lessons Learned 1.2. Coordination, Command and Control of the Maritime Security Organisations 1.2.1. National and international planning for protection of the maritime security 1.2.2. Operations planning 1.2.3. Command and control of forces 1.2.4. Coordinate and integrate joint, multinational and interagency support and interaction with public organisations 1.2.5. Conduct information operations 1.2.6. Deploy the command and control system 1.3. Support to the Maritime Security Organisations 1.3.1. Provide material means 1.3.2. Recover/maintain systems and equipment 1.3.3. Provide legal support 1.3.4. Provide medical support 1.3.5. Provide transportation and deployment support
2. Prevention 2.1. Identify threats 2.1.1. Manage intelligence activities 2.1.2. Collect intelligence information 2.1.3. Process intelligence information 2.1.4. Analyse intelligence information 2.1.5. Disseminate information on threats 2.1.6. Identify, inform, and report 2.2. Control access 2.2.1. Inspect vessels and cargo 2.2.2. Monitor zones and areas 2.2.3. Inspect people 2.3. Eliminate threats 2.3.1. Investigate and detain terrorist suspects 2.3.2. Seizedangerous materials 2.3.3. Explosive ordnance disposal 2.3.4. Detect and eliminate information incursion
3. Protection 3.1. Assess critical infrastructure and key resources and sites 3.1.1. Identify key resources and sites 3.1.2. Assess vulnerability 3.1.3. Coordinate and exchange information among institutions, non-governmental organisations, and businesses on key resources and sites 3.1.4. Assess the situation 3.2. Protect forces and sites 3.2.1. Adopt measures to lower/mitigate threats against sites 3.2.2. Prepare/ develop the types of defence and protection of mobile and stationary assets 3.2.3. Disseminate key resources and objects 3.2.4. Detect and destroy mines 3.2.5. Detect and seize illegal fishing devices 3.3. Lower the risks to society 3.3.1. Safeguard public health 3.3.2. Provide public safety 3.3.3. Prepare the public
4. Response 4.1. Assess incidents 4.1.1. Investigate incidents 4.1.2. Assess threats and consequences 4.1.3. Maintain internal communication and disseminate information on incidents 4.2. Limit incident consequences 4.2.1. Manage incidents 4.2.2. Respond to threats 4.2.3. Target hardening 4.2.4. Search and rescue 4.2.5. Fire fighting 4.3. Impact by opponents 4.3.1.Trackdetected ships and submarines 4.3.2. Destroyships and submarines 4.3.3. Establish defensive mine barrages 4.3.4. Detain ships 4.3.5. Antiterrorist activities
5. Recovery 5.1. Assist the public 5.1.1. Provide pre-hospitalcare/ support and evacuation 5.1.2. Provide humanitarian assistance 5.1.3. Provide social services 5.2. Restore environment 5.2.1. Clean up contaminated sites and areas 5.2.2. Dispose of materials 5.2.3. Conduct site remediation 5.2.4. Restore natural resources 5.3. Restore infrastructure 5.3.1. Restore Civil Services 5.3.2 Rebuild property 5.3.3 Restore lifelines 5.3.4. Restore economic institutions
REQUIRED CAPABILITIES FOR PROTECTION OF MARITIME SOVEREIGNTY • General (for each mission): • Management of the maritime sovereignty forces – managing force development • Coordination, Command and Control of the Maritime Sovereignty Forces • C2 – communications and information support • Logistics support • Force deployment
REQUIRED CAPABILITIES FOR PROTECTION OF MARITIME SOVEREIGNTY • Prevent: • Surveillance and detection of surface, sub-surface and aerial targets • Fusion and analysis of intelligence information • Exchange of information and cooperation • Target identification, dissemination and reporting • Inspection of vessels and their cargo • Control the traffic of vessels, cargo, passengers and personnel in harbour areas • Investigate and detain intruders, including terrorists, in national maritime spaces • Detect chemical, biological, radiation, nuclear, and ecological threats and effects • Detect information incursion
REQUIRED CAPABILITIES FOR PROTECTION OF MARITIME SOVEREIGNTY • Protect: • Defend and protect forces and areas • Protect sites and critical infrastructure in the coastal area • Detect and destroy mines • Detect and seize illegal fishing gear • Protect databases and computer networks
REQUIRED CAPABILITIES FOR PROTECTION OF MARITIME SOVEREIGNTY • Respond: • Track detected surface and subsurface vessels and aircraft • Destroy surface and subsurface vessels and aircraft • Set defensive mine barrages • React to a terrorist attack against a vessel and a harbour facility • Rescue hostages • Search and rescue at sea • Fight fires at sea • Evacuate and provide pre-hospital care
REQUIRED CAPABILITIES FOR PROTECTION OF MARITIME SOVEREIGNTY • Recover: • Limit a pollution source/spill • Decontamination of sea areas • Assist a ship/aircraft in emergency • Provide humanitarian assistance
NEXT STEPS • to suggest distribution of the capabilities among security sector organizations taking into account their traditions, experience, and current roles, with a focus on cost effectiveness. • to assess the risk.
CONCLUSIONS • The problem with the lack of interagency cooperation is very serious and it must be made central for the maritime policy of the country. • The wide array of tasks related to the protection of maritime sovereignty requires that that the activities should be systematized and specified. • The defining of the maritime sovereignty protection capabilities must be based on the particular tasks carried out within the particular scenarios. • The suggested distribution of the capabilities reflects their current state in the maritime institutions. • The main purpose of risk assessment is to evaluate the extent to which the planned capabilities will be adequate to the possible future requirements for the maritime institutions.