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When the policy commitment has transnational boundaries there is a role for international coordination: International

OBJECTIVE: TO INDIVIDUATE INDICATORS IN ORDER TO MONITOR A POLICY OR A SET OF POLICIES OVER TIME AND ACCROSS SPACE (i.e. COUNTRIES COMPARISONS). When the policy commitment has transnational boundaries there is a role for international coordination:

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When the policy commitment has transnational boundaries there is a role for international coordination: International

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  1. OBJECTIVE: TO INDIVIDUATE INDICATORS IN ORDER TO MONITOR A POLICY OR A SET OF POLICIES OVER TIME AND ACCROSS SPACE (i.e. COUNTRIES COMPARISONS) When the policy commitment has transnational boundaries there is a role for international coordination: International organizations/ agencies (FAO, OCSE) Conventions (climate, biodiversity, desertification) or international agreements (WTO)

  2. IN ORDER TO CONSTRUCT INDICATORS AT INTERNATIONAL LEVEL WE NEED: • AGREEMENT ON THE METHODOLOGY • COLLECTION OF DATA AT COUNTRY LEVEL: • BUDGETARY EFFORT • ORGANIZATIVE EFFORT

  3. OECD THROUGH PSE’S ESTIMATION HAS A LONG HISTORY ON PROVIDING INDICATORS FOR MONITORING DOMESTIC AGRICULTURAL POLICIES OF ITS MEMBER STATES WITH THE FOLLOWING OBJECTIVES: • monitor the reform of domestic policies (trade concerns) • improve domestic policy targeting FAO, WB, IFPRI AND OECD HAVE ESTABILISHED A CONSORTIUM TO CO-ORDINATE AND UNDERTAKE AGRICULTURAL POLICY ANALYSIS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

  4. MAIN SHORTCOMINGS OF PSE’S COME FROM: • MIS-USE OF THE INDICATOR • USE OF WORLD PRICES AS REFERENCE PRICES • DIFFICULTIES IN TAKING INTO ACCOUNT NON PRICE POLICIES • PROBLEMS ARISING FROM USING CENTRAL BUDGET OUTLAYS

  5. MAIN SHORTCOMINGS OF PSE’S : MIS-USE OF THE INDICATOR POLICY INDICATORS MUST BE USED AS BUILDING BLOCKS FOR MODEL EVALUATION AND NOT AS AN END IN THEMSELVES PSE HAS BEEN USED FOR THE QUANTITATIVE ESTIMATION OF POLICY IMPACT (TRADE DISTORSION) AND NOT ONLY AS QUANTITATIVEDESCRIPTION OF POLICIES

  6. MAIN SHORTCOMINGS OF PSE’S COME FROM: USE OF WORLD PRICES AS REFERENCE PRICES ARE ACTUAL WORLD PRICES THE APPROPRIATE BENCHMARKS OR ARE THEY DISTORTED?

  7. MAIN SHORTCOMINGS OF PSE’S COME FROM: DIFFICULTIES IN TAKING INTO ACCOUNT NON PRICE POLICIES PUBLIC GOODS IN ABSENCE OF A REFERENCE PRICE SUPPORT AS FOREGONE INCOME BY THE GOVERNMENT (FISCAL POLICY) GREEN BOX POLICIES (RURAL DEVELOPMENT; AGROENVIRONMENT)

  8. MAIN SHORTCOMINGS OF PSE’S COME FROM: PROBLEMS ARISING FROM USING CENTRAL BUDGET OUTLAYS USE OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET DOES NOT INCLUDE OTHER OUTLAYS (REGIONAL EXPENDITURE, COUNTRIES WITH FEDERAL SYSTEM) USE OF BUDGETED VS ACTUAL OUTLAYS

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