ARGUMENTATION

1. ARGUMENTATION Hello Itchy, are you going to observe Grice’s Principle of Cooperation today? SUCKER I SAW THAT Only if you observe the Principle of Charity

2. Argumentation requires at least two people One of these people is arguing for some position about which there is some dispute or controversy This is sometimes called the standpoint. She gives reasons in favour of her standpoint. The respondent may argue against the standpoint, perhaps by offering reasons of his own. Or he may direct critical questions at her reasoning to reveal its flaws. In the argumentation scheme from position to know, some persons(s) is in a priveleged position to ascertain some fact. This could be something quite trivial, like whether it is raining. The argumentation scheme from expert opinion can be seen as a special case. The expert is expected to know the facts in the domain of their expertise. If some alleged fact is not known by the expert, it is reasonable to conclude that it is not a fact. An arguer may deliberately leave premises unexpressed. Sometimes this is the right thing to do, since an audience may become suspicious if the arguer argues for what they already accept. But sometimes the arguer might hope that the audience, who are probably adopting a Principle of Charity, will fill in the premises in the way that they personally find the most convincing. Although Walton uses this terminology also, he suggests that this is a misunderstanding of what Aristotle meant when he introduced the term. Instead, the enthymeme properly should be identified with what he calls presumptive arguments, e.g. Birds fly, Tweety is a bird, therefore Tweety flies. Such arguments are defeasible because Tweety could be a penguin and penguins cannot fly. Similar are the argumentation schemes from popular opinion and from popular practice. These can be summed in the reasons “Everybody thinks so!” and “Everybody else is doing it!” respectively. Used incorrectly it is called the ad populum fallacy. It is used correctly when we are justified in thinking that people are in a strong position to know, just as in the expert case. To be truly analagous, the analogue must consist of the same number of features interrelated in the same way as in the original domain. • Critical questions to be asked are: • How credible is E as an expert witness? • Is E an expert in the field that A is in? • What did E assert that implies A? • Is E personally reliable as a source? • Is A consistent with what other experts assert? • Is E’s assertion based on evidence? This can be a strong argument because the argument can be made to look like one that is widely accepted, even by the respondent. The respondent will try to deny that the cases are really analagous. When used improperly, this is called thead verecundiam fallacy. However, not all appeals to authority are fallacious. There are situations where, if some fact were true, some person(s) can reasonably be expected to know that it is true. This should cause the defender of the standpoint to clarify her reasoning. Clarification could be: ARGUMENT FROM ANALOGY ARGUMENT FROM CORRELATION TO CAUSE APPEAL TO AUTHORITY When they are made aware of a contradiction, they are obliged to resolve it by revoking one of their commitments. i) Adding new reasons that are independent of the ones before. This is convergent argumentation. When someone makes a statement, they commit themselves to a certain set of statements. They can usually do this by making an exception to a general rule they were committed to. The arguer argues that if the course of action she is recommending is not followed, then either it will have have a bad result, or it will have a result that will itself lead to a bad result (the slippery slope argument) AD HOMINEM ARGUMENTS Any conclusion drawn from a correlation is presumptive because the correlation may be accidental. It could also be due to a common cause, but then it is not necessarily a bad argument, but an argument from sign. Used incorrectly this is the fallacy known as post hoc ergo propter hoc, or that after this, therefore that because of this. ARGUMENTATION SCHEMES We see that which critical questions are relevant depends on the argumentation scheme. This seems like a helpful formal constraint on a Principle of Charity, so that agreement can be reached on what the argument in question actually is. Presumptive arguments are, he claims, distinct from deductive or inductive arguments. “Birds fly” is intended to be a different premise from “All birds fly” or “Most birds fly”, As a whole, the argument is meant to be more like a practical syllogism than a logical syllogism. ARGUMENT FROM SIGN ii) Filling in unexpressed premises iii) Using an argumentation scheme. The respondent can question the basis on which the classification is made, on whether it is merely stipulated or biased (e.g. persuasive definitions), or just vague. Individual Premise: a has property F Classification Premise: For all x, if x had property F, then x can be classified as having property G. Conclusion: a has property G. A sign is something that indicates when something else is true, e.g a footprint is a sign that someone has stood there. iv) Separating into two concepts what was previously just one. ARGUMENT FROM COMMITMENT ARGUMENT FROM CONSEQUENCES This is called the PRINCIPLE OF DISSOCIATION The answers to those questions should be in the premises. So, once you know the argumentation scheme, you know how to fill in the unexpressed premises. These are traditionally called enthymemes. ARGUMENT FROM VERBAL CLASSIFICATION This is called the PRINCIPLE OF ASSOCIATION v) Combining into one concept what was previously two.

3. ARGUMENTATION STRUCTURES There are more ways than one to argue for a standpoint The arguer has to judge from the audience what needs to be said explicitly and what should be taken for granted, what can be left unexpressed. Redundant argumentation is not merely time-consuming but could actually be seen as suspicious by the audience, with a corresponding fall in the persuasiveness of the argument. Lawyers have to very careful what arguments they use and when they use them. By arguing against an objection, you might suggest that it has more importance than it really has. Normally, the main arguments are presented at the beginning and repeated again at the end. Additional support is put in the middle. This support is weaker (at least for the audience in question) but independent of the main points. A B A and B give different support to C. If the respondent manages to rebut A, then the arguer can still appeal to B. In the sense that the respondent must rebut two argumentations instead of one, this structure is stronger. But if A is conclusive on its own, then adding B seems like a confession that it is not conclusive. In some sense, the more argumentatations you add, the less persuasive force each one has. C The argumentation-structure looks like this. This argumentation-structure is called convergent.

4. ARGUMENTATION STRUCTURES There are more ways than one to argue for a standpoint A B Usually more than one rule will need to be applied, so the premises only support a subconclusion, which together with the premises supports the standpoint. For instance… Deductive argumentation is linked, since the premises A and B only support the conclusion C when combined according to a rule of inference. C The pragma-dialectical view sees linked and convergent structures as forms of complex argumentation that can be analysed into single argumentations; these are interrelated differently when the premises are interdependent. Some philosophers consider all linked structures to be deductive argumentation, but others like Thomas, and Pinto and Blair, allow inductive argumentation. D This argumentation-structure is called linked or subordinative. This argumentation-structure is called serial.

5. ARGUMENTATION STRUCTURES This is not the only way to diagram argumentation. Below we have a diagram illustrating the Toulmin model. One interesting thing to note is that the rebuttal does entail rejection of the claim, but only a qualification of it. Another is the distinction between warrant and backing. The warrant says simply “From this data, you can infer that”. The backing is the grounds of the warrant, the reason for accepting it. This could be more observational data, or it could be something like a legal statute.

6. fallacies dialectics The traditional view of fallacies was that they looked like valid arguments, but were not. Barth and Krabbe took Hamblin’s lead and created a formal model of argumentation. However, many fallacies, e.g., petitio principii, are valid arguments according to classical logic. Influenced by the dialectics of Barth and Krabbe and the critical rationalism of Popper, the pragma-dialecticians consider the ability to handle fallacies to be a crucial test of their theory. Others are not arguments at all, e.g., the fallacy of many questions. Their approach is characterized by the idea that certain rules have to be obeyed for a discourse to aim at the rational resolution of disagreement. In 1970, Charles Hamblin wrote a book “Fallacies” that highlighted the inadequacy of classical logic to deal with the fallacies. His work is widely considered to be devastating. Some have considered that logic books and teaching logic should exclude fallacies altogether. Hamblin’s own approach, though, still seems to be essentially logical, although not truth-valued logic. Fallacies were better understood dialogically as something like illegal moves in a game. This led to things like formal dialectics. Such rules had already been suggested by philosophers such as H.P. Grice and Jurgen Habermas. Fallacies are violations of these rules. When arguers argue fallaciously, they are no longer pursuing a rational resolution of disagreement, but any resolution in which they win. Van Eemeren calls this “strategic maneuvering” Habermas also stresses that language should be used communicatively and not strategically.

7. PRAGMA-DIALECTICS AND FALLACIES Van Eemeren is a critical rationalist. Disputes are to be resolved by rational argumentation, and both protagonist and antagonist must be committed to this kind of resolution. In the meta-level dispute between pragma-dialectics and other theories of argumentation, the crucial experiment is the handling of the fallacies. Knowledge increases by making bold conjectures and then testing them Every standpoint is open to criticial discussion Standpoints are best when they advertise the means of their falsification

8. PRAGMA-DIALECTICS AND FALLACIES There are 10 rules for critical discussion and fallacies. If the protagonist or antagonist break these rules then they are no longer committed to resolving the dispute rationally, but are engaging in strategic maneuvering. This is reminiscent of Habermas’ distinction between communicative and strategic action, and his rules of discourse. • Freedom rule • Burden-of-proof rule • Standpoint rule • Relevance rule • Unexpressed premise rule • Starting point rule • Argument scheme rule • Validity rule • Closure rule • Usage rule

9. Freedom rule • Parties must not prevent each other from putting forward standpoints or casting doubt on standpoints • Violations of rule 1 by the protagonist or the antagonist at the confrontation stage • Placing limits on standpoints or doubts • Fallacy of declaring standpoints sacrosanct • Fallacy of declaring standpoints taboo • Restricting the other party’s freedom of action • Putting the other party under pressure • Fallacy of the stick • Fallacy of appeal to pity • Attacking the other party’s person • Fallacy of depicting the other party as stupid, bad, unreliable, etc. • Fallacy of casting suspicion on the other party’s motives • Fallacy of pointing out a contradiction in the other party’s words or deeds

10. Burden-of-proof rule • A party who puts forward a standpoint is obliged to defend it if asked to do so • Violations of rule 2 by the protagonist at the opening stage • Charging the burden of proof to the other party • In a non-mixed difference of opinion, instead of defending his or her own standpoint the protagonist forces the antagonist to show that the protagonist’s standpoint is wrong • Fallacy of shifting the burden of proof • In a mixed difference of opinion the one party does not attempt to defend his or her standpoint but forces the other party to defend their standpoint • Fallacy of shifting the burden of proof • Escaping from the burden of proof • Presenting the standpoint as self-evident • Fallacy of evading the burden of proof • Giving a personal guarantee of the rightness of the standpoint • Fallacy of evading the burden of proof • Immunizing the standpoint against criticism • Fallacy of evading the burden of proof

11. Standpoint rule • A party’s attack on a standpoint must relate to the standpoint that has indeed been advanced by the other party • Violations of rule 3 by the protagonist or the antagonist at all the discussion stages • Attributing a fictitious standpoint to the other party • Emphatically putting forward the opposite standpoint • Fallacy of the straw man • Referring to the views of the group to which the opponent belongs • Fallacy of the straw man • Creating a fictitious opponent • Fallacy of the straw man • Misrepresenting the other party’s standpoint • Taking utterances out of context • Fallacy of the straw man • Oversimplifying or exaggerating • Fallacy of the straw man

12. Relevance rule • A party may defend his or her standpoint only by advancing argumentation relating to that standpoint • Violations of rule 4 by the protagonist at the argumentation stage • The argumentation has no relation to the standpoint under discussion • Fallacy of irrelevant argumentation • The standpoint is defended by means other than argumentation • Non-argumentation • Fallacy of playing on the sentiments of the audience (pathetic fallacy) • Fallacy of parading one’s own qualities (ethical fallacy)

13. Unexpressed premise rule • A party may not falsely present something as a premise that has been left unexpressed by the other party or deny a premise that he or she has left implicit • Violations of rule 5 by the protagonist or the antagonist at the argumentation stage • Adding an unexpressed premise that goes beyond what is warranted • Fallacy of magnifying an unexpressed premise • Refusing to accept commitment to an unexpressed premise implied by one’s own defence • Fallacy of denying an unexpressed premise

14. Starting point rule • No party must falsely present a premise as an accepted starting point, or deny a premise representing an accepted starting point • Violations of rule 6 by the protagonist or the antagonist at the argumentation stage • Meddling with the starting points by the protagonist by falsely denying that something is an accepted starting point • Fallacy of falsely denying an accepted starting point • Meddling with the starting points by the antagonist by falsely presenting something as an accepted starting point. • Fallacy of making unfair use of propositions in making assertions • Fallacy of making unfair use of presuppositions in asking questions • Fallacy of using an argument that amounts to the same thing as the standpoint

15. Argument scheme rule • A standpoint may not be regarded as conclusively defended if the defence does not take place by means of an appropriate argument scheme that is correctly applied • Violations of rule 7 by the protagonist at the argumentation stage • Using an inappropriate argument scheme • Populist fallacy • Fallacy of confusing facts with value judgments • Incorrectly applying an argument scheme • Fallacy of authority • Fallacy of hasty generalization • Fallacy of false analogy • Fallacy of post hoc ergo propter hoc • Fallacy of the slippery slope

16. Validity rule • The reasoning in the argumentation must be logically valid or must be capable of being made valid by making explicit one or more unexpressed premises • Violations of rule 8 by the protagonist at the argumentation stage • Reasoning that treats a sufficient condition as a necessary condition • Fallacy of denying the antecedent • Fallacy of affirming the consequent • Reasoning that confuses the properties of parts and wholes • Fallacy of division • Fallacy of composition

17. Closure rule • A failed defence of a standpoint must result in the protagonist retracting the standpoint, and a successful defence of the standpoint must result in the antagonist retracting his or her doubts • Violations of rule 9 by the protagonist or the antagonist at the concluding stage • Meddling with the conclusion by the protagonist • Fallacy of refusing to retract a standpoint that has not been successfully defended • Fallacy of concluding that a standpoint is true because it has been defended successfully • Meddling with the conclusion of the antagonist • Fallacy of refusing to retract criticism of a standpoint that has been successfully defended • Fallacy of concluding that a standpoint is true because the opposite has not been successfully defended

18. Usage rule • Parties must not use any formulations that are insufficiently clear or confusingly ambiguous, and they must interpret the formulations of the other party as carefully and accurately as possible.

19. Circular arguments “begging the question” and Van Eemeren Hahn et.al YES Hahn et al. say “the notion that a poor argument is pragmatically ‘question begging’ precisely labels the limitations of such arguments, highlighting the consequences of their use in dialog . . . [it] fails to explain why poor arguments are poor in the first place. . . . The arguer too, presumably fails only because his or her argument is poor Hahn et al. explain the fallacy using Bayesian probability: the posterior probability of a conclusion is the same as the prior probability of a conclusion, or to put it another way, being provided with a circular argument for a conclusion does not change how convinced of that conclusion a thinker would be. Are these the same thing? Although Walton seems to say that circular arguments are not always invalid, any error in the arguer is always trasmitted to the argument. NO “Begging the question” is a pragmatic error distinct from circular arguments. Walton Truncalito If the arguer is bad, does this mean that the argument is bad ? YES NO

20. They have a number of items in common: • They are both influenced by formal dialectics • They both want a rapprochement between dialectics and rhetoric. • They both see argumentation fundamentally as a dialogue with moves made by “players”. • They both see argumentation schemes as logical tools to regulate the dialogue. • They both use the “speaker-commitment” model, thus avoiding the irritation of having to consider what the speaker may have meant to say • They are both concerned with the fallacies. Conclusion The “pragmatic” approach of Douglas Walton and the “pragma-dialectical” approach of Van Eemeren et al. are the two most worked out, most talked about, and arguably the best theories of argumentation currently out there. Whose is the best, or are they equals? Waltonrefers to fallacies as illegitimate shifts from one dialogue type to another. But it is only by some very creative theorizing that some argumentation (e.g. in advertising where the audience cannot question) can be construed as dialogues at all. Is it really reasonable then to think that we can determine what particular type of dialogue is being engaged in without antecedently identifying the fallacies? Do dialogue shifts explain fallacies, or do fallacies explain dialogue shifts? Is there any sharp boundary between one dialogue type and another? Like Van Eemerens “strategic maneuvering” the addition of dialogue types to the core theory of argumentation schemes poses more questions than it answers. Can we tell just from what somebody says (i.e. their commitments) what type of dialogue they take themselves to be involved in and what their communicative goals are? Couldn’t a speaker pursue more than one communicative goal at once, e.g. to persuade his interlocutor and to reassure himself of his correctness? Whereas Habermas, who sees such rules as constitutive of rationality, can say that violators are simply no longer “arguing”, Van Eemeren has to try to bring in “strategic maneuvering” In such maneuvering the agent is only trying to win, yet we may suppose that he says exactly the same things as he might otherwise, thus his commitments are the same. Van Eemeren identifies the fallacies as violations of rules that regulate specifically rational discussion.

21. Logic is the art of thinking; grammar, the art of inventing symbols and combining them to express thought; and rhetoric, the art of communicating thought from one mind to another, the adaptation of language to circumstance. Another description is: Logic is concerned with the thing as-it-is-known,Grammar is concerned with the thing-as-it-is-symbolized, andRhetoric is concerned with the thing-as-it-is-communicated. Rhetoric came to be separated from dialectic and treated with suspicion, partly because of Plato’s criticisms of the Sophists. Rhetoric seems concerned with persuasion rather than truth. Not only would Sophists argue fallaciously, but they would do so not accidentally but with the express purpose of persuading irrespective of rationality. Civic or political man, loyal to the state Dialectic consists of the canons of logic and is concerned with how you should reason, for which it sets up purely objective and rational standards. By correct reasoning you can reach the truth, and it seems to be further assumed that by communicating that reasoning, another rational being should be equally convinced of the truth. Argumentation is thus viewed by the dialectician is persuading by the best reason and to argue using fallacies is anathema. In medieval universities, the trivium comprised the three subjects taught first: grammar, dialectic, and rhetoric. The word is a Latin term meaning “the three ways” or “the three roads” forming the foundation of a medieval liberal arts education. dialectic rhetoric grammar EDUCATION

22. Walton seems to be the most amenable to rhetoric because he says that not everything normally described as a fallacy represents bad reasoning or incorrect argumentation He endorses value-based argumentation, where one can argue differently to different audiences by taking into account what is important to them, what they value most. I think that the “flexibility”ofWalton’s approach is actually a problem. It is vulnerable to the same kind of criticisms that Popper aimed against psychoanalytic theory of not ruling anything out and explaining too much. Van Eemeren’s theory has the advantage of being obviously wrong, but wrong in ways that are potentially revealing. In particular, I think it shows the inadequacy of the speaker-commitment model. It also assumes too readily that the best argument from a dialectical perspective will also be effective rhetorically; he doesn’t seem to have much to say if “bad” arguments are more effective other than that higher-order conditions are not being met, such conditions presumably meaning that argumentation is no longer taking place at all. This seems to me a fairly empty consolation. Although he talks about different contexts and values, he fails to explain how these are to be modelled using a purely dialectic system that operates with speaker commitments. Any such analysis will necessarily ignore the aspects of performance that are central to rhetoric. Arguing rhetorically is not so much a question of what you say as of how you say it.