Security Games with Limited Surveillance

1. Security Gameswith Limited Surveillance Professor MilindTambe Dr. Bo An Dr. James Pita GauravMogre Jacob Kalakal Joseph Software MultiagentSystems CSCI 543 (Spring 2012) | Project Proposal | Mar 07, 2012

2. Motivation • Adversary has perfect knowledge of defender strategy – well, not really • Cost of surveillance • Risk of getting busted • Delay in attack • Reality – Attacker works on partial knowledge • Defender’s expected utility can improve by modeling the attacker’s limited knowledge CSCI543-Mogre, Joseph

3. SGLS model • Defender • Attacker’s prior beliefs about defender strategy • Number of observations attacker makes • Not aware of when the observations are made • Attacker • Beliefs based on surveillance • Larger the number of observations closer the attacker’s belief to true defender strategy but lower the utility due to higher cost CSCI543-Mogre, Joseph

4. Analysis • Optimal Defender Strategy • How to compute attacker’s number of observations CSCI543-Mogre, Joseph

5. Comparison against other algorithms • Create game with limited observer data • Compare simulation results between: • SGLS • COBRA • QRE CSCI543-Mogre, Joseph

6. Experiments Implement SGLS in a game format and host it on Amazon Mechanical Turk Compare the results against those obtained by simulation CSCI543-Mogre, Joseph