Developing a State-level Approach

Developing a State-level Approach International Safeguards Policy and Information Analysis Course • Monterey, California, 4-8 June 2012 • Celia Reynolds and George Anzelon

Safeguards implementation under the State level concept (As depicted in recent IAEA presentations to Member State safeguards support programs)

Outline • Acquisition path analysis • Coverage considerations • Formulating safeguards technical objectives • Identifying and selecting applicable safeguards measures • Working through a concrete example

What are acquisition paths? • Routes by which the State could, from a technical point of view, obtain weapon-usable nuclear material outside safeguards control, whether through diversion of declared material, misuse of declared facilities, construction and operation of undeclared facilities, or combinations of these strategies

Plausible acquisition paths • In principle, any State could pursue any acquisition path • Resource constraints make it impractical for the IAEA to assess all possible acquisition paths for all States • Thus, the IAEA focuses on identifying and assessing the…. • Plausibilityofacquisition paths for any given State • Plausibility ≈ How well equipped a State is to a pursue a particular path given its technical capabilities in the nuclear fuel cycle and related technologies Very plausible Not very plausible

Unpacking the assessment of acquisition path plausibility further… • Evaluating a State’s technical capabilities is not limited only to its declared nuclear program • It also takes into account: • A State’s professed future plans for its nuclear program • A State’s latent ability to develop and deploy nuclear capabilities that it is not known to possess currently. This is based on assessments of: • A State’s knowledge base and experience • A State’s ability to acquire necessary equipment through trade or indigenous manufacturing

Covering acquisition paths

Dynamics of acquisition path coverage Priority for coverage Means of coverage Measures to detect/deter diversion of declared NM Assessed technical capability to execute the path Measures to detect/deter misuse of declared facilities Uncertainties, information gaps Maintain and refine a consistent model of State’s nuclear program Indications of pathway use; inconsistencies IAEA measures to detect indications of undeclared activities Shortness of time to complete path IAEA response to credible third-party leads

Formulating safeguards technical objectives • For each plausible path, identify what must be detected to achieve use of the path • Paths may be able to be covered at multiple points along the path • Some path segments may be common to several important pathways, increasing the overall safeguards value of detecting or deterring their use • May not be necessary to cover every step • Maintain meaningful detection probabilities for credible diversion paths • One overarching objective, not specific to any one path, is to maintain a model of the State’s nuclear-related activities and investigate inconsistencies in all available information

Safeguards technical objectives should be described in specific terms • Identify in detail what has to be verified, looked for, monitored or investigated, and if possible where • Where applicable, outline performance measures for meeting the objectives • Especially for undeclared activities, what are the analogues to timeliness and quantity goals – even “ballpark” performance measures can help assess the viability of various candidate measures

Identifying applicable safeguards measures • What are the indicators and signatures of what you want to verify, monitor, looked for, or investigate? • What safeguards tools are available, under what safeguards legal authority? • Try to identify flexible options for meeting objectives • Try to estimate the likely effectiveness of measures in accomplishing the objectives

Safeguards measures should be assessed for their estimated effectiveness • For detection of diversion and misuse, applicable measures and their effectiveness as a function of intensity are reasonably understood and tractable • By contrast, for objectives related to detection of undeclared nuclear activities and facilities, the relationship between safeguards measures and their detection effectiveness is more uncertain • For undeclared activities at sites and other declared locations, or cued by specific actionable leads, the value of IAEA in-field activities can be high • For detecting undeclared activities at unknown locations, realistically affordable IAEA efforts might not be able to increase State’s detection risk meaningfully beyond the already-extant risk of detection by third-parties

Concrete Example: Developing a State-level Safeguards Approach for Brazil* * This is example is for illustrative purposes only to demonstrate how one might work through the IAEA’s specified steps for developing a SLA. Thus,, it does not presume to suggest what the IAEA’s safeguards approach for Brazil would look like under the SLC.

Establishing Knowledge about Brazil (1): Its Nuclear Fuel Cycle at a Glance Exports U3O8 for conversion to NUF6 • Angra 1 and Angra 2 PWR NPPs • 657 MW and 1350 MW generating capacity respectively • Angra 3 is under construction; similar specs as Angra 2 • Resende Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant • Produces LEUF6 up to ~ 3.5% U235 • ~ 120 MTSWU/yr capacity • Resende Fuel Fabrication Plant • Converts LEUF6 to LEUO2 powder & produces LEUO2 fuel elements • ~ 240 t HM/yr capacity • Caetité Mine • & Mill • Produces U3O8 • ~ 400 MT/yr capacity This flow diagram depicts elements of Brazil’s nuclear fuel cycle that are dedicated to producing the fuel for its nuclear power plants (NPPs)

Establishing Knowledge about Brazil (2): Its Nuclear Fuel Cycle at a Glance Production facilities at the Aramar Research Center in Ipero (owned and operated by the Brazilian Navy) Imported NUF6 • BRTG fuel fabrication laboratory • Assembles LEUO2 fuel elements for the IPEN-MB01 Research Reactor • Gas centrifuge enrichment pilot plant • Produces LEUF6 up to 5% U235 • ~ 4 MTSWU/yr capacity • Gas centrifuge enrichment laboratory • Produces LEUF6 up to 19.9% U235 • ~ 5 MTSWU/year • BRQ fuel fabrication laboratory • Converts LEUF6 to LEUO2 pellets • 2.55 tHM/yr capacity • BRW conversion pilot plant under construction • Produces NUF6 • ~ 40 MTU/yr capacity • Fuel fabrication pilot plant at IPEN in Sao Paulo • Produces U-silicide plate type fuel elements for research reactors • Converts imported LEUF6 to U3Si2 powder • U-AVLIS laboratory at the Advanced Studies Institute • Part of the Air Force’s Aerospace Technology Center • Technology still in the development stage • CELESTE-1 reprocessing laboratory at IPEN in Sao Paulo • No longer operating • Awaiting decommissioning PIE hot cells at the Navy Technology Center in Sao Paulo Research facilities dispersed across multiple locations Depicts major elements of Brazil’s nuclear fuel cycle that are dedicated to research and development (research reactors not shown separately)

Establishing knowledge about Brazil (3) Information about Brazil that might help us identify technically plausible paths for it: • It has a declared nuclear program with the necessary knowledge, experience, and manufacturing capabilities to indigenously produce HEU from uranium ore, if it so desired. • It currently operates declared facilities for all necessary elements of an HEU acquisition path, with the exception of UF6 production. • It has a naval nuclear program that includes navy-operated enrichment facilities and a prototype reactor for nuclear propulsion that are under IAEA safeguards. • Has some additional military-managed nuclear research beyond the naval nuclear program—research to date has not involved nuclear material • It had a past reprocessing research program, including a shutdown and soon-to-be decommissioned reprocessing laboratory that remains under Agency safeguards. It has stocks of spent fuel that it could reprocess to separate plutonium. • It has large reserves of readily accessible uranium ore.

Identifying plausible acquisition paths for Brazil (1) • Brazil has a large number of plausible acquisition paths available to it • Breaking them into groups that share a common characteristic or two may help facilitate analysis across many paths

Identifying plausible acquisition paths for Brazil (2) • Plausible acquisition paths could be grouped into distinct families where Brazil: • Acquires HEU through indigenous gas centrifuge enrichment • Acquires HEU through U-AVLIS enrichment • Acquires Pu by diverting declared spent fuel for subsequent undeclared reprocessing • Acquires Pu by irradiating undeclared targets in a misused declared reactor • Acquires Pu by irradiating undeclared targets in an undeclared reactor

HEU paths involving gas centrifuge enrichment Activities involving pre-34(c) material that do not have to be reported in the absence of an Additional Protocol Diversion of declared materials or misuse of declared facilities Fuel fab UF6UO2 for LWR NPP GC enrichment Purifi- cation Conv to U Ox Conv to UF6 Overt UOC production LWR NPP Weaponization, including any necessary conversion Undec GC enrichment Covert UOC production Undeclared purification & conversion to UF6 Noncompliant undeclared activities • Multiple paths are depicted at once, but not even all of the plausible acquisition paths involving gas centrifuge enrichment that Brazil could pursue, in principle, are depicted here. • For simplicity, this diagram does not depict paths that: • Begin with the diversion of declared nuclear material that was imported • Begin with importing undeclared nuclear material, including direct use unirradiated material • Involve diversion of nuclear material from its laboratory or pilot plant scale fuel fabrication facilities at the Aramar Research Center or IPEN • Involve the misuse of the fuel fabrication pilot plant at IPEN to convert any HEUF6 it produces to HEU-metal • Involve the introduction of undeclared UF6 produced at a clandestine facility into Brazil’s declared enrichment facilities

Disaggregating paths involving gas centrifuge enrichment Diversion of declared materials or misuse of declared facilities Fuel fab UF6UO2 for LWR NPP GC enrichment Purifi- cation Conv to U Ox Conv to UF6 Overt UOC production LWR NPP Weaponization, including any necessary conversion Undec GC enrichment Undeclared purification & conversion to UF6 Covert UOC production Activities involving pre-34(c) material that do not have to be reported in the absence of an Additional Protocol Noncompliant undeclared activities Example 1:Paths that allow Brazil to circumvent all IAEA safeguards that would be implemented on declared nuclear material and at declared facilities

Disaggregating paths involving gas centrifuge enrichment Diversion of declared materials or misuse of declared facilities Overt UOC production GC enrichment Purifi- cation Conv to U Ox Conv to UF6 HEUF6 LEUF6 Weaponization, including any necessary conversion LEUF6 HEUF6 Undec GC enrichment Activities involving pre-34(c) material that do not have to be reported in the absence of an Additional Protocol Noncompliant undeclared activities Example 2: Paths that begin with the diversion of UF6. They involve either diversion of declared LEUF6 to an undeclared gas centrifuge facility for further enrichment or the undeclared production of HEUF6 in a declared facility whose design specifications indicate it only produces LEUF6.

Assessing acquisition path plausibility Use HEU paths involving gas centrifuge enrichment as an example Consider the following: • Brazil can design, construct, and operate a gas centrifuge facility • Has done so at multiple scales of production • This is not a new technology that Brazil is still trying to master • It can also manufacture gas centrifuges indigenously • Technical barrier to producing HEU via gas centrifuge enrichment is probably relatively low • Would likely require some experimentation with different cascade arrangements to determine how to scale up from producing LEUF6 with an enrichment level of up to 20% 235U to HEU Assessed technical capability to execute the path Uncertainties, information gaps Indications of pathway use; inconsistencies Shortness of time to complete path

Assessing acquisition path plausibility Use HEU paths involving gas centrifuge enrichment as an example Consider the following: • What is Brazil’s scale of production for manufacturing gas centrifuges? • Can Brazil also manufacture the necessary components for its gas centrifuges? • Does it have to import key material from abroad? • If so, who is/are Brazil’s supplier(s)? • If not, where does this material production occur? • Does it outsource any of its component manufacturing? • If it has to acquire necessary materials or components through trade, is Brazil actively trying to develop an indigenous capability to overcome this vulnerability in its supply chain or does it seem content to rely on the international market? Assessed technical capability to execute the path Uncertainties, information gaps Indications of pathway use; inconsistencies Shortness of time to complete path

Assessing acquisition path plausibility Use HEU paths involving gas centrifuge enrichment as an example Consider the following: Assessed technical capability to execute the path • Information about Brazil’s R&D efforts in topics related to gas centrifuge enrichment technology loses some of its potential as an indicator of pathway use since this technology is part of Brazil’s declared nuclear program • Potential inconsistencies that might be meaningful: • A significant mismatch between Brazil’s centrifuge manufacturing capacity and the production scale of its current GCEPs (including any planned expansions) Uncertainties, information gaps Indications of pathway use; inconsistencies Shortness of time to complete path

Assessing acquisition path plausibility Use HEU paths involving gas centrifuge enrichment as an example Consider the following: Assessed technical capability to execute the path Uncertainties, information gaps • Can vary significantly from path to path • Example: The time it would take to produce a significant quantity of HEU by misusing the Resende GCEP would be shorter than the time it would take to do so in an undeclared GCEP. The Indications of pathway use; inconsistencies Shortness to time to complete path

Formulating technical objectives for a single path (1) Diversion of declared materials or misuse of declared facilities Fuel fab UF6UO2 for LWR NPP GC enrichment Purifi- cation Conv to U Ox Conv to UF6 Overt UOC production LWR NPP Weaponization, including any necessary conversion Undec GC enrichment Undeclared purification & conversion to UF6 Covert UOC production Activities involving pre-34(c) material that do not have to be reported in the absence of an Additional Protocol Noncompliant undeclared activities Example: A path where Brazil would draw from its established uranium mining and milling installations to feed a set of entirely clandestine nuclear facilities to produce HEU Steps Brazil would take to fulfill the highlighted path: Divert uranium ore or ore concentrate (UOC) from the Catetité mine and co-located concentration plant Design, construct, equip, and operate an undeclared conversion facility with process lines dedicated to converting UOC to NUF6 Design, construct, equip, and operate an undeclared gas centrifuge enrichment facility with a cascade configuration that enriches NUF6 up to levels suitable for weaponization (enrichment level of ~90% 235U) Convert HEUF6 to highly enriched uranium metal that is suitable for weaponization NOTE: Any of these steps could be disaggregated further.

Formulating safeguards technical objectives for a single path (2) Corresponding to step 2 from previous slide What: Detect the design, construction, equipping, and operation of an undeclared UOC to UF6 conversion facility Notional quantity & timeliness goals: A facility capable of producing on the order of 10 tons of natural uranium as UF6 would be sufficient for producing 1 SQ of weapons-grade material in a year Corresponding to step 1 from previous slide What: Detect the removal of uranium ore or UOC from the Caetité uranium mining and milling installation Notional quantity and timeliness goals: ~10 metric tons within a year; this is ~0.01% of Caetité’s uranium reserves and ~2.5% of its annual UOC production capacity Corresponding to step 4 from previous slide What: Detect the conversion of HEUF6 to HEU-metal that is suitable for weaponization Notional quantity and timeliness goals: Less relevant at this point since the game is basically up once Brazil has acquired HEUF6? Corresponding to step 3 from previous slide What: Detect the design, construction, equipping, and operation of an undeclared GCEP configured to enrich NUF6 to levels suitable for weaponization Notional quantity and timeliness goals: A GCEP with a ~5000 SWU/year capacity would be sufficient to produce 1 SQ of weapons-grade material in a year

Identifying applicable safeguards measures Diversion of declared materials or misuse of declared facilities Fuel fab UF6UO2 for LWR NPP GC enrichment Purifi- cation Conv to U Ox Conv to UF6 Overt UOC production LWR NPP Weaponization, including any necessary conversion Undec GC enrichment Covert UOC production Undeclared purification & conversion to UF6 Activities involving pre-34(c) material that do not have to be reported in the absence of an Additional Protocol Noncompliant undeclared activities Example: Enrichment in an undeclared gas centrifuge enrichment facility is a critical node for many paths within this family, thus it warrants careful consideration by the IAEA when it comes to identifying applicable safeguards measures and allocating resources across paths within Brazil.

Identifying applicable safeguards measures for… Detecting the design, construction, equipping and operation of an undeclared gas centrifuge enrichment plant • Environmental sampling • Where to sample? • Under what authority? • Satellite imagery analysis • Where to look? • Information analysis • What to look for? • What sort of approach—trolling or directed to follow up on cues?

Returning to knowledge about Brazil Information that might influence how the IAEA decides to cover plausible acquisition paths: • It only has a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement in force, has not signed the Additional Protocol, and shows no indications of doing so in the near future • IAEA does not have complementary access rights, but it can still request access to any place or information that it deems necessary for fulfilling is verification duties • It is a member of a Regional System of Accounting and Control of nuclear material (RSAC)—the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Material (ABACC)

Developing a State-level Approach